LINCOLN CITY LIBRARIES
3 3045 01867 4800

PSQ

Political Science Quarterly

Per

APR 11 1979

PROPERTY OF
LINCOLN CITY LIBRARIES
LINCOLN, NEBRASKA

Published by
The Academy of Political Science

Spring 1979

Daniel Patrick Moynihan — Patterns of Ethnic Succession

Richard W. Steele — Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. — A Comment on "Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics"

Michael Baruch Grossman
Martha Joynt Kumar — The White House and the News Media

Jiri Valenta — Soviet Bureaucratic Politics and Czechoslovakia

Stephen D. Krasner — American Oil Policy toward the Middle East

Alan M. Fisher — Realignment of the Jewish Vote?

Harry Holloway — The Political Machine of the AFL-CIO

Ronald Tercheck — Incentives and Voter Participation

Book Reviews

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

BERNARD BARBER
Barnard College
Columbia University

WALTER DEAN BURNHAM
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.
University of Virginia

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York at Stony Brook

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

LEWIS J. EDINGER
Columbia University

RICHARD R. FAGEN
Stanford University

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

CHARLES V. HAMILTON
Columbia University

HUGH HECLO
Harvard University

ROBERT L. JERVIS
University of California, Los Angeles

JOYCE K. KALLGREN
University of California, Davis

IRA KATZNELSON
University of Chicago

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON
The University of Texas at Austin

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM
Harvard University

ALPHEUS T. MASON
Princeton University

NELSON W. POLSBY
University of California, Berkeley

ROBERT D. REISCHAUER
Congressional Budget Office

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD
Columbia University

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

ROBERTA S. SIGEL
Rutgers University

GEORGE L. SHERRY
United Nations

SUZANNE R. WEAVER
Wall Street Journal

TOM WICKER
The New York Times

M. CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is published by the Academy of Political Science, 619 West 114th Street, Suite 500, New York, New York 10025. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy. Regular membership, $16 a year. Three years, $42. Students, $12 a year. Libraries and institutions, $22 a year. Foreign postage, $2 additional per year. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y., and additional mailing offices. Volume 94 Number 1 Spring 1979.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Managing Editor
DEMETRIOS CARALEY
Barnard College
Columbia University

Assistant Managing Editor
MARY ANN EPSTEIN

Manuscript Editor
RICHARD SNYDER

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study of contemporary and historical aspects of government, politics, and public affairs.

Published continuously since 1886.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 619 West 114th Street, Suite 500, New York, N.Y. 10025. Correspondence about advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to William V. Farr, Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science, 619 West 114th Street, Suite 500, New York, N.Y. 10025.

Correct preparation of manuscripts expedites production and therefore contributors must observe the following requirements: Submit manuscripts in triplicate, all copy double-spaced including main text, quotations, and footnotes. Place tables, graphs, and numbered footnotes on separate pages at end of manuscript. Include an abstract of 100 to 200 words that specifies the article's main theme or conclusions. Authors who want their manuscripts returned must enclose postage.

Articles that appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY before 1953 are indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and since that year in the *Social Sciences Index*. Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, the *International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin* and abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents*, *The International Political Science Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life*. Book reviews are listed in the *Book Review Index* to *Social Science Periodicals*, *Book Review Index*, and *Book Review Digest*. A title page and an index of articles and book reviews for each volume of the QUARTERLY are included in the Winter issue.

Back issues prior to 1976 and reprint editions may be ordered from Kraus Reprint Co., Route 100, Millwood, New York, 10546. Other back issues may be ordered from the Academy. A check payable to the Academy of Political Science should accompany all orders. Single issue, $4.00. Reprints of articles are available from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. One copy, $3.00. Additional copies, $.50 each. Complete issue, $.08 per page.

Copyright © 1979 by The Academy of Political Science. All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Volume 94
Number 1
Spring 1979

Contents

Patterns of Ethnic Succession: Blacks and Hispanics in New York City
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN 1

Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics
RICHARD W. STEELE 15

A Comment on "Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics"
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR. 33

The White House and the News Media: The Phases of Their Relationship
MICHAEL BARUCH GROSSMAN
MARTHA JOYNT KUMAR 37

The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia
JIRI VALENTA 55

A Statist Interpretation of American Oil Policy toward the Middle East
STEPHEN D. KRASNER 77

Realignment of the Jewish Vote?
ALAN M. FISHER 97

Interest Groups in the Postpartisan Era: The Political Machine of the AFL-CIO
HARRY HOLLOWAY 117

Incentives and Voter Participation: A Research Note
RONALD TERCHECK 135

Book Reviews 141

Reference Books and Source Materials Received. 191

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Oliver, The United Nations in Bangladesh — Inis L. Claude, Jr. 141

Hill, The United Nations System: Coordinating its Economic and Social Work — Harold K. Jacobson 142

Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State — Scott D. Sagan 144

Van Cleave and **Cohen**, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: An Examination of the Issues; **Stockholm International Peace Research Institute**, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives — Philip W. Dyer 146

Pechman, ed., Setting National Priorities: The 1979 Budget — Paul Atkinson 147

Wayne, The Legislative Presidency — Dorothy Buckton James 149

Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts — David A. Leuthold 150

Levering, The Public and American Foreign Policy: 1918–1978 — George H. Quester 151

Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State — Michael Roskin 152

Mulder, Woodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation — Arnold A. Rogow 153

Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis — Bernard Barber 155

Domhoff, Who Really Rules? New Haven and Community Power Reexamined — Stephen David 156

Bayor, Neighbors in Conflict: The Irish, Germans, Jews, and Italians of New York City, 1929–1941 — Selma Berrol 158

Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself — Douglas E. Rosenthal 159

Adams and **Mangum**, The Lingering Crisis of Youth Unemployment — Robert Taggart 160

Bryce, ed., Small Cities in Transition: The Dynamics of Growth and Decline — Alvin D. Sokolow 161

Ornstein and **Elder**, Interest Groups, Lobbying and Policymaking — Grant McConnell 163

Wellstone, How the Rural Poor Got Power: Narrative of a Grass-Roots Organizer — Frances Hill 164

Ravitch, The Revisionists Revised: A Critique of the Radical Attack on the Schools — Edward A. Duane 165

Walsh, The Public's Business: The Politics and Practices of Government Corporations — Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr. 166

Ball, Judicial Craftsmanship or Fiat? Direct Overturn by the United States Supreme Court — D. Grier Stephenson, Jr. 168

Eisenstein and **Jacob**, Felony Justice: An Organizational Analysis of Criminal Courts; **Heumann**, Plea Bargaining: The Experiences of Prosecutors, Judges, and Defense Attorneys — David Adamany 169

Seidel, Housing Costs and Government Regulations: Confronting the Regulatory Maze — Michael J. Munson 171

Bupp and **Derian**, Light Water: How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved — Steven J. Baker 173

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Friedlaender, ed., Approaches to Controlling Air Pollution
LAURA M. LAKE 174
Krier and **Ursin**, Pollution and Policy: A Case Essay on California and Federal Experience with Motor Vehicle Air Pollution, 1940–1975
MICHAEL E. KRAFT 176
Breneman and **Finn**, eds., Public Policy and Private Higher Education
ELINOR G. BARBER 177
Pole, The Pursuit of Equality in American History STEPHEN BOTEIN 179
Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process, The Colonial Period DAVID H. FLAHERTY 180
Berg, The Remembered Gate: Origins of American Feminism, the Woman and the City 1800–1860 CATHARINE R. STIMPSON 182
Nelson, Wartime Origins of the Berlin Dilemma JOHN GIMBEL 183
McCagg, Stalin Embattled, 1943–1948 ROBERT WESSON 184
Knei-Paz, The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky
EUGENE VICTOR WOLFENSTEIN 186
Llerena, The Unsuspected Revolution: The Birth and Rise of Castroism
RICHARD R. FAGEN 187
Strack, Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia WILLIAM J. FOLTZ 188
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations
WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN 190

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the Managing Editor:

In this issue . . . .

DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN reviews the gains achieved by blacks and Hispanics in New York City over the past decade and relates those gains to general patterns of ethnic succession.

RICHARD W. STEELE reexamines the actions and attitudes of President Franklin D. Roosevelt toward critics of his foreign policy just before and in the early years of American entry in World War II. According to Steele, Roosevelt viewed what was mere dissent as evidence of subversion and disloyalty. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR. takes issue with Steele's analysis, contending that presidential critics fared much better under the Roosevelt administration than under earlier wartime administrations such as Lincoln's and Woodrow Wilson's.

MICHAEL BARUCH GROSSMAN and MARTHA JOYNT KUMAR explore what they define as phases that have occurred in the relationship between the president and the news media in all administrations since 1960. They suggest that there are three such phases—alliance, competition, and detachment—that have recurred in spite of the major differences in policies and personalities of the incumbents.

JIRI VALENTA applies the bureaucratic politics paradigm to Soviet management of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. His study shows that the paradigm substantially illuminates many aspects of decision making that have not previously received sufficient attention and suggests that focusing on the dynamics of the role played by the bureaucracies can be useful in the analysis of Soviet national security and foreign policy behavior.

STEPHEN D. KRASNER reviews American oil policy toward the Middle East from World War II to the oil crisis. He argues that that policy can only be understood if a theoretical perspective is used that conceives the state as an autonomous actor rather than as a reflector of underlying economic forces or interest group pressures.

ALAN FISHER tests some recent perceptions of party realignment among American Jews by examining different data sources for party affiliation and voting in national and local elections. He finds continued support among Jews for Democrats and a relatively constant difference with the non-Jewish vote for the last thirty years.

HARRY HOLLOWAY argues that the weakening of political parties has been accompanied by the rise of interest group political activity and that the political machine created by the AFL-CIO federation embodies such activity on an unusual scale.

RONALD J. TERCHEK analyzes levels of black voting in Cleveland during the 1960s. He finds that turnouts varied with the saliency of issues, the symbolic importance of ethnicity, and the expected competitiveness in a particular election.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Patterns of Ethnic Succession: Blacks and Hispanics in New York City

DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN

Ethnic succession is one of the pronounced rhythms in the life of New York City. Political scientists will recognize it as a homely variant of Pareto's circulation of elites, and it seems fair to take it as a measure of the vigor of our society and our capacity for self-renewal.

In the late 1950s Nathan Glazer and I, collaborating on a study of the ethnic groups of New York City, saw ethnic succession as a central dynamic of the city's organizational life. At that time, for example, the Irish had dominated the political life of the city for generations; yet just as clearly they were departing that scene, and this was the opening observation in our chapter devoted to them. Indeed, in the aftermath of the municipal elections of 1977 there was (for what a diligent researcher would probably find to be the first time in at least a century) not a single Irish name on the Board of Estimate, the central governing body of the city made up of the mayor, the comptroller, the president of the city council, and the five borough presidents.

Ethnic succession was not, however, the central theme of our study, which had as its more elemental purpose the mere assertion that ethnicity was still a force in the life of New York City (and by extension, the nation) and *was not going away*. The first proposition received grudging assent at the time; at election season the editorials deploring the persistence of the balanced ticket were as predictable as the accompanying admonition to all citizens to make certain to vote. (So much for the influence of editorialists. The balanced ticket cheerfully persists while voting participation steadily declines!) But the thought that

---

DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, a sometime professor of political science, is United States Senator from New York. His books include *Beyond the Melting Pot, Toward a National Urban Policy, Ethnicity,* and, most recently, *A Dangerous Place.* This article is adapted from The 1978 Public Affairs Lecture sponsored by the Graduate Program in Public Affairs and Administration at Columbia University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ethnicity was *not* going away aroused alarm, since it conflicted with the then near universal view that held the ethnic group to be a deplorable, premodern, preindustrial phenomenon soon to disappear. The view was espoused with equal vigor by the two preeminent ideological schools of the period, the Marxists and the reformist liberals. That they agreed on this, as on almost nothing else, gave extra weight to the then conventional wisdom that Glazer and I called into question.

The Marxist view was well known: "Workers of the World Unite!" Among reformist liberals, however, it was more a matter of the unstated assumptions that at this period Milton Gordon described as the "liberal expectation." This was the belief that in the normal course of events superficial traits, such as speech accents and food preferences, would simply fade away, or homogenize, and thereafter only individual characteristics would be visible and significant. (Typically, neither school paid much heed to the persistence of religious belief *and* difference.)[1]

The Ethnic Group: A Focus of Social Mobilization

We called our study, which finally appeared in 1963, *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City.*[2] We stated that far from being preindustrial, ethnic groups were very much a modern phenomenon, and whether one liked it or not, should be expected to persist. The Harvard University Press did not like it one bit, and declined to publish the book. This was rather to the advantage of the M.I.T. Press, which did, and which keeps it in print to this day.

The key to our analysis was the simple statement: "The ethnic groups in New York are also *interest groups*." That the individual members had personal and family ties to one another was obvious enough. But we argued that the group itself established ties to the larger society, and this added greatly to its utility. As Daniel Bell later wrote, "ethnicity can combine interest with an affective tie."[3]

That ethnic groups are interest groups immediately suggests that from time to time, they will either be in conflict (or alliance) with one another, or that one group will overcome a second in one sphere or another, and thereupon what we have come to call ethnic succession will follow.

In 1975 we published a much more ambitious undertaking entitled *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*,[4] the result of a two-year seminar at the American

[1] We were dimly aware at this time of the work of the Viennese Marxist theorist Max Muller who tried to accommodate the reality of ethnicity in Central Europe to Marxist doctrine. Muller's work deserves more attention, but it is more an aberration in the Marxist tradition than a modification of it.

[2] Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963).

[3] See Daniel Bell, "Ethnicity and Social Change," in *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, eds. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 169.

[4] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Academy of Arts and Sciences. By this time the persistence of ethnicity was no longer much in dispute, and aspects of it were rather in favor. (The Harvard University Press published this second work.) But Glazer and I persisted, or so we thought, merely in trying to be descriptive. That ethnicity persisted in New York was by now obvious. "In this city it often seems that ethnic is all," the *New Yorker* City Hall columnist, Andy Logan, wrote in 1978.[5] But we were struck by how much it had come to the fore in the world at large—not just in the United States but everywhere, including, quite graphically, the United Kingdom, a society whose offspring, it had been so recently assumed, would form the model of the postethnic American.

We now essayed a more general theoretical exposition. The ethnic group had plainly become a focus of social mobilization thoughout the world, from preindustrial regions to postindustrial regions. (*A* focus, not *the* focus.) We offered a twofold explanation. First, there was the evolution of the welfare state in the more advanced economies and the advent of the socialist state in the underdeveloped ones. In either circumstance the *state* becomes a crucial and direct arbiter of economic well-being and political status, with all that flows from that. In such circumstances the ethnic group acquires great strategic efficacy both as a way of making claims for benefits derived from the state *and* as a channel by which the state distributes such benefits. This latter point, not much noticed, seemed to us to be an important one. The state finds it helpful for the population to organize itself along ethnic lines; thus it is possible to confer distinct, rather than general, benefits. This, presumably, enables the state to appear to be efficacious. Hence, we hypothesized, as the world becomes more industrial and more collectivist, there will be an enlargement of ethnic claims.

The second part of our explanation, which had to do with the social dynamics that lead to such claims, concerned the fact and the nature of inequality. If in theory men are everywhere equal, they are rarely equal in condition. Neither, we observed, are ethnic groups. Concerning the inequality of both individuals and groups, we continued:

> As to the origins of this inequality, we follow Ralf Dahrendorf (in his now classic essay, "On the Origin of Inequality among Men") in holding that it arises from differential success in achieving social norms. Dahrendorf accounts for individual inequality in these terms: we adapt his thesis to group inequality. His thesis is that every society establishes norms—socially established values—selected from a universe of such values. There seems no end to human ingenuity in thinking of characteristics that can be described as desirable or undesirable. It can be thought a good thing to be wealthy, or alternatively to be poor; to be dark or to be light; generous or mean; religious or atheistic; fun-loving or dour; promiscuous or chaste. However, once a selection is made as to what is good and what is bad, individuals—and, we now add, ethnic groups—have different levels of success in attaining the desired condition. . . .
>
> In Dahrendorf's account the individual encounters the norms of his society *and* the "sanctions designed to enforce these principles." Some do better than others and reap

[5] Andy Logan, "Around City Hall," *New Yorker*, October 23, 1978, p. 146.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the rewards; some suffer the punishments. This is a dynamic process which forms groups (classes), those who do better and those who do worse. Equally, it can be a process which begins with groups, and helps form them further. Dahrendorf clearly anticipates this: "The selection of norms always involves discrimination, not only against persons holding sociologically random moral convictions, but also against social positions that may debar their incumbents from conformity with established values. . . ."

In a situation of mixed ethnic groups where one group is dominant, which is to say that its norms are seen as normal not just for it, but for others also, there follows an almost automatic consignment of other groups to inferior status. But some groups may discover that they are quite good at achieving the norms of the dominant group: even better than the group that laid down those "laws." This is to be encountered almost everywhere: in some instances cheerfully accepted, in others bitterly resented. . . .

Herein lies the dynamic element in the system. Dahrendorf writes that inequality "serves to keep social structure alive." This is because "inequality always implies the gain of one group at the expense of others: thus every system of social stratification generates protest against its principles and bears the seeds of its own suppression. . . ."

Here again we come to the strategic efficacy of ethnicity as an organizing principle. Different groups *do* have different norms. In the most natural way the unsuccessful group has the best chance of changing the system if it behaves *as a group*. It is *as a group* that its struggles become not merely negative, but positive also, not merely against the norms of some other group, but in favor of the already established norms of its own. One of the difficulties of social class as an organizing principle surely is that there just is not that much conflict of *norm* between most social classes. In the West intellectuals and others at the top of the social stratification will fantasize about the differences between the values of those at the bottom and those in the middle—always to the advantage of the former—but it usually turns out that those at the bottom pretty much share the notions of desirable and undesirable with those in the middle. Ethnic differences, however, *are* differences, or at least are seen as such.[6]

We also, in this work, took some pains to call attention to David Schneider's concept of the "desocialization" of ethnic groups, which is to say the increasingly similar *cultural* content of different ethnic groups in the United States, which by our lights would reduce ethnic content.[7] But differences persist, and so do loyalties. Loyalties themselves constitute a kind of conflicting norm.

Hence, of course, the pattern of ethnic succession in part consists of the displacement of established groups (established in a neighborhood, a profession, a church, a sport, a trade union) by another group and *also*—I stress—the attainment of one group to the condition of another.

Measures of Success

So much for theory. How has it worked out in practice for the two ethnic groups, blacks and Puerto Ricans, which in *Beyond the Melting Pot* we

[6] Glazer and Moynihan, *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, pp. 12–16.
[7] Ibid., p. 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

described as the newest groups in the city?[8] They are no longer the newest groups, a rather distinctly Asian cohort—Korean, Chinese, Filipino, and East Indian—having come in behind them. How then are the blacks and Puerto Ricans doing? If our theory holds up, they both ought to be moving up (and being pushed up), to be actively challenging the norms of previous groups, and also to be emulating them. If history holds up, they ought to be having some success.

Both things seem to be so. Their challenge is well established. The mere assertion that there ought to be, for example, "racial" balance in the major institutions of city government—the Emergency Financial Control Board, the Board of Estimate—is a challenge to the previous norm of "ethnic" balance, which typically excluded these two groups. Curiously, the achievement of that balance constitutes a diminution of differences. But that, to repeat, is the dynamic of it all.

To appreciate the extent of the success of blacks and Hispanics, we must recall the dimensions of the black and Hispanic migration that occurred. Between 1960 and 1970, New York City's black population grew by more than half a million—giving the city the largest black community in the Western Hemisphere, and among the largest in the world.[9] Just as the formula went that New York had more Jews than Jerusalem, more Irish than Dublin, and so on, so it can be said that New York today has more blacks than the populations of three great African capitals combined—Nairobi, Dakar, and Khartoum.[10] In 1970, New York had more citizens of Hispanic origin than the combined population of Puerto Rico's three largest cities.[11] Blacks now comprise almost 24 percent of New York City's residents; persons of Hispanic origin make up almost 18 percent. Together, they constitute well over one-third of the city's population (although they themselves have become increasingly disparate as the proportion of non-Puerto Rican Hispanics grows).

New York's blacks and Hispanics tend both to be considerably younger than the population of the nation and to have higher proportions of females[12]—

[8] Glazer and Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970), Introduction.

[9] U.S., Bureau of the Census, *The 1960 U.S. Census of the Population*, vol. 1, Part 34, Table 21, reports a Negro population in New York City of 1,087,931. *The 1970 U.S. Census of the Population*, vol. 1, Part 34, Table 24, reports a population of 1,668,115.

[10] *CBS News Almanac* (Maplewood, N.J.: Hammond Almanac, Inc., 1978).

[11] U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Middle Atlantic Office, *A Socio-Economic Profile of Puerto Rican New Yorkers*, Regional Report 46 (July 1975), p. 24.

[12] The median age of "persons of Puerto Rican birth and parentage" for New York City in 1970 was 21 years, and there were 1.1 females for every male in the population (*1970 U.S. Census of the Population*, vol. 1, Part 34, Table 96). The median age for blacks was 26 years, and there were 1.2 females to each male (Ibid., Table 24). The median age of whites in the U.S. population in 1970 was 30.4 years, and the ratio of females to males was 1.05 to 1 (U.S., Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-23, no. 42 [1971], Table 14). It should be remembered on considering this and other data on blacks and Hispanics that census surveys tend to undercount these groups, especially their younger male members.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

characteristics that mean they often have more difficulty finding employment, and often make greater claims on certain kinds of government services. In the city's public schools, for example, nearly 40 percent of the pupils enrolled this year are black, and almost 30 percent are Hispanic.[13]

Education

Our schools, for all their troubles, are still the essential agency of ethnic succession. And blacks and Hispanics in New York are making educational gains. A census survey determined that as of March, 1977, the median number of school years completed by blacks in the New York area was 11.9, compared to the overall U.S. level for blacks of 11.3. The median number of school years completed by all New Yorkers was 12.3—only slightly higher than that for New York blacks. Hispanics were still behind, with 9.9 years, compared to a national level for Hispanics of 10.4 years,[14] but there are signs that they are beginning to press forward. *The Undergraduate Ethnic Census for the City University of New York* for the fall of 1977 showed that Hispanic enrollments had nearly doubled since 1972—from 13,563 to 25,351—while black enrollment increased by 12 percent—from 44,031 to 49,313.[15]

Employment

No immigrant group ever arrives at the right time; that is a staple of immigrant history. In this respect blacks and Puerto Ricans were no different. They entered the labor force in particularly large numbers beginning in the 1960s, not long before job opportunities in New York ceased to grow and began to decline, not merely in business cycle terms, but as a long-term, secular development. Roy Bahl at the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, has recently shown that employment in New York City grew by only 0.6 percent in the twelve years between 1960 and 1972. This contrasts with an increase of 31 percent in the rest of the state and 34.2 percent for the nation.[16] Trends since 1972 have made our relative situation even worse than that pictured in Professor Bahl's gloomy figures. Between 1969 and 1977, New York City has lost over 634,000 manufacturing jobs, a number larger than the total work force of many states.[17]

[13] New York State Education Department, *Racial/Ethnic Distribution of Public School Students and Staff: New York State, 1977-78* (Albany, N.Y.: Information Center on Education, 1978).

[14] All figures for median school years completed are taken from U.S., Bureau of the Census, *Educational Attainment in the U.S.*, Series P-20, no. 314 (December 1977).

[15] The City University of New York, *Report of the Fall Undergraduate Ethnic Census*, 1972 and 1977.

[16] These startling figures are cited by Professor Roy Bahl, Director of Metropolitan Studies Program, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University, in "The Long Term Outlook for the New York State Economy" (Paper presented at the New York State Energy Conference, New York City, September 20, 1978), mimeograph.

[17] Letter to the author from Mr. Herbert Bienstock, Regional Commissioner of Labor Statistics for the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Middle Atlantic Region, March 21, 1978.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

Labor Force Status of Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Second Quarter, 1978

	New York City	*U.S.*
Percent of all persons 16 years and over in civilian labor force:		
White	55.0	63.3
Black	55.8	61.8
Unemployment rate		
White	7.7	5.1
Black	10.1	12.0

Source: U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, release of August 2, 1978

Given the numbers of jobs in manufacturing and other lower-skilled occupations that have flowed out of New York City, the overall employment situation of New York's poorer minorities is bleak. New York's labor force participation rates—the percentage of people working or seeking work—are lower than those of the rest of the nation for both whites and blacks. In part, this is because many blacks, often younger, are still in school or college. There is also reason to suspect that this is in some part a *consequence* of New York City's chronically high unemployment rate. In time, people just stop looking for work. Yet while the unemployment rate for New York City's blacks in the second quarter of 1978 was a high 10.1 percent, that was virtually two percentage points lower than the national rate for blacks; for whites, however, unemployment here was two and half points higher than the national rate (Table 1). All these numbers are dismaying, but they do suggest that the distribution of New York's unemployment may not be quite so inequitable as elsewhere in the United States. The unemployment level of Hispanic men, our data suggest, in recent years has moved closer to the unemployment level for black men; however, unemployment levels of Hispanic women are still considerably higher than those of both white and black women—perhaps evidence that the division of labor between men and women within an ethnic group frequently corresponds to the group's position in the line of ethnic succession.[18]

Quite apart from employment rates, there has been a marked upgrading of the work force. The percentage of employed blacks in the New York metropolitan area listed by the census as "Professional and Technical" has tripled since 1960, and the percentage of Hispanics in similar job classifications more than doubled between 1960 and 1970.[19] While 61 percent of New York's whites had

[18] U.S. Department of Labor, *A Socio-Economic Profile of Puerto Rican New Yorkers*, p. 71. Data on Hispanic unemployment are seriously questioned by some labor statisticians.

[19] Compare *1960 U.S. Census of the Population* to the *1970 U.S. Census of the Population*. The Bureau of Labor Statistics gives a somewhat lower figure than the Bureau of the Census, but both agree that the growth has been quite large.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

white collar jobs in 1976, so did 51 percent of New York's blacks.[20] The distribution of blacks through the various classifications of employment in the New York area is now remarkably similar to that of Washington, D.C.—long thought of as the capital of the American black middle class. And among persons of Hispanic origin born in the mainland United States, the ever-improving employment distribution that the ethnic succession model would suggest is likewise beginning to emerge.[21] Just as other ethnic immigrants overcame the proposition that there should be distinctively ethnic occupational castes, so too have blacks and Hispanics—at least in the New York area.

Income

Incomes of minority groups in New York, as those of blacks and Hispanics throughout the country, have risen significantly since the mid-sixties. In New York City, it seems, they have risen higher than in most places.

The Census Bureau's *Survey of Income and Education* (SIE), a survey conducted in mid-1976, reports the status of respondents for the preceding calendar year (1975). The sample size for the SIE was sufficiently large to permit some data for New York City to be broken out for comparison to national findings. The census officials who have made this data available warn that because of the limited size of the sample, such data must be used with caution. Yet they are willing to let us make our own calculations from the raw data, and draw our own conclusions. With this caveat, I offer the following analysis:

—Despite the harsh recession of the mid-1970s, and the additional troubles that afflicted New York City's economy, the ratios of black to white median family incomes in New York City are higher than those of black to white families in the nation at large. For New York City, the ratio of black to white median family incomes in 1975 was .73. For the United States as a whole, it was .62. For all large cities taken together, it was .65 (Table 2).

—Families of Spanish origin are making some income gains in New York City, but are not gaining so rapidly as blacks. This is in keeping with familiar patterns of ethnic succession, for unlike blacks, New York City's Hispanics, as relative newcomers to the United States, tend more frequently to return to their places of origin after having amassed some savings, and hence might be expected to rise more slowly in our relative measurements. (It is, however, somewhat at variance with the speculation Glazer and I offered in 1963.) Hispanics in California and the Southwest—who often are long established in the communities where they live—have higher incomes than New York Hispanics (Table 2).[22]

[20] U.S., Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment, 1976*, Report 504, Table 12 (1977), p. 46.

[21] Compare *1960 U.S. Census of the Population* to the *1970 U.S. Census of the Population*.

[22] For more detailed information on Hispanic incomes in the United States, see U.S., Bureau of the Census, *1976 Survey of Income and Education*, Series P-60, no. 110 (March 1978).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

Family Median Income, 1975

	White	Black	Spanish Origin	Black as Percentage of White	Spanish Origin as Percentage of White
United States*	$14,664	$9,045	$9,948	62%	68%
All Central Cities*	$14,389	$9,363	$8,970	65%	62%
New York City†	$14,687	$10,746	$8,341	73%	57%

*Source: Bureau of the Census, *1976 Survey of Income and Education*, Series P-60, no. 110, Table 1-A, issued March, 1978. Calculations of income comparisons are my own.

†Source: Tabulation of New York City data from the above survey prepared at special request by the Bureau of the Census. Calculations of income comparisons are my own.

TABLE 3

Median Income, Unrelated Individuals, 1975

	White	Black	Spanish Origin	Black as Percentage of White	Spanish Origin as Percentage of White
United States*	$5,373	$3,837	$4,730	71%	88%
All Central Cities*	$5,768	$4,102	$5,009	71%	87%
New York City†	$6,775	$4,857	$4,249	72%	63%

*Source: Bureau of the Census, *1976 Survey of Income and Education*, Series P-60, no. 110, Table 1-A, issued March, 1978. Calculations of income comparisons are my own.

†Source: Tabulation of New York City data from the above survey prepared at special request by the Bureau of the Census. Calculations of income comparisons are my own.

—Among those not living in family units, the black-white median income ratio is about the same in New York as in the nation as a whole (Table 3).

—In 1970, some 25 percent of the black households in the New York City area had incomes above the median income for all New York State metropolitan area households—putting them indisputably in the middle class. By 1975, that proportion had risen to 30 percent. In 1970, some 16 percent of the city's Hispanic households were middle class by this definition, and by 1975 that proportion had grown to 20 percent.[23] It should be

[23] Based on an analysis of unpublished data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1976 Survey on Income and Education*; and from unpublished data compiled by Professor Emanuel Tobier of the Graduate School of Public Administration, New York University, in *1978 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 4

Mean Income of Persons, By Ethnicity and Sex, 1975

	New York City†		*United States**		*All Central Cities**	
	Male	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*
White	$11,796	$6,459	$11,060	$4,732	$11,045	$5,262
Black	7,937	5,815	6,852	4,346	7,153	4,669
Spanish Origins	7,482	4,962	7,944	3,912	7,650	4,141

*Source: Bureau of the Census, *1976 Survey of Income and Education*, Series P-60, no. 110, Table 1-A, issued March, 1978.

†Source: Tabulation of New York City data from the above survey prepared at special request by the Bureau of the Census.

TABLE 5

Percent Below Poverty Level, 1975

Families	*NYC*†	*All Central Cities**	*U.S.**
White	8.4%	7.7%	7.0%
Black	21.8	24.4	25.8
Spanish Origin	27.0	24.9	22.1
Persons (in families and unrelated individuals)			
White	10.4	10.1	8.8
Black	24.1	27.4	29.6
Spanish Origin	28.6	26.0	23.1

*Source: Bureau of the Census, *1976 Survey of Income and Education*, Series P-60, no. 110, Table 1-A, issued March, 1978.

†Source: Tabulation of New York City data from the above survey prepared at special request by the Bureau of the Census.

TABLE 6

Owner-Occupied Housing in New York City

	White	*Black*	*Puerto Rican*†
1950	434,808	15,055	(no data)
1960	530,196	46,816*	7,396
1965	536,628	53,140	9,733
1970	578,445	83,937	14,391
1975	563,342	98,731	16,946
1978	527,773	115,547	20,914

*includes all non-white.

†data for all Hispanics not available.

Sources: 1950–1970: U.S. Census; 1975–1978: Emanuel Tobier, *1978 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey*, New York University, New York, N.Y., 1978.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

kept in mind that these gains occurred during a period in which white income, in New York and in the nation at large, was not rising at so rapid a rate, and that some of the progress of our poorer minorities is therefore a relative matter. But there was progress, both relatively and absolutely. This trend toward equality was not simply a benefit conferred by the workings of the market economy. Politics and government played an important part.

—New York City has growing numbers of blacks and Hispanic families with annual incomes over $20,000. About 20 percent of black families are in this bracket.[24]

—Mean female incomes for blacks and Hispanics in New York City are significantly higher than female incomes for whites in the nation at large—surely an important factor in the economic standing of black and Hispanic families here (Table 4).

—A comparison of poverty rates for whites, blacks, and Hispanics in New York City in 1975 shows that while whites and Hispanics have somewhat higher poverty rates than those of corresponding groups in the nation at large, black poverty rates are lower than the national level (Table 5).

Housing

Housing shows the most promising trends of all, albeit ones with troubling features of their own. Blacks—especially those who are entering into the main currents of the city's economic life—are leaving the old neighborhoods of Central Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant (Jewish neighborhoods two generations ago) in a quickening stream.[25] While other cities show a trend toward increasing black movement to the suburbs, however, New York City is seeing the resettlement of working-class and middle-class blacks within the city itself—for instance, in Flatbush, Brooklyn and in Laurelton, Queens. In 1970, according to an analysis by Professor Emanuel Tobier of New York University, 86 percent of the black, middle-class households in the New York region—the city and five counties closest to it in the state—were located in New York City. Five years later, that figure had not changed.[26] Blacks—and, to an increasing extent, Hispanics—are buying up the sound, older housing stock in the outer boroughs. Blacks owned and occupied eight times as many homes in 1978 as they did in 1950—an increase of 100,000 in black home ownership—and more than three-quarters of them are in Brooklyn and Queens (Table 6). If housing values hold

[24] According to the special tabulation of SIE data for New York City, 90,000 out of 434,000 black families had incomes of more than $20,000.

[25] See, for instance, "In the Last Decade, Leaders Say Harlem's Dreams Have Died," *New York Times*, March 1, 1978, p. 1.

[26] Tobier, *1978 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

up—and, regrettably, this is no certainty—the growth of these neighborhoods could turn out to be one of the most heartening aspects of our city.

Cynics will believe that whites are leaving these neighborhoods because blacks are coming to them. But there may be a more innocent reason for this. Whites may be leaving because the better jobs have been leaving. Here we encounter a factor that may prove to be a serious obstacle to those following the old routes of ethnic succession in New York City. For unlike earlier migrants, the wave of the postwar era has made its advances in large measure through its successes in obtaining government employment. And although the effects of economic decline may reach government somewhat belatedly, when they do arrive, they strike with brutal and concerted force.

In a speech in January, 1978, Professor Andrew F. Brimmer noted that blacks "have historically depended more heavily on the public sector for employment than was true of the labor force as a whole. This has been especially true of those in professional positions."[27]

In another paper, drafted for the National Commission on Manpower Policy in 1976, Professor Brimmer presented some powerful facts to illustrate this same point: whereas only 15 percent of white workers work for the government, 22 percent of blacks work in the public sector. And only 17 percent of all white earnings come from government, while 26 percent of all black earnings do.[28] Perhaps these observations provide a partial explanation for the flow of the black middle class to Brooklyn and Queens rather than to the suburbs. Blacks have stronger economic attachments to the city government than whites, and government was five years behind in feeling the effects of the sharp economic downturn of the late sixties.

But the consequences of that decline are now beginning to become clear. In the decade since 1968, according to the Office of the Chancellor of the New York City Board of Education, the proportion of blacks among the professional staff of the New York City school system increased from 9.7 percent to 10.7 percent. But overall cutbacks in education have meant that, despite the energy expended, there are, in absolute numbers, several hundred fewer blacks employed today in the school system.[29]

In the three years between 1974 and 1977, according to New York City's Department of Personnel, black employment in the so-called "mayoral agencies" in New York City declined by almost 13,000, and that of Hispanics

[27] Andrew F. Brimmer, "Economic Growth and Structural Unemployment" (Address to the White House Conference on Balanced Growth and Economic Development, Washington, D.C., January 30, 1978), mimeograph.

[28] Andrew F. Brimmer, National Commission for Manpower Policy, *The Economic Position of Black Americans*, Report no. 9, Washington, D.C. (July 1976), p. 33.

[29] Personal communication from Mr. Steve Bogart, Office of the Chancellor, New York City Board of Education, December 21, 1978.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

declined by almost 5,000.[30] A similar pattern seems to hold in the uniformed services. And if the White House and the Congress cut back federal funds for CETA programs, these losses will be heavily compounded.

Conclusion

The politics of ethnic succession brought considerable progress over the past decade and a half; but we cannot neglect to note that what government can do, it also can undo. The gains that were achieved must be consolidated by widening the foundation upon which they rest. In the speech cited earlier, Professor Brimmer warned that "too much hope is being placed on the expected expansion of public service jobs. Instead, we must look to greater efforts to increase openings on private payrolls."[31]

That, surely, is part of the answer. But there is yet an important role for government. Government must plan for an orderly adjustment to the circumstances we face, and can do a great deal both to counteract further decline in the private sector and to foster the kinds of economic development that still are possible. New York must learn to pursue economic development the way others do. We must establish in our political culture a concern for economic development—a concern not unlike that demonstrated by the governors of the Sunbelt states in the previous generation, one of whom is now our president. But it should be possible for us to do this without sacrificing the better-than-average accomplishments made by those who came here to reenact the experience of ethnic succession that New York City has provided to so many generations of Americans.

The social programs of the 1960s, overpraised at the time (and woe it was for those of us who at the time suggested that this might be so), are now generally overcriticized. As careful and detached an observer as Dick Netzer of New York University recently published a study of government programs in the arts, programs which he found not altogether without merit.

> Yet to count a major new government undertaking as a partial success is anything but negative: most of the new non-arts related government programs initiated in the 1960s have been commonly evaluated as failures, completely or mainly so.[32]

I believe the record of ethnic succession in New York City in the 1960s belies so pessimistic a summary. There is achievement alongside failure, and the achievement matters more.

Years ago I was introduced to Langston Hughes in a restaurant on 125th Street. I said to him that I thought he was the best political satirist writing since Finley

[30] Personal communication from Mr. T. Norton of the New York City Department of Personnel, December 15, 1978.

[31] Brimmer, "Economic Growth and Structural Unemployment."

[32] Quoted in Tom Bethel, "Welfare Arts," *Public Interest* 53 (Fall 1978): 135.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Peter Dunne. "That is high praise," he said. But he accepted it, for he knew his own worth. And surely Hughes's character Simple was a fitting successor to Mr. Dooley, as apt an ethnic succession as we could hope for. But both are gone, and neither yet has a successor. That restaurant is gone also, and much of 125th Street on which it stood. But surely the spirit and the process that created them still endures.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics

RICHARD W. STEELE

From the spring of 1940 until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war in early December 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt confronted a situation as frightening for the nation as any since the Civil War. By the end of 1940, Adolf Hitler had convincingly demonstrated to the world his ambitions and the awesome power of his military force. The British, ineffectual in their efforts to halt Hitler's advance on the Continent, stood alone awaiting an assault they appeared ill-prepared to repel. But the German air attack failed; the invasion did not come. Hitler's opponents, actual and potential, thus were given an opportunity to look to their defenses and consider the next moves, both their's and his.

In the United States, the administration's efforts to make the most of the opportunity were limited by widespread cynicism about the origins of the European war and well-organized resistance to direct American involvement. The situation was troubling and potentially dangerous, and the rapid conversion of public attitudes became an important part of Roosevelt's foreign policy. Isolationism, with its strong emotional appeal and the sanction of American tradition, might be challenged by words, but only Hitler's final, and perhaps fatal, offensive could conclusively disprove its value. Rather than wait for the "Great Debate" to bring the American people to its senses, FDR resolved to supplement the persuasive effects of world events and the arguments of the interventionist forces by seeking to silence or discredit the critics of his administration's foreign policy.

The chief objects of Roosevelt's concern were not spies, saboteurs, enemy

---

RICHARD W. STEELE is professor of history at San Diego State University. He has written *The First Offensive, 1942: Roosevelt, Marshall, and the Making of American Strategy*, and a number of articles on the Roosevelt administration and American public opinion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

propagandists, or even those whose activities could be construed as violating the 1940 peacetime sedition law. The very few who fit these categories had almost no impact on American foreign policy and were effectively dealt with by federal authorities under existing law.[1] Roosevelt's problem was with those whose obstructive advocacy skirted the borders of constitutionally protected free speech. Dealing with these people was a frustrating task that sent the president on a wide-ranging search for effective means. Although his efforts were neither systematic nor entirely fruitful, the persistence and energy he devoted to the attempt provide insights into Roosevelt's attitudes toward free expression and the limits of presidential authority.

The source of much of FDR's concern was the seemingly special nature of the Nazi threat. In the common-sense view of the period, Nazi Germany was not an ordinary state but the instrument of a madman. From this perspective, Nazi actions were not simply a series of aggressions, but a worldwide conspiracy directed ultimately against free people everywhere. This idea was sustained in part by Nazi propaganda, the rantings of Hitler, and by the existence of Nazi groups outside Germany that subscribed to Hitler's racial concepts and supported the ambitions of the "new" Germany. The capacity of the German army to exceed the expectations of military experts also argued the unprecedented and unconventional nature of the Nazi threat. The battles that unfolded in 1940 seemed only the opening phase of the war of the future—a war that appeared revolutionary in strategy and equipment. Since the Nazis, and the war they waged, were unique, the administration plausibly concluded that the nation could no longer rest secure behind its traditional defenses.

The changes in the nature of war were so apparent that they raised for FDR the question of how loyal Americans could continue to talk as if these changes had not occurred. If isolationism was so obviously obsolete, how could one account for the stubborn dissidence of a willful minority? Events in Europe suggested an explanation. Press reports created the widely held belief that Nazi agents and sympathizers, a fifth column, prepared the way for German armies, sealing the fate of Hitler's victims even before the first plane or tank crossed their frontiers. This "boring from within," undermining the will and capacity of the democracies to resist, was thought to hold the key to Germany's success. The strength and pervasiveness of this myth understandably suggested to Roosevelt that those who opposed his foreign policies constituted an American equivalent of the fifth column.[2] The idea thrived on information, some of it originating

[1] The laws governing subversive activities are discussed in Zechariah Chafee, *Free Speech in the United States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 439-490, 572-574. The absence of any significant subversion or espionage is documented in Louis DeJong, *The German Fifth Column in the Second World War*, trans. by C. Geyl (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), especially pp. 118-119, 215-221.

[2] DeJong, *German Fifth Column*, especially pp. 20-25, 52-65.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with British intelligence, "documenting" the link between Berlin and the administration's opponents.[3]

A Small Group of Selfish Men

While the circumstances of the European war made an American fifth column plausible, they did not dictate that Roosevelt act upon the idea. What transformed an appealing rationale into a course of conduct was the president's disposition to see dissidence as disloyalty and the proper subject of government action. This attitude was in evidence long before, and in circumstances far removed from, the threat to national security manifest in 1940. As early as 1934 President Roosevelt had directed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate the "Nazi movement in the United States."[4] The object of this investigation was an obnoxious conglomeration of groups dedicated to building and preserving cultural ties with Germany. Despite their anti-Semitism and the efforts of the German government to use the "movement," they posed little threat to American security. Their sometimes frightening, sometimes comic, antics helped, in fact, to intensify American awareness of the Nazi menace.[5]

The systematic investigation of dissidents begun in 1934 soon expanded, pursuant to the president's instructions, to include *all* suspected subversives.[6] It is clear that from the outset, at least some of the individual investigations ordered by the president were politically inspired and only remotely related to the commission of a crime or "subversion." In 1940, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover suggested privately that the administration, as well as the bureau, would be seriously embarrassed if the nature and scope of FBI operations came to light.[7] Thus, for example, in 1935 Roosevelt referred a pamphlet accusing the president of being a "Socialist Pure and Simple" to the attorney general with the injunction to "find out who is paying for this"[8]; also, in late 1940, FDR directed Hoover to investigate George Seldes, the publisher of the left-wing *In Fact* which had been critical of the president.[9]

[3] H. Montgomery Hyde, *Room 3603: The Story of the British Intelligence Center in New York During World War II* (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Co., 1962), pp. 218–220.

[4] U.S., Congress, Senate, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, Book II, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 26 April 1976, Senate Report 94–755, pp. 24–25.

[5] See Sander T. Diamond, *The Nazi Movement in the United States, 1924–1941* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), and Geoffrey S. Smith, *To Save A Nation: American Counter-Subversives, the New Deal, and the Coming of World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

[6] In U.S. Senate, *Intelligence Activities*, pp. 25–27. A fuller account of this and subsequent directives is in Athan G. Theoharis, "The FBI's Stretching of Presidential Directives, 1936–1953," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Winter 1976–77): 649–672.

[7] Adolf Berle manuscript diary, 21 March 1940, p. 187, in Berle Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. Hereafter cited FDRL.

[8] FDR for Attorney General, memo, 7 August 1935, Official File [OF] 10B, FDRL.

[9] Wm. Hassett for Stephen Early, memo, 21 November 1940, and Early for FDR, memo, 18 February 1941, OF 4185, FDRL.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

John L. Lewis, head of the United Mine Workers, was among those subjected to FBI inquiry. Although Roosevelt denied it at a White House confrontation in 1940, since 1938 the FBI, with FDR's knowledge, and probably on his initiative, had been tapping the phones at Mine Workers' headquarters.[10] The reason is not entirely clear. It is true that Lewis was engaged in negotiations involving Mexican officials and the sale of oil to Germany, and these activities, although not illegal, invited FDR's suspicion. On the other hand, the friction between Lewis and the White House since 1936 suggests a political motive. Whatever the rationale, only a strained concept of national security would appear to justify the action.[11]

In dealing with his isolationist critics, Roosevelt was guided by the same intolerant, conspiratorial outlook that had characterized his attitude toward earlier critics. As a result, the president too readily concluded that his long-standing political opponents had now aligned themselves with the nation's enemies, either to hurt him or to promote their own interests. "A small group of selfish men," he publicly described the isolationist leaders, "who would clip the wings of the American eagle to feather their own nests. . . . Partisan groups . . . who wrap themselves in a false mantle of Americanism to promote their own economic, financial, or political advantage." On the eve of the 1940 election, Roosevelt warned that "something evil is happening in this country," citing what he called the "unholy alliance" between Republican leaders and the forces of both communism and nazism.[12] Such statements may have overstated the president's feelings, but not by much. Following the election, he told an associate that he thought "too many" in the Republican hierarchy, moved by their materialistic outlook, had come to think "in terms of appeasement of Hitler."[13] Actually, although the motives of his critics varied, isolationism, as one scholar has noted, was not only "devoid of political, economic, or social content," but also "neither liberal nor conservative, capitalist nor socialist, Fascist nor Communist, Democratic nor Republican."[14] Isolationists may have been mistaken, but they were not preeminently greedy, necessarily cynical or stupid, nor, as Roosevelt would also suggest, "soft" on nazism.

[10] J. Edgar Hoover to Marvin H. McIntyre, 14 September 1938, and attachments, in President's Secretary's File [PSF] "Justice Department, 1938-1944," FDRL. For Lewis's account, see Saul D. Alinsky, *John L. Lewis: An Unauthorized Biography* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p. 238.

[11] See C. K. McFarland, *Roosevelt, Lewis, and the New Deal, 1933-1940* (Fort Worth, Texas: Texas Christian University Press, 1970), especially pp. 68-69, 91, 94.

[12] "Selfish men" remark made in Annual Message, 6 January 1941, p. 665; "partisan groups" in Annual Message, 3 January 1940, p. 9; "unholy alliance" in speech made on 1 November 1940. All in *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 1940 volume, *War—And Aid to Democracies*, comp. Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Macmillan, 1941).

[13] FDR to Samuel I. Rosenman, 13 November 1940, President's Personal File [PPF] 64, FDRL.

[14] Manfred Jonas, *Isolationism in America, 1935-1941* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 274. Ronald Radosh, *Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975) suggests that the movement of some of Roosevelt's foreign policy critics toward the right "began when they were accused of betraying their own principles and going conservative, because they dared to criticize FDR and his interventionist policies" (p. 323).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although Roosevelt was inclined to see his isolationist critics as opportunists, when this did not suffice to explain their actions he questioned their loyalty. This predilection is apparent in his dealings with Charles A. Lindbergh. When Lindbergh first emerged as a leading advocate of isolationism, Roosevelt assumed that the one-time national hero was merely power hungry. But when Lindbergh refused FDR's offer of a cabinet post and continued his attacks, Roosevelt confided to an associate that he was "absolutely" convinced that his adversary was a "Nazi." The president's inclination to see his opponents as enemies is reflected in that label; Lucky Lindy was now indeed a racist, an admirer of the "new" Germany, and disenchanted with aspects of American society, but his obnoxious ideas made him neither disloyal nor a Nazi.[15] By thinking of his opponents in this manner, Roosevelt denied the legitimacy of their claims and hence their right to be heard.

The Isolationist "Fifth Column"

On the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939, the White House learned that the German government had ordered its agents in the United States to work for the retention of the Neutrality Law. Press Secretary Stephen Early quickly informed the press of Berlin's instructions to "its friends in the United States," thus implying from the outset of the struggle over foreign policy that opponents of the administration were ultimately guided from abroad. Although Early publicly eschewed administration propaganda on the neutrality issue, he and Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle immediately arranged to have the alleged "Berlin connection" made widely known through various unofficial spokesmen.[16]

In the months that followed, FDR led an education campaign that portrayed his domestic critics as part of the Nazi conspiracy. His efforts gained credibility from the fifth column myth that, due in part to the propaganda efforts of the administration and its interventionist supporters, had established a firm grip on the American imagination. Probably the single most influential administration endeavor along this line was the widely circulated exposé written by William J. Donovan and Edgar Mowrer. The four-part series of articles, sponsored and endorsed by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, purportedly derived from Donovan's observations on a trip through Europe. In fact it was based on material supplied by British intelligence. The story, which appeared in virtually every newspaper in the nation in August 1940, authoritatively informed the American public that Hitler's success could be explained by the democracies' susceptibility to internal subversion. More frightening was Donovan's assertion that the same conspiracy that had undermined the free nations of Europe was

[15] Wayne S. Cole, *Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), pp. 73–74, 128.

[16] Early press conference, 5 September 1939, and newspaper reports in Early Scrapbook, Early Papers, FDRL; and B. B. Berle and T. B. Jacobs, eds., *Navigating the Rapids, 1918–1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), p. 259.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

now at work in the United States, breaking down national morale and enlisting traitors. In fact, according to Donovan, "as matters now stand the United States possesses the finest Nazi-schooled fifth column in the world."[17] Although no less an authority than J. Edgar Hoover privately minimized the alleged fifth column,[18] the Donovan reports were subsequently broadcasted on a nationwide hookup, issued in pamphlet form with a preface by Knox, and elaborated in a State Department publication. Hundreds of books, articles, and movies on the subject followed, and thousands of private citizens alerted the FBI to various suspected fifth column activities.[19]

The president himself contributed to public anxiety by repeatedly warning Americans during 1940–41 that it could happen, indeed was happening, here. The struggle in Europe, he declared, was not an "ordinary war," but a "revolution" that had unleashed forces in the United States that were dividing and weakening the nation. "Let us no longer blind ourselves," he told the American people, "evil forces . . . are already within our own gates." And on another occasion he warned that "great numbers" of "secret agents and their dupes" were already in the United States and Latin America, doing their subversive work. In making these statements FDR repeatedly linked his critics to foreign-inspired subversion, labeling those who stubbornly fought American involvement in the war as "apologists for foreign aggression," "appeaser fifth columnists," and "conscious disorganizers or unwitting dupes."[20]

Even as he sought to convince the public that isolationism was subversion, Roosevelt proceeded against dissidents and critics as if his allegations were fact. In the aftermath of the 1940 election, Roosevelt warned his critics: "No one can tell the exact character of the emergency situations that we may be called upon to meet, [and] the Nation's hands must not be tied when the Nation's life is in danger. . . . The best way of dealing with the few slackers or troublemakers in our midst is first, to shame them by patriotic example, and if that fails, to use the sovereignty of Government to save Government."[21]

Roosevelt's interpretation of sovereignty was apparently broad enough to sanction official interest in anyone who openly dissented from administration policy. Thus, the names of those who wrote to the White House in the spring of

[17] "Donovan Says Democracies Prove Easiest for Nazis Fifth Column," *New York Times*, 21 August 1940, p. 9; and "Germans Said to Spend Vast Sums Abroad to Pave Way for Conquest," *New York Times*, 22 August 1940, p. 5. See Hyde, *Room 3603*, p. 41.

[18] See Hoover for Attorney General, memo, 23 December 1941, in declassified documents of the FBI.

[19] See DeJong, *German Fifth Column*, pp. 136–138; Hyde, *Room 3603*, pp. 41 and 105; Ruth Inglis, *Freedom of the Movies: A Report on Self-Regulation from the Commission on Freedom of the Press* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 9.

[20] "Revolution" remark in speech of 19 July 1940, p. 296; "evil forces" in fireside chat, 29 December 1940, p. 638; "secret agents" in Annual Message, 6 January 1941, p. 666; "apologists" in Annual Message, 3 January 1940, p. 9; "appeaser fifth columnists," 19 July 1940, p. 302; "disorganizers and dupes," 24 October 1940, p. 496. All in Rosenman, *Public Papers of FDR*. Similar remarks appear throughout FDR's public statements in 1941.

[21] Annual message to the Congress, 6 January 1941, ibid., p. 670.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1940 protesting American foreign policy were forwarded to the Justice Department. Although the government defended this action as merely routine, the covering note from Stephen Early to Hoover accompanying a batch of these referrals suggests otherwise: "As the telegrams all were more or less in opposition to national defense, the President thought you might like to look them over, noting the names and addresses of the senders."[22] In spite of public protest, the practice continued.

Immediately following his reelection in 1940, Roosevelt sought to expand his capacity to deal with his critics. He assigned responsibility for devising a program to a group of cabinet officers led by Harold Ickes, the administration's chief anit-Nazi and, second only to Roosevelt himself, its most effective spokesman. Ickes was a civil libertarian of sorts, but his commitment to personal freedom extended most readily to those of whom he approved—dissidents on the left, persecuted racial minorities, labor organizers, and the like. His contempt for isolationist dissenters left him unmoved by any claim to free expression they might have.[23]

FDR commissioned the Ickes group to act as a kind of command staff to mobilize the full resources of the government for the struggle against isolationism. The group, which included the secretaries of war and navy and the attorney general, agreed that the task would require the complete cooperation of existing government intelligence agencies to monitor "subversive" propaganda and to expose its financial backers. But when Soliciter General Francis Biddle was consulted, he argued that "vigorously expressed" isolationism, not a foreign conspiracy, was at the heart of the administration's difficulties, and that since "such opposition was not illegal," he could not sanction any government action that "would tend to smother and suppress this opposition." Attorney General Robert Jackson, worried by criticism raised by the White House referral of telegrams to the Justice Department, agreed, and the endeavor collapsed.[24] Much to Ickes's disappointment, the president refused to pursue the plan. His desire to combat dissidence was real, but not without bounds. Isolationist critics were only one of many political concerns confronting FDR, and he did not allow them (as well he might have) to become an all-consuming preoccupation. If he could hurt them readily, he welcomed the opportunity. He was not, however, disposed to act recklessly, without regard to the difficulties or political risks entailed.

Biddle's concern for the constitutional rights of the government's "enemies"

[22] Early for Hoover, memo, 21 May 1940, PSF "Justice-Hoover," FDRL; see also Cole, *Lindbergh*, p. 129.

[23] See Ernest Gruening, *Many Battles: The Autobiography of Ernest Gruening* (New York: Liveright, 1973), pp. 239, 343.

[24] See OF 1661-A ("Fifth Column"), particularly Ickes to FDR, 28 November 1940, FDRL. Committee discussions are in transcript of Second Conference of Committee on Propaganda, 18 November 1940, in "Propaganda Committee, 1940"; Biddle's objections are in his "Memorandum on the 'Plan for a National Morale Service,'" 3 March 1941, in "War-National Morale Committee," file no. 2; all in Ickes Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

troubled the president, and when Biddle was mentioned as a possible successor to Jackson as attorney general, Roosevelt confided to an associate that he thought the aristocratic Philadelphia lawyer "too strict at a time like this when . . . we ought to have an attorney general who can close his eyes on occasion." Further inquiries, however, convinced him that Biddle would be "tough enough," and neither "too liberal" nor "too conscientious."[25] Roosevelt correctly gauged his ability to handle Biddle. In a number of instances, including the forced relocation of West Coast Japanese-Americans in 1942, Biddle, although expressing doubts about the justice of the proposed actions, loyally did his duty.[26] Nevertheless, Biddle served as the administration's conscience, reminding Roosevelt of the purist view of civil liberties.

The collapse of the Ickes committee's efforts left Roosevelt still without an effective way of exposing the roots of isolationism. British intelligence, which included among its varied activities in the United States manipulating public opinion and discrediting opponents of intervention, was a continuous source of inspiration and help. But in February 1941, feeling the need for additional investigative resources, Roosevelt created a secret White House intelligence unit responsible only to himself. Its varied and undefined functions were directed by John Franklin Carter, whose qualifications for secret agency were a modestly successful career as a journalist and radio commentator; a short tour in the diplomatic service; and, above all, a strong interest in foreign intrigue—a passion reflected in the several novels he wrote on that theme. "Special emergency" State Department monies financed the operation, which by the end of 1941 employed a staff of eleven.[27]

Some of Carter's assignments served the president's interest in his critics' motives and associations; among his earliest projects was Burton K. Wheeler, the leader of Senate isolationists. Carter's efforts to get something on the Montana Democrat produced only some allegations of "crookedness" in Wheeler's office, and the preposterous suggestion that Wheeler's isolationism was tied to the Great Northern Railway's commercial stake in trade with Japan. Roosevelt, forever hopeful, forwarded these charges to Ickes, apparently hoping he would succeed in encouraging a reluctant J. Edgar Hoover to investigate further.[28]

[25] Remarks by Thomas Corcoran to Harold Ickes, in Ickes Manuscript Diary, 3 August 1941, Ickes Papers, Library of Congress; and Francis Biddle, *In Brief Authority* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1952), pp. 164–165.

[26] See Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 68–70; and Biddle, *Brief Authority*, chap. 13.

[27] Unit described in Secretary of State Cordell Hull to J. F. Carter, 19 February 1941, in "1941" folder, Carter Papers, University of Wyoming. Roosevelt's use of Carter is apparent in PSF Subject File "Carter," FDRL. The size and funding are in Carter, "Report on Budgetary Needs of This Unit," 31 December 1941, in "John Franklin Carter," Berle Papers, FDRL.

[28] Carter memo, "Sen. Wheeler and the Great Northern Railway," 16 July 1941, and FDR's referral to Ickes, 17 July 1941, in PSF Subject File "Carter," FDRL. Roosevelt authorized Ickes to approach Hoover concerning an investigation of Wheeler. Ickes Manuscript Diary, 28 June 1941, Ickes Papers, Library of Congress. On Wheeler, see Richard T. Ruetten, "Burton K. Wheeler and the Montana Experience," *Montana: The Magazine of Western History* XXVII (Summer 1977): 2–19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Roosevelt's search for the men behind the most formidable isolationist group, the America First Committee, followed a somewhat different course. It began in February 1941 when Roosevelt sent the FBI an America First flyer and requested that the bureau find out "who is paying for this." Hoover promptly responded with a short history of the organization, together with biographical data on its founders and leaders—information readily available from public sources. Follow-up reports contained basically the same unsensational information: the organization was well run and well financed; its activities effective and legal; and its backers (otherwise) upstanding citizens, many of them wealthy, and some known for their support of right-wing causes.[29]

The FBI assessment of America First was confirmed by Carter who in July 1941 forwarded a report to the president that concluded there was no evidence of Nazi influence in the organization. Indeed, according to the report, America First National Committee Chairman Robert Wood "had no use for the Nazis or their doctrines, and would not tolerate any dealings with them if he knew of such dealings."[30] The president, however, did not abandon his search for the Nazi-isolationist link. In September he asked Federal Communications Commission Chairman James L. Fly to confirm his suspicion that former President Herbert Hoover was supplying Axis propagandists with material. Fly could not, but promised to keep on trying. Meanwhile, federal agents monitored America First operations and meetings, and FDR pressed for congressional and grand jury investigations. The voluntary dissolution of the organization following the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor destroyed the rationale for such actions.[31]

Even while these efforts were foundering on the disconcerting legality and loyalty of the opposition, FDR pursued a plan supplied by lawyer-lobbyist Morris Ernst. Ernst, like Ickes a well-known defender of civil liberties, specialized in literary censorship. But, also like Ickes, his interest in personal freedoms did not extend to the rights of administration critics. Early in 1941, Ernst, who acted as a part-time adviser and trouble-shooter for the president, urged a change in Internal Revenue Service regulations that would require tax-exempt corporations, including the various isolationist groups, to file annual reports giving the

[29] FDR for Early, memo, 21 February 1941, and Early for Hoover, memo, 21 February 1941, in OF 10B, FDRL. Hoover's response in Hoover to Early, 1 March 1941; Hoover to Watson, 19 March 1941 and 22 September 1941; FBI report on America First rally, see Hoover for Attorney General, memo, 8 October 1941, copy sent to White House 14 October 1941; all in declassified FBI documents.

[30] "Memorandum on the Chicago Situation and 'America First' Setup" attached to memo, Carter for President, memo, 22 July 1941, in PSF "Carter," FDRL.

[31] On Herbert Hoover, see "Hoover Inspires the Axis Radio," 5 August 1941, confidential report by the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, Federal Communications Commission, in PSF Subject File "FCC," and James L. Fly to FDR, 1 October 1941, OF 1059, FDRL. On monitoring, see Hoover for Attorney General, memo, 11 June 1941, 10 July 1941, and 8 October 1941, and Hoover to Watson, 14 October 1941, all in declassified records of the FBI. On Congressional or Grand Jury action, see FDR for Attorney General, memo, 17 November 1941, PSF "Justice Department 1938–1944," FDRL; and Wayne Cole, *America First, the Battle Against Intervention, 1940–1941* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1951), pp. 122–123.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

names of their officers and directors, the number and times of their meetings, and an accounting of the sources and expenditures of their funds. Ernst assumed that America First, like the anti-New Deal Liberty League of the 1930s, depended on the contributions of Roosevelt-hating plutocrats who would shrink from public association with a controversial cause. Forcing the "underground anti-American movement" into the open, he argued, would enable the government to "chop off the heads" of the isolationist leadership. Roosevelt liked Ernst's idea and told him to work out the details of its implementation. Despite Roosevelt's support and Ernst's persistence, however, Treasury Department officials dragged their feet, claiming various technical difficulties.[32]

By the beginning of 1942 the United States had gone to war and most Americans had rallied around the flag, but the president continued to press for action. In May the Treasury Department at last began collecting detailed information on tax-exempt organizations. Officials in both the Treasury and Justice Departments, however, showed no enthusiasm for developing criminal cases from the "intelligence" gathered, and the scheme produced no immediate results. By late 1942 the idea had lost much of its original promise. The attack on Pearl Harbor had elicited declarations of loyalty from prominent former isolationists, many of whom were now deeply involved in the war effort. Moreover, it had become clear that probing the political connections of White House enemies was certain to raise demands for similar revelations about the administration's shadier friends; given Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau's scrupulousness, the informational tax returns could produce more harm than good.[33]

Manipulation of the Media

Roosevelt's campaign against isolationism led him to challenge the ideal of an informed public and a free press. FDR's "management" of the news during 1940–41 has long proven embarrassing to even his staunchest defenders. However, given the Nazi menace and the stubborn obtuseness of the American public, a little lying has usually been judged a tolerable thing. As one recent

[32] Ernst, at Roosevelt's suggestion, "worked with" J. Edgar Hoover on countersubversive activities of an undisclosed nature. See Ernst to FDR, 2 June 1941, PSF "Ernst," FDRL. Ernst's original "Plan for Government Tax Reports on Alleged Tax Exempt Corporations" is in Morgenthau Manuscript Diary, vol. 3491, pp. 281–283. See also documents in OF 962; PPF 2841; PSF Subject file "Ernst"; and "Morris Ernst" file in Oscar Cox Papers. All in FDRL.

[33] See Ernst to FDR, 10 June 1942, PSF "Ernst," FDRL. For suggestions that the Treasury Department was naively "stirring up political trouble for 'our crowd,'" see memo, James Rowe for Grace Tully, memo, 20 November 1942, PSF "Executive Office-Rowe," and memo of conversation between Morgenthau and FDR, 4 December 1942 in Morgenthau Presidential Diary, vol. V, p. 1205. Similar difficulties between the White House and the Treasury over investigation of "friends" arose in 1944. See entry for 7 March 1944, and FDR for Morgenthau, 24 February 1944, Morgenthau Presidential Diary, vol. V, pp. 1346–1347. All in FDRL.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

commentator has it, "the cause justified the dubious means employed."[34] Any favorable judgment on this score must rest ultimately on the assumption that the nation's security, not the administration's sensibility, was the intended beneficiary of the information policy adopted. An examination of Roosevelt's attitudes and actions toward his critics in the press suggests that these were needlessly restrictive and stemmed as much from personal preference and political expedience as from a realistic appraisal of national interests.

Although Roosevelt prided himself on his thick skin, he was in fact annoyed and sensitized by the hostile, and sometimes unfair, press coverage he received during his first two terms. He attributed this, correctly in many instances, to the selfish biases of wealthy publishers. Journalists who consistently criticized his administration, he believed, were the tools of his ideological enemies. For example, in 1937 FDR described his critics as a "small minority" that sought "by every means within its power to thwart the will of the majority." More important, he suggested that the news media might somehow be held accountable for their "truth, justice, and fair play."[35] This theme was to resurface after the outbreak of war in Europe.

A major factor determining the public's attitude toward isolationism was its perception of events. Insofar as events suggested the inevitability of conflict and the capacity of the United States to deal with it successfully, Americans were apt to rally behind the president. But events did not always speak for themselves. The meaning they conveyed reflected largely the manner in which they were presented. Thus, what was reported and how it was interpreted were critical elements in determining whether events argued for or against the administration's policy. In this situation Roosevelt concluded that dispensing information about international affairs and national policy was too important to be left entirely to the judgment of journalists. Nevertheless, outright censorship was a politically volatile issue, especially in the absence of a declared state of war; thus the president had to proceed carefully in his dealings with the press. In early 1941 Roosevelt rejected an overly ambitious Army-Navy censorship plan; and when an Office of Censorship was created following American involvement in the war, its controls were modest and voluntary. Rather than invoke a potentially disruptive rigid censorship, he chose to rely on the government's ability to limit public access to information bearing on military and diplomatic events, and on the newsmen's acceptance of these controls. At a press conference the morning after the German attack on Poland he told reporters that they had an obligation to confine their reporting to "straight facts," that is, to information supplied or verified by the appropriate government official.[36] During the next several months the military and State Department, and ultimately other defense

[34] H. Stuart Hughes, "A Question of Confidence," *New York Review of Books*, 17 February 1977, p. 18.

[35] FDR to Everett R. Clinchy, 20 August 1937, PPF 691; see also FDR to Cleveland Rodgers, 11 August 1936, PPF 82. Both in FDRL.

[36] James E. Pollard, *The Presidents and the Press* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 821.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agencies, adopted policies designed to curtail severely the kinds of war information made public. The president made it clear that he expected press cooperation with this restrictive policy and publicly questioned the ethics and patriotism of newspapermen whose stories contained information the government wanted withheld.[37]

In FDR's view, no story that in any way hurt the administration was justified; neither the accuracy of the account nor its remoteness from military affairs vitiated the rule. Thus, in April 1941 FDR condemned a story about the destroyer *Niblack*'s attack on a German submarine and another on confusion and conflict within the cabinet over the creation of the Office of Civilian Defense. Without denying the reliability of either account, Roosevelt told an associate that "no decent columnist ought to print stories which would hurt the prosecution of our defense program."[38] Since the president sought to control the release of news, and on several occasions distorted the news he released,[39] newsmen who complied with his appeals to patriotism and responsibility, as most did, became little more than semiofficial propagandists. Those who refused to "cooperate" found their motives impugned.[40]

White House press conferences reflected these views. While Roosevelt urged citizens to withhold judgment on newspaper accounts until they had determined whether they were truthful, that is, officially sanctioned, he proceeded to undermine the value of the major source of authoritative information on his administration's actions and intent. During 1940, presidential press conferences, once the pride of the administration and the joy of reporters, became a pale reflection of Roosevelt's earlier performances; FDR deliberately avoided serious

[37] For the origins of the security classification system see David Wise, *The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy and Power* (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 62. Censorship is discussed in Delbert Clark, *Washington Dateline* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1941), pp. 301–302. Systems for controlling leaks are discussed in Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to FDR, 25 November 1941, "Knudsen" folder, and Harry Hopkins to FDR, 27 November 1941, in "Harry Hopkins" folder. Both in Early Papers, FDRL. Challenge to ethics in press conference, 21 February 1941, *Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941*, vol. 17 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), pp. 141–148.

[38] FDR to Ickes, 16 June 1941, PSF "Interior-Ickes," FDRL.

[39] The *Greer* incident is the most notorious example. See Joseph Lash, *Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941* (New York: Norton, 1976), pp. 417–421. Others include his denial that the Portuguese government had protested his May 27, 1941 threat to the Azores (see *Press Conferences of FDR*, 10 June 1941, pp. 395–396; and the protests found in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941*, 7 vols. [Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1959], II:844–848); and his misleading description of the cargo and destination of the S.S. *Pink Star* in press conferences held on 23 September and 30 September 1941 in *Press Conferences of FDR*, vol. 18, pp. 175–176 and 183–184, and the embarrassment this caused officials in Robert E. Kintner to Early, 3 October 1941, in "Kintner" folder, Early Correspondence, Early Papers, FDRL.

[40] See press conferences 21 February 1941 and 6 June 1941, both in *Press Conferences of FDR*, vol. 17, pp. 141–148 and 381–384. Early also made the point at this own conferences on 13 June 1940, 4 March and 18 August 1941. All in Scrapbook, Early Papers, FDRL.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

comment on current issues and ridiculed those reporters with the temerity to challenge his policy.[41]

Roosevelt found in radio an effective and more malleable alternative to the press. As he told one publisher in June 1940, his problems in getting "factual" news to the American people had obliged him "to resort to other media in order to give the people of the country the facts they are entitled to."[42] Broadcasters, already acutely aware of the government's regulatory authority, readily accepted the role the government had cast for them. Asked immediately after the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939 to comment on speculation that the president was contemplating radio censorship, Press Secretary Stephen Early in effect confirmed the suspicion. The administration was listening carefully, he said, to see how the youthful industry would respond to its first major test of maturity. "If we find that a child is well mannered it will be left to move along on its own. If it proves to be a bad child, there would be a disposition to teach it some manners, correct it, and make it behave itself."[43] In ensuing months the White House had reason to be well satisfied with radio's performance, which the president's chief adviser on media relations attributed, at least in part, to the constant threat of adverse administration action.[44]

The threatening tone of much of the president's discourse on press relations was inconsistent with the reality of the "problem." Only a relatively small number of journalists resisted the accelerating drift toward intervention.[45] Radio broadcasters, acting out of sympathy or fear, bent over backward to present the administration's case; the majority of newspapers supported the administration's foreign policy and cooperated with its efforts to promote public awareness of the Axis threat. Far from wishing to challenge the administration's view of international developments, influential papers solicited the White House for ways in which they might be more helpful.[46] Nevertheless, the dissenting minority seemed to dominate Roosevelt's thinking. How much this criticism disrupted or interfered with national purposes, and how much it sim-

[41] White House press policy 1939–41 is discussed in Pollard, *Presidents and Press*, pp. 829–830. For a general discussion of the administration's efforts to control the news, see Clark, *Dateline*, pp. 285–286. Considerable editorial resentment over the president's jocose or evasive responses to foreign policy questions is noted in a report on editorial opinion, "American Morale," prepared in the Treasury Department, dated 2 May 1941, in PSF "Treasury-Morgenthau," FDRL.

[42] FDR to Helen Reid, 6 June 1940, PPF 897, FDRL.

[43] Early press conference, 6 September 1939, Early Papers, FDRL.

[44] See Lowell Mellett for FDR, memo, 17 March 1941, "White House-1941," Mellett Papers, FDRL.

[45] For an overall assessment of media relationships see Mellett memo cited above. See also OF 788 for "Memorandum on Editorial Reaction Toward Aid for the Allies," 10 June 1940, prepared by the Division of Press Intelligence; and "Memorandum from the Executive Officer to the Director of the Office of Government Reports," 15 August 1940. See also editorial reports in PSF "Treasury-Morgenthau." All in FDRL.

[46] See correspondence among Harry Chandler, Mellett, Early, and FDR in OF 4630, FDRL.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ply irritated FDR is not certain. Both elements were probably present, but the president apparently made no attempt to distinguish between them.

FDR and Wartime Dissent

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor silenced dissent as no administration action could. The press, already sympathetic, was now more than ever inclined to subordinate its critical instincts to administration needs. U.S. military strategy obviously had to remain secret; international relations clearly had to be handled with care. Faultfinding on war-related matters seemed unsporting, if not downright unpatriotic, and even usually cynical reporters were disposed to give the government the benefit of the doubt on matters involving the national interest. Then too, their sacrifice, which most reporters believed to be in an eminently good cause, was after all not too great, since there was still plenty of news to go around. For what the government withheld through its many censors, it dispensed lavishly through its even larger corps of information officers.[47]

The president, taking advantage of the Fourth Estate's tolerance, provided the press and public with as little food for controversy as he could. His press conferences, declining in news content immediately before the war, yielded even less of value as the press found the president unwilling to discuss the significant issues of the war.[48] The same spirit produced a presidential order banning travel by publishers to Russia, China, India, and the battlefronts. The purpose, as Early put it, was to keep a few critical, although not necessarily hostile, newsmen from "running around the world looking for weapons with which to attack Pappy."[49] And when newspapers did obtain potentially embarrassing stories, such as the bungling political machinations that grew out of the North African invasion and the notorious Darlan deal, the president or senior military officials successfully appealed to patriotism and secured voluntary self-censorship.[50]

Although patriotism and increased government control over access to news diminished opposition, it did not entirely end it. Some issues remained fair game. Squabbles among cabinet officials, home front blunders, even the questionable policies and contributions of some of America's allies, and the vagueness of American postwar plans remained subjects of critical commentary. Most of it emanated from a handful of neoisolationist papers, including Colonel Robert R. McCormick's *Chicago Tribune*, Joseph Patterson's *New York*

[47] See Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), chaps. 12 and 13.

[48] "A Suggestion to the President as A Critic of the Press," editorial in the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, 18 October 1942, p. 2. Pollard, *Presidents and Press*, p. 830 comments on wartime relations.

[49] John Franklin Carter Manuscript Diary, "This Year of Crisis," 10 November 1943, in Carter Papers, University of Wyoming.

[50] Richard W. Steele, "American Popular Opinion and the War Against Germany: The Issue of Negotiated Peace," *Journal of American History* LXV (December 1978):704–723.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Daily News, his sister Eleanor Patterson's *Washington Times-Herald,* the declining Hearst chain, and a few columnists.

These critics all supported the war. Indeed they were superpatriots, but their loyalty failed to embrace the president or most of his policies. The administration's mistakes were headlined and unmercifully exploited and FDR's postwar plans ridiculed for their muddleheaded impracticality. To Roosevelt the criticism was annoying. It was divisive. Most of it came from those who had long been a thorn in Roosevelt's side. Now that the war had proven him right, FDR was ill-disposed to forgive or forget. Thus when Joseph Patterson, once a vigorous supporter of the New Deal but later an active enemy of interventionism, came to the White House following Pearl Harbor seeking to patch up their quarrel and enlist in the service of the war effort, Roosevelt humiliated and dismissed him with the injunction to reflect on his past sins.[51]

This sort of personal pique was also evident in the petty retribution Roosevelt visited upon correspondents or columnists who offended him. Drew Pearson, who generally supported the administration, earned a particularly scathing public denunciation from the president for his persistence in airing internal administration rivalries and disputes.[52] *New York Daily News* columnist John O'Donnell fared even worse. Although Stephen Early had rated him "tops professionally, politically, and socially" in 1939, O'Donnell had subsequently turned against the president over his conduct of foreign affairs. His unrestrained criticism eventually gained him investigation by the FBI and denial of War Department press credentials. The vendetta climaxed in late 1942 when, following a White House press conference, Roosevelt awarded O'Donnell the "Nazi Iron Cross" (in absentia).[53] A less sensational, although perhaps more effective, censure was applied to Igor Cassini, the antiadministration columnist for the *Washington Times-Herald.* Early, incensed that Cassini had avoided military service on medical grounds, made arrangements, with the president's approval, to ensure that Cassini eventually was obliged to do his duty in the army.[54]

Dealing with the consistent hostility of McCormick, the Pattersons, and Hearst proved considerably more difficult. Several methods were considered,[55] but the most promising scheme seemed to be offered by the possibilty of linking

[51] Discussed in Frank C. Waldrop, *McCormick of Chicago* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966; reprint ed., Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), p. 234.

[52] *Newsweek,* 13 September 1943, p. 79. In Early Scrapbook, Early Papers, FDRL.

[53] See Early to William C. Bullitt, 6 July 1939, Early Correspondence, "Bullitt," Early Papers, FDRL. For investigation by the FBI and denial of press credential, see memo, Ernest Dupuy to Director of Public Information Division, "Clearance of War Correspondents," 10 July 1942, in Bureau of Public Relations File 000.77 Secret (Public Information Division), Record Group 319, National Archives. "Roosevelt Awards Iron Cross to News Columnist by Proxy," *Washington Post,* 19 December 1942, p. 11.

[54] Confidential memo, Early for FDR, memo, 11 June 1943; and Early for Grace Tully, memo, 20 November 1943. Both in Early Correspondence "Ca-Misc.," Early Papers, FDRL.

[55] Proposal to use internal revenue law against McCormick and other hostile publishers vetoed by Morgenthau. See Ickes Diary Manuscript, 11 April 1942, Library of Congress; and Morgenthau for FDR, 14 May 1942, in PSF "Treasury-Morgenthau," FDRL.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

them to the official Axis line. Thus in March 1942, Roosevelt publicly denounced his critics as a "few bogus patriots who used the sacred freedom of the press to echo the sentiments of the propagandists in Tokyo and Berlin."[56] In the spring, the suspicions Roosevelt had voiced without proof, were supported by a British intelligence report that claimed that the isolationist papers were parroting enemy sources.[57] Greatly impressed, Roosevelt asked the attorney general to confirm the suggested relationship with a view to initiating criminal prosecutions or at least a damaging exposè.[58] Without waiting for the results, FDR used the British allegations as the basis of a vigorous propaganda campaign against his opponents. The message was echoed by patriotic groups and in network news programs and other media coached by the government.[59] As it turned out, analyses conducted by the Justice Department and later by the Office of War Information comparing Axis shortwave broadcasts with articles appearing in the leading isolationist newspapers, disproved the assumed link, and no criminal action was taken.[60]

Although the administration's victims might warn of dangerous precedents, FDR's information policies provoked no great outcry. The war was "well covered"; news was plentiful and mostly good. Nevertheless, the administration's attitude toward criticism did eventually elicit a defensive reflex from respected elements of the press. In April 1943, the *New York Times*, reflecting press peevishness, noted that journalists were free to report only what was "officially released," and complained that "the press had been throttled in a manner totally without justification."[61] A number of protests of this kind from generally friendly sources, however, failed to alter Roosevelt's determination to control public access to news and to harass (as best he could) those journalists who consistently disturbed the general wartime harmony.[62]

Although the president failed to silence his powerful wartime critics, he had greater success in dealing with America's extreme right wing. Mostly pathetic eccentrics, these domestic "Nazis" expressed and inflamed the fears and hatred of a minority of Americans through a number of relatively insignificant hate sheets. Their idée fixe was that Roosevelt had contrived the war for the benefit of, and connivance with, the Jews, Communists, and the British, who alone would profit from an Allied victory. Whether Roosevelt was fearful that such talk might have a significant divisive effect, or if he simply took the opportunity

[56] *New York Times*, 25 March 1942, p. 1.

[57] Hyde, *Room 3603*, p. 196.

[58] Roosevelt's reaction to the report, and a summary of its contents are in FDR to Attorney General, 7 May 1942, OF 4453, FDRL.

[59] Hyde, *Room 3603*, p. 197.

[60] Both reports discussed in a memo to R. Keith Kane from Ralph O. Nafziger, 15 July 1942, "Statement Coding for the Nazi Line in Chicago *Tribune*, N.Y. *Daily News*, N.Y. *Journal-American*," in entry 171, box 1846, Record Group 44, National Archives.

[61] "Press and the Peace," *New York Times*, 7 April 1943. This and a large number of other clippings on the same theme are found in Early Scrapbook, FDRL.

[62] For example, see Raymond Clapper, "Silly Censorship," *Washington Daily News*, 6 December 1943, Early Scrapbook, FDRL.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the war afforded to silence those whom he could not abide is not clear. Whatever the case, FDR insisted that these fringe elements be suppressed.

Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor Roosevelt told J. Edgar Hoover that he thought it was now time to "clean up" the extremist publications. Hoover responded with a series of raids and arrests, only to find his efforts blocked, and in some instances, reversed, by Attorney General Biddle, who insisted on fulfilling his public pledge not to harass citizens for their opinions. Roosevelt, apparently hoping to avoid direct intervention, urged Hoover to invoke White House support to overcome Biddle's obstructionism. Hoover, insisted, however, that "his hands were tied" and that Roosevelt would have to speak to the attorney general himself.[63]

Rather than order the action he wanted, the president badgered the attorney general, demanding to know when he would put an end to the American fifth column.[64] Biddle had expressed confidence that the good sense of the American people made them immune to the crude nonsense of a few crackpots, but this lofty sentiment was not enough to dissuade the president, and Biddle received little support from liberal elements outside the government. As a result, the head of the Justice Department's criminal division, although conceding privately that many of the intended victims were obviously unbalanced, prepared a set of grand jury presentations against the domestic "Nazis."[65] There followed protracted criminal proceedings of questionable merit[66] which, while not always ending in conviction, effectively drove these elements from sight.[67] Although Roosevelt was not indifferent to their rantings of these fringe elements, he may well have seen their suppression as a way of quieting the far more influential, and "respectable," isolationist papers led by the *Chicago Tribune*.[68] Whether this was indeed the administration's intent, the possibility was not lost on the *New York Daily News*, which warned the nation's press to watch the sedition trials closely since they "may be aimed at setting some precedents."[69]

Conclusion

Isolationism confronted the president with serious problems of public leadership, but his response in many instances bore no close relationship to the "threat." FDR's enemies" did not constitute a fifth column—a conclusion

[63] FDR to Hoover, 21 January 1942, PSF "Justice-Hoover," and Early to FDR, 20 March 1942, PSF "Justice," FDRL.

[64] Biddle, *Brief Authority*, pp. 237–238.

[65] Wendell Berge (Asst. Atty. Gen.) to James Rowe (asst. to Atty. Gen.), 15 April 1942, and Berge to Attorney General, 20 April 1942, and attachment. All in "Official Correspondence," Berge Papers, Library of Congress.

[66] Edward S. Corwin, *Total War and the Constitution* (New York: Knopf, 1947; reprint ed., Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), pp. 111–116.

[67] Biddle, *Brief Authority*, pp. 241–243.

[68] Ickes and Ernst shared the idea. Ickes Manuscript Diary, 11 April 1943, in Library of Congress.

[69] Quoted in *Newsweek*, 3 August 1942, pp. 26–27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

verified by the FBI, the Justice Department, and even his own personal investigator. FDR's decision to disregard this information and to act instead on the necessarily suspect suggestions fo British intelligence suggests that his judgment was strongly conditioned by the hopes of using the loyalty issue to smear his critics and to set the stage for public acceptance of the globalism toward which his policies were moving.

It is true (although hardly to his credit) that Roosevelt's campaign against dissent victimized relatively few people. Moreover, had a fifth column actually threatened national security his actions might be viewed as reasonable, indeed restrained. What the president battled, however, was not disloyalty but the doubts of a minority of Americans concerning the origins and purposes of the war. Instead of tackling these misgivings head on, admittedly a difficult task of education, FDR chose to discredit and dismiss them. In dealing with opposition by managing the news and by the systematic use of unfounded accusations and innuendo, Roosevelt limited, rather than expanded, the public's understanding of national issues. More importantly, he tended to cultivate the American disposition to view dissent on foreign policy matters as subversion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Comment on "Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics"

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.

I am sympathetic to the general purpose of the preceding article. Franklin Roosevelt was a very remarkable but also a complex and often careless president. His methods could be casual and devious, sometimes inexcusably so, and history demands full documentation of his faults as well as his virtues. But historical assessment also involves due recognition of the context in which a historical figure has acted and of the standards by which action was judged in his epoch. And it forbids the suppression of evidence that tells on the other side of the author's case. In these aspects, this paper falls signally short. It is not a historical analysis but a prosecutorial brief.

The historian's imaginative leap into the past enjoins first of all an understanding of problems as perceived at the time. Mr. Steele acknowledges contemporaneous perceptions in his early paragraphs, but this acknowledgment does not inform the pages that follow. Roosevelt, and many other Americans, really thought that Hitler was posing a mortal threat to the United States. Mr. Steele calls the idea that Nazi Germany was "the instrument of a madman" the "common-sense view of the period," almost as if it were no longer the common sense of a later and wiser period. It is easy to be complacent about nazism forty years after; but no president at the time, confronted by a state that still seems to me to have been the instrument of a madman, could afford to run unnecessary risks. No doubt the menace of the American Nazis was greatly exaggerated, but their "antics," as Mr. Steele characterizes their behavior, appear a good deal more "comic" now than they did then.

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities at the City University of New York, is the author of *The Crisis of the Old Order, The Coming of the New Deal,* and *The Politics of Upheaval,* volumes in his series *The Age of Roosevelt.* He is also the author of *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, The Imperial Presidency,* and, most recently, *Robert Kennedy and His Times.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since, without quite saying so, Mr. Steele evidently regards Roosevelt's view of nazism as wrong, he finds it easy in retrospect to condemn the contemporaneous response to what he evidently looks back on as an illusory threat. As he warms to this task, he freely engages in a prosecutor's exaggeration. He tells us that the "systematic investigation of dissidents begun in 1934 soon expanded, pursuant to the president's instructions, to include *all* suspected subversives." Here he cites Book II of the *Final Report* of the Church Committee; but a glance at his source shows that the 1934 instruction applied, not to dissidents—that is, dissenters—but to the "Nazi movement in this country," that the 1936 instruction applied not to dissenters but to "subversive activities in the United States," and that the 1939 instruction applied not to dissenters but to "matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage." Investigation of foreign spies and saboteurs is quite a different thing from the persecution of citizens for disagreeing with the administration. This is not to say that Roosevelt on occasion did not investigate dissent, but that such investigation was ad hoc, exceptional, and definitely not "systematic."

One could continue to point out the author's determination to build a case. It is excessive to write of "the president's disposition to see dissidence as disloyalty." *All* dissidence? He cites as a well-established fact that Roosevelt offered Lindbergh a cabinet post. The only source for this improbable offer, so far as I know, is Lindbergh himself. Mr. Steele speaks of "the fifth column myth." Very likely apprehensions were exaggerated, but they were real enough at the time—see, for example, Edmond Taylor's *The Strategy of Terror*—and even in retrospect the fifth column cannot altogether be dismissed as a "myth." He records Roosevelt's suspicion that Herbert Hoover "was supplying Axis propagandists with material" in terms that suggest Roosevelt thought Hoover a Nazi spy when the president was obviously complaining that Axis propagandists were picking up his predecessor's speeches.

Roosevelt's press conference after the German attack on Poland is presented as if the president, in asking the press to stick to facts, was seeking thereby to prevent the free expression of opinion. But an examination of the transcript shows that Roosevelt was distinguishing, not between fact and opinion, but between fact and rumor. The author describes the Office of Censorship as if it were set up to suppress stories that "hurt the administration." In fact, its chief, Byron Price, was a highly respected newspaperman; its restrictions were confined almost entirely to military information; and its impact did not at all resemble the 1984 atmosphere evoked in Mr. Steele's paper. The *New York Time's* contention that "the press had been throttled in a manner totally without justification" referred not to the expression of political opinion but to the reporting of military and naval news. Mr. Steele does gross injustice to American newspapermen when he writes that those who complied with Roosevelt's "appeals to patriotism and responsibility, as most did, became little more than semiofficial propagandists." If he really thinks there was little political controversy during World War II, he ought to take a look at the newspapers of the time and the *Congressional Record*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The author's determination to portray Roosevelt as the methodical and relentless persecutor of dissent blinds him to the abundant evidence showing how obviously divided Roosevelt was regarding the best way to deal with extremist opposition in a time of national emergency. Most of the damning items quoted against him come from diaries and memoranda. Such remarks were plainly the blowing off of steam by an exasperated executive, not the considered expressions of a systematic campaign to extirpate free speech and brand all Roosevelt critics as traitors. If he had not been a divided man, Roosevelt would not have appointed so many officials who were devoted to civil liberties and would not have permitted these officials to ignore, frustrate, and overrule his own antilibertarian impromptus.

Actually, by past standards of American wartime behavior—that is, by comparison with World War I or the Civil War—civil liberties fared much better at the hands of government under Roosevelt than they had done under Wilson or Lincoln. We must remember too that Nixon and Watergate have made us much more sensitive to issues like wiretapping than even liberals were forty years ago, when men like Ickes, Morgenthau, and La Guardia had no problem about wiretapping for their own presumably benign ends. It is important not to impose our contemporary standards too drastically on the past.

There is a sound and legitimate point buried in the piece, but the omissions, the overstatements, and the pervading prosecutorial zeal carry it far away from history.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The White House and the News Media: The Phases of Their Relationship

MICHAEL BARUCH GROSSMAN
MARTHA JOYNT KUMAR

The legacy of Vietnam and Watergate commonly is assumed to have altered the relationship between the president and the press drastically and permanently. "I think for the most part honeymoons with presidents are over," President Carter's press secretary said, agreeing with an interviewer who suggested that the "hangover" from these crises was responsible for the shortness of the honeymoon phase. "They're sort of a thing from the past," Jody Powell continued. "The basic relationship between president and press or president and Congress has changed over the past decade. It will never be what it was."[1]

Certainly some of the changes in the relationship are a result of a crisis in confidence about the believability of White House officials, including the president, that stemmed from the experience of many reporters during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. In spite of assurances from Presidents Ford and Carter that they would speak with candor and require their subordinates to do the same, many reporters adopt a style of questioning at daily briefings suitable to inquisitors trying to unveil a dark coverup. When spokesmen have announced that the White House has changed its position, reporters have asked both Ron Nessen and Jody Powell if earlier answers were "inoperative," the term used by

[1] Interview with Jody Powell by Martin Agronsky on "Agronsky at Large," Public Broadcasting System, WETA, Washington, D.C., June 24, 1977.

MICHAEL BARUCH GROSSMAN is professor, and MARTHA JOYNT KUMAR associate professor, of political science at Towson State University. A more extended analysis of White House press operations and the news media will appear in their forthcoming book, *Portraying the President: White House Press Operations and the News Media.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President Nixon's press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, when he admitted that his earlier vehement denials of White House involvement in Watergate were inaccurate. A leading White House correspondent, Helen Thomas of United Press International, emphasized the continued prominence of memories of the Watergate era when she commented that Jody Powell "can garbage up an answer when he doesn't want you to know what he is saying; he is very Ziegleresque in that respect."[2]

In contrast to this picture of dramatic, recent, permanent change, the argument is presented here that the White House and the news media are involved in a continuing relationship based on the permanent factors that affect both sides no matter who is president or who is doing the reporting. Presidents and those who serve them, as well as those who staff news organizations, have developed increasing needs for each other. The relationship that has developed is based on unwritten but inflexible rules, deeply ingrained habits, and the fact that presidents enjoy built-in advantages in their relations with the press which they have found convenient to exploit.[3]

The rules and habits, which have roots that may be traced to the growth of bureaucratic routines among White House officials and news organizations, limit the options available to new administrations and newly assigned reporters. New White House officials find they are constrained in the manner in which they can use the media to get the president's message across to the public. Newly assigned reporters at the White House find that they are channeled into the same routines as their predecessors.

From these rules, habits, and bureaucratic routines, a relationship has emerged that follows similar patterns from administration to administration regardless of changes of policy and personality among the occupants of the White House and those assigned to cover them. Our examination of this relationship from the inauguration of Dwight D. Eisenhower to the present has led us to the view that these patterns recur with some regularity in each administration. We suggest that the pattern of the continuing relationship between White House officials and the representatives of news organizations may be characterized in three phases: alliance; competition; and detachment.

The view that important continuing patterns of predictable behavior could be discovered by observing the relationship between the president and the press has only recently gained currency. Presidents, it was believed, could define their own relations with the press: They could create the modern press conference, as did Franklin Roosevelt, or ignore it, as did Richard Nixon. For their part reporters viewed themselves as individual operators subject to no bureaucratic

[2] Quoted by Dom Bonafede in "Powell and the Press—A New Mood in the White House," *National Journal* 9, no. 6: 982.

[3] For an account of the built-in advantages of presidents and their temptations to yield to them, see George Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency* (New York: Mentor Books, 1970), esp. pp. 100–117.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rules. Since reporters wrote most of the books and articles about White House press relations, this view prevailed.

In recent years, however, political scientists have analyzed some of the long-term connections between reporters and White House officials. In his pioneering work on the subject, *Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion*, Elmer Cornwell described the central importance of communications policy for presidential power.[4] Cornwell demonstrated that during the twentieth century an increasingly important factor in determining the success of a president's communications policy has been the sophistication with which White House officials approached the job of organizing and coordinating the numerous offices in the White House that share in the task of communicating the president's message and image to the public. Several years later, Leon Sigal in *Reporters and Officials* offered the first detailed presentation of the process in which the continuous interweaving of the needs of reporters for news and the needs of bureaucrats for particular kinds of publicity has led each to learn to adjust and to accommodate the predictable activities of the other.[5] More recently, in an article in this journal entitled "The Media and the Presidency: An Exchange Analysis," Francis Rourke and one of the present authors applied this theory of complementary needs to the relationship between the White House and reporters.[6]

In the analysis that follows, the concept of phases is used to indicate the patterns of a continuing relationship which includes strong elements of cooperation and competition. It is a concept that is based on extensive observation of the relationship at the White House between 1976 and 1978, over 100 interviews with reporters and officials at the White House, and an examination of the available papers relating to White House press operations of the administrations of Franklin Roosevelt through Richard Nixon. It is important to note at the outset, however, that our use of the terms alliance, competition, and detachment to describe the phases does not mean that we are claiming that each individual reporter or official changes his or her style of dealing with the other during the course of a president's term. What we do mean is that the number of reporters and officials behaving in one way or another changes from phase to phase. It is the behavior of most officials and reporters at a given time that enables us to differentiate one phase from the others.

Generalizations about the relationship during each phase do not apply to all officials or to all reporters, or even to individual reporters and officials all of the time. There are some officials who maintain a cooperative relationship with

[4] Elmer Cornwell, *Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1965).

[5] Leon Sigal, *Reporters and Officials* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1973), especially pp. 107–11; 127–28; 136–37; and 182–83.

[6] Francis Rourke and Michael Grossman, "The Media and the Presidency: An Exchange Analysis," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Fall 1976): 455–470.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reporters throughout their term in office even when their chiefs are busily feuding with every reporter in sight. For example, during the Nixon administration, Herbert Klein, Nixon's director of communications, and Gerald Warren, the deputy press secretary who handled daily briefings during the final days of the administration, maintained good relations with reporters when the relationship as a whole had become acrimonious. Some reporters are so well established that the change from one phase to another has little affect on them. David Broder of *The Washington Post* commented that he had no difficulty maintaining his contacts in the Nixon White House even during the bitterest moments of that crisis when his own newspaper was under strong attack from the administration.[7] And reporters with specialized or regional interests are far less affected by the phases than reporters who have a general assignment to cover the president.

The phases usually appear in sequence. The period of alliance coincides with the early months of a new administration. The period of competition is generally in full swing by the end of the first year. The start of the period of detachment depends upon the sequence of events that leads both White House officials and reporters to give up on their efforts to mold the other's behavior.

Phase One: Alliance

During the phase of alliance a silent partnership exists between White House officials and the representatives of news organizations assigned to cover the presidency. This partnership is based on two elements: the common definition by both parties of what are newsworthy items; and the reporters' willingness to provide an unfiltered conduit to the White House for messages that the administration wishes to convey to the public. There is little conflict between the objectives of reporters and White House officials during this phase; the major news organizations are interested in presenting to their audience the same items about the administration that the White House wants publicized. The fundamental mode is cooperative.

Reporters assigned to cover the presidency on a daily basis need the cooperation of White House officials, particularly those in the press office. This is especially true at the beginning of an administration when reporters are dependent on arrangements provided by the White House for their daily provisions of information at briefings and in press releases, for coverage of the president's activities, and for travel arrangements.

Because this phase usually coincides with the euphoric early weeks of a new administration, it is popularly known as the president's "honeymoon" with the press. The term honeymoon implies the suspension of normal self-interest. It conveys the impression that the president is being given a chance by reporters to get to know his job and to relish the fruits of his newly won office for a few

[7] Interview with David Broder (Washington, D.C., January 11, 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weeks before reporters and White House officials resume their traditional role as adversaries. Although this is an element in the relationship, the alliance exists primarily because during this period the White House and the news media share the same definition of news. They are allies working toward the same objective—to obtain maximum media exposure for the new administration, its staff, and its policies.

Newsworthy Items

The first item on the reporters' agendas is to profile interesting personalities—the "people" stories that are in constant demand from news editors. "It's a lot easier for me to get into several newspapers in the chain with a story about Amy than with a story about an important policy decision," noted Andrew Glass, the White House correspondent for the Cox newspapers. "If they use both, the Amy story is likely to get on page one, while the policy story will be buried on page 29."[8]

The most newsworthy person in the new administration is the president himself. Reporters are interested in three types of stories about the chief executive: human interest stories about the man himself and the people closest to him; stories about the president as policymaker, focusing on the way he conducts himself while making up his mind as to which policy positions he will choose and emphasize; and stories about the goals that he hopes to achieve and the plans he is formulating to attain them. All three types of stories are likely to be presented to the public in a manner that is favorable to the president in large part because of the habits and traditions of reporters in dealing with what they consider to be newsworthy items at this time.

"The President himself is a story, regardless of what he does," said George Reedy who served as Lyndon Johnson's press secretary.[9] A Ford White House official observing the Carter administration preparing to take office predicted that reporters would be very interested in "personality" stories about President Carter during the early days of his term. The reporters would want to find out:

> [First] Who is Jimmy Carter? What is his personality? Does he get mad? Does he golf? Does he fish in a pond? How do you find out who somebody is? You look at his friends, his habits, his manner, his character, his personality.[10]

The stories that result from these personal glimpses invariably are friendly to the president, as are stories that deal with the new president at work attempting to reach decisions about the direction of his administration. The same Ford of-

[8] Interview with Andrew Glass, White House correspondent for the Cox newspaper chain, now Washington bureau chief (Washington, D.C., June 17, 1977).

[9] George Reedy to the authors, April 19, 1976. See also Reedy, *Twilight of the Presidency*, pp. 101–103.

[10] Interview with Michael Raoul Duval, special assistant to President Ford (Washington, D.C., January 4, 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ficial explained why he thought that reporters would produce favorable stories about Carter at work making his mind up:

> The second story is what is he doing as president? The answer is that he is developing policy. When you develop policy and the options, and [you] consult, it is almost universally attractive. That's why there is a honeymoon. It is attractive because you are not making that many decisions. You are pulling together information. You are consulting. You are listening and defining problems. Nothing is as attractive to the country and the press as dealing—or appearing to deal—with problems.[11]

A newly inaugurated president also may receive favorable publicity when he announces such general goals as cutting back unemployment or curbing inflation. Reporters are not likely to respond critically to this type of announcement because of two deeply ingrained habits common to the production of news stories (as opposed to commentary). First, reporters present criticism in the form of a comparison between the president's rhetoric and his record. Since the president has no record at this time, his rhetoric is presented as the news story. Second, critical stories are seldom presented by reporters on their own authority—they prefer to pluck critical words from the mouths of public figures. At this early stage of an administration, however, most public figures are unwilling to criticize the president in strong, and thus newsworthy, terms because it is not yet clear in which direction the president is moving. He may be on their side and they do not want to antagonize him prematurely. Thus in the early months of his term, President Carter was spared strongly critical news stories—even in such controversial areas as the extent to which the United States should meet the new Soviet armaments build-up—until his decisions indicated whether he was coming down on the side of the "hard" or "soft" liners.

Another reason why reporters are willing to use the president's own words to describe his objectives in the early weeks of the new administration is that so many of them believe in what columnist David Broder has called the "expository period." Broder explained that when he first began to work as a journalist in Washington he learned from the widely syndicated columnist, Roscoe Drummond, that a reporter has a "responsibility to expound what a president was trying to do before he gets into the question of analyzing it and criticizing it."[12]

The Conduit Style of Reporting

During the phase of alliance, most reporters perceive their role as a conduit, that is, continuously channeling information to their news organizations in approximately the same form it is given to them. Thus, the president finds it relatively easy to dominate the agenda of the media. This style of reporting—which is characteristic of the wire services, some television news, and the smaller news

[11] Ibid.

[12] Interview with David Broder (January 11, 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organizations during an entire presidential term—is characteristic of most reporting at this time. Because of their large audiences, the wires and networks are particularly important to the White House.

Wire service reporting requires a constant response throughout the day to scores of requests from member papers and stations. Most information provided in response to these requests is attained from the press office with only occasional assistance from other White House officials. The wire services are also expected to cover all news events at the White House. Their news budget is usually made up on the basis of the president's schedule. Later, when the wire services begin to serve as a conduit for the president's critics or for news stories critical of the president that have appeared elsewhere, this process may be reversed and the White House may base its agenda on the AP or UPI budget.[13] But during the phase of alliance, the wire services serve as a channel for information that the White House officials want distributed to media outlets throughout the country.

Television networks are restricted in their presentation of materials by their need to present a story that can be communicated visually. The recognition of this need of the most important contemporary medium has produced a common thread in the last five administrations. "You pitch everything you have toward television," said one high-level member of President Ford's White House staff.[14] And Jody Powell, citing Theodore Roosevelt's appraisal of the presidency as a bully pulpit, stressed that the "pulpit now is CBS, NBC, and to some extent the wires."[15]

Phase Two: Competition

An end comes to the alliance between the White House and the news media when reporters become interested in news stories that emphasize the administration's involvement in controversies and conflicts among personalities and over policies. An activist president who has made clear policy commitments provides reporters with stories about conflicts with adversaries over policy as well as stories about conflicts among presidential supporters over which tactics should be used to win the policy battle. In the case of less active presidents, the passage of time usually provides reporters with the opportunity to produce stories about conflicts among advisers who are urging policy commitments, or at the very least stories about which adviser or cabinet official is currently on top of the White House pecking order. The shared definition of newsworthy items that led to stories supportive of the president and his policies during the phase of alliance dissolves in the phase of competition. Presidents find, as did John F. Kennedy

[13] Interview with Frank Cormier, White House correspondent for the Associated Press (Washington, D.C., March 4, 1977).

[14] Background Interview, White House official, Ford administration (Washington, D.C., December, 1976).

[15] Interview with Jody Powell (Washington, D.C., January 11, 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when asked about his reaction to press coverage, that they are "reading more and enjoying it less."[16]

During this phase, the president and White House officials become unhappy with the media that, from their perspective, is now focusing on either the wrong aspect of the story or the wrong story entirely. To deal with what they see as critical stories, the president and his staff can respond to the source of the criticism, to its messenger, or to both. If the source is known, he or she can be answered; if unknown, the leak must be traced to its source. "I never saw either president for whom I worked [Kennedy and Johnson] so mad as when they were upset over leaks," Walt Rostow told an interviewer.[17] If presidents themselves do not attempt to track down the individual who passed unauthorized information to the press, their aides do it for them, as did Jody Powell who admitted at a briefing that he had questioned a large number of White House aides when trying to find the source of a *New York Times* story that President Carter had become a "recluse" in the White House. Sometimes these efforts have unanticipated results. Pierre Salinger discovered that the president who sent him to track down leaks was often the culprit himself.[18]

The phase of competition is characterized by the chief executive's attempts to manipulate his relations with the news media. There is a retrenchment from the open presidency; the White House specifies the conditions under which officials may talk to reporters and seeks to curb unauthorized disclosures of information. White House officials usually opt for three approaches during this phase: news management, ingratiation, and attack.

News Management

News management involves the manipulation by the president and his advisers of the kinds of information that will be made available to reporters and of the forums in which information is given to them. Events such as trips are planned where reporters are more likely to be forced to accept the White House versions of what is going on since they have access only to officials and can observe only the ceremonies and parades of the trip. Of course there are many additional reasons why presidential travel may be scheduled by the president and his advisers, but White House aides indicated their awareness of the advantages travel gives to them in controlling the media's agenda and determining the flow of news and pictures to the public.

A second technique of news management is the manipulation of access. During the competition phase White House officials are more likely to evaluate each

[16] News conference of May 9, 1962, *Kennedy and the Press, The News Conferences* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1965), p. 239.

[17] Interview with W.W. Rostow, National Security Advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson (Austin, Texas, July 9, 1976).

[18] Pierre Salinger, *With Kennedy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 60-61

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contact with reporters in terms of how much they get out of them before they are arranged. The files of the presidential libraries provide evidence of this concern. In the Johnson Library, on a letter to George Reedy (who was then serving as press secretary) from Dan Rather requesting permission to film the White House staff at work, Lyndon Johnson noted in the margin, "this man and CBS are out to get us any way Bill Paley can. Tell him you have much more work than you can handle and these men are workers on routine, not actors."[19]

News management also involves the attempt to manipulate the forums in which information is given—press conferences, briefings, backgrounders, and interviews—by holding them less frequently, by changing the ground rules, by not providing as much information, and by burying reporters under piles of information. These settings, especially the presidential press conference, have become high-risk forums. An associate director of the Ford administration's office of communications predicted that the risks will ultimately outweigh the benefits for President Carter. His predictions are supported by the experiences of Carter's predecessors, from Kennedy to Ford:

> Carter's going to find exactly what every other president has found and that is the president's desire to portray his policies accurately and in a positive light invariably runs at cross purposes with the press's cynicism. . . . [Eventually] there's going to be some bad economic news two days before a scheduled press conference or there's going to be some other major story developing over which he has no control and about which he is not going to want to comment. And then the press conferences will stop. It is not a conscious evil decision to evade the press, but more a desire to answer those questions that you want to answer in a way that you want to answer them.[20]

Although this prediction was not borne out by President Carter, who through June 1978 kept to his promised average of two conferences a month, the president has on at least two occasions declared that certain kinds of questions could not be asked. The White House also manipulated the schedule during the Bert Lance affair in 1977 to give the president a reprieve from embarrassing questions while at the same time maintaining his average of two press conferences a month.

The success of individual officials and reporters in getting results from manipulative techniques depends in part on relations established during the early days of the new administration. More important to the success of the White House is its ability to place the president in dramatic national and international settings and situations during which news organizations seem compelled to follow the agenda set before them. Ultimately, however, White House officials must face the problem that the two sides no longer share a common definition of news. Consequently, the administration finds it more difficult to prevent the media from producing stories that raise issues in ways it does not want them

[19] LBJ notes on a letter from Dan Rather to George Reedy, April 20, 1964, PR18 files, Lyndon Johnson Library.

[20] Interview with William Rhatican (Washington, D.C., December, 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

raised, bestowing reputations that are not helpful from the White House's point of view, and conveying messages that the White House would prefer to have remained unsent.

Ingratiation

Ingratiation, the attempt to manipulate reporters by providing favors to them, usually involves rewarding some reporter or reporters with exclusive information. For example, a select group of editors or reporters may meet with a White House official at a specially arranged "backgrounder" where they are given information that, they are told, is usually provided exclusively to the highest officials in the administration. Ingratiation may also mean providing for the material needs and accommodations of reporters who travel with the president or granting an exclusive interview with the president or other high official to a reporter who gets his or her stories "straight" from the White House perspective. This undoubtedly was the case with the interview granted to Garnett Horner of the *Washington Star* by President Nixon immediately after his electoral triumph in November 1972. Such rewards are intended to have the concurrent effect of punishing those reporters who had "distorted" the White House's position and actions.

Ingratiation can be a subtle and effective technique during the period of competition when used to convert, through distraction, a potentially serious adversary in the press. A high-level Johnson administration spokesman described one such case involving a prominent reporter who had written critical stories about the administration. According to this official, LBJ said that the proper response to this situation was "to throw them a piece of meat when they are nipping" at your behind. He asked the spokesman to arrange for the reporter to receive briefings and interviews on administration plans that would give him a considerable head start on other reporters covering the White House. The tactic worked as the reporter devoted himself to his new opportunity to write stories that described the president's plans, giving them an almost guaranteed front page play. According to the spokesman, the reporter chose to believe that he was a trusted and highly valued newsman and did not appear to consider the possibility that he was being used by the White House.[21]

Attack

The technique of attack is the most extreme weapon in the president's arsenal during the phase of competition. It involves efforts by the White House to overcome what it sees as setbacks in the president's ability to lead and persuade caused by unfavorable reporting. Attack includes efforts to discredit (or get

[21] Background interview, White House official, Johnson administration (Washington, D.C., January, 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

discharged) a particular reporter, to damage a news organization, and in the most extreme cases to challenge the legitimacy of the media itself.

Some of the manifestations of attack show up in almost every administration, and the implied threat of possible retaliation by the White House may make some reporters pull in their horns if they see a minor story that is potentially damaging to the president. Some reporters may even profit from the widespread paranoia about press enemies that has afflicted so many recent administrations.

> A few words of sympathy over the unfair treatment by the "Eastern press" (or the liberal press or the conservative press) is an effective method of slamming doors against competitors. An important leader who can be persuaded that his journalistic "friend" is the lone holdout against a "press conspiracy" can serve as a meal ticket for many years.[22]

All-out attack on the media has been the characteristic of only one recent administration. The assault on wide segments of all forms of media by the Nixon administration was well planned and well coordinated and obviously struck positive responses among large numbers of citizens who indicated that their distrust of the media was nearly as great as their distrust of the political leadership.[23] The ultimate impact of the Nixon administration's efforts to exploit popular dissatisfaction with and hostility toward the news media may have led, after Nixon's downfall, to a situation in which large segments of the public believe neither the president nor those who report on and analyze the activities of his administration.

To cope with manipulation by the White House, reporters develop manipulative tactics of their own to pry loose information that the White House would prefer to withhold. During the phase of alliance, most reporters adopt the conduit style of reporting. During the phase of competition a reporter may become a friend of the court, an adversary, a historian-observer, or an institutional analyst. Many reporters do not change, but these more aggressive styles are particularly noticeable on the part of reporters for the major publications that set the tone for national reporting.

The Friend of the Court

This reporter's work depends on information obtained from White House sources in return for supportive articles. In some cases this may involve flattery or ingratiation of a particular official, including the president himself. One correspondent during the Johnson administration sent the president a picture of his

[22] Reedy, *Twilight of the Presidency*, p. 115.

[23] See Porter, *Assault on the Media* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1976) for a chronological presentation of the relationship between the Nixon administration and the White House with particular emphasis on the attack technique.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

den wall on which hung nine pictures of Johnson and the reporter.[24] Not surprisingly, the reporter was regarded as a favorite of the administration.

Most reporters who employ the friend of the court technique are somewhat less sycophantic. One correspondent described it as almost a psychoanalytical tactic for getting news. "Instead of asking them for news, you discuss their problems with them," he said, "and eventually they tell you more than they intend."[25] Other reporters who use this technique maintained that this tactic did not involve writing favorable stories but stories that indicated an understanding of a point of view of the officials.

The Adversary

This reporter approaches White House encounters from the perspective that officials may not be telling the truth or at the very least are withholding part of the story. Most White House reporters who take on this role limit it to the combative style with which they approach officials in public forums such as briefings. Reporters who employ this technique told us that it paid off because officials did not want to be confronted with a lie in public. The combative style of questioning does not necessarily translate into an accusatory style of writing. One of the best known practitioners of this style at the White House is Helen Thomas of United Press International. But readers of Thomas's stories would not be aware of how aggressively she questions officials at briefings. Like most wire service reporters, her stories provide a report of what has happened.

The Historian-Observer and Institutional Analyst

Some reporters become historian-observers in response to the White House's manipulative tactics during the phase of competition. Those who adopt this style of reporting interpret both the policies and the personalities who make and administer these policies in terms of the mood of the times. The advantage of this style for reporters is that their stories deal with the character of the administration and are thus less influenced by the "hard news" that during this phase often consists of "pseudo-events" staged by the White House.

Related to reporters who choose the style of the historian-observer are the institutional analysts whose beat includes the entire White House staff and executive office of the president. Officials who have worked at the White House during the last 16 years suggested to interviewers that in their minds this would be the best way of finding out what was going on at the White House. The single greatest problem reporters have in accurately portraying the presidency, according to these respondents, stems from the fact that newsmen concentrate almost exclusively on the president and those who have contact with him in the

[24] Material obtained from PR18 files, Lyndon Johnson Library.
[25] Andrew Glass interview (Washington, D.C., October 12, 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

oval office. The officials further suggested that what reporters could look at more profitably is the whole executive process, including the flow of alternative policies as they are sent from office to office before they finally land on the president's desk. The part of the story that reporters miss is the selection process of policy alternatives. The manager of this flow of information in the White House during the Ford administration suggested that the people making these important decisions are virtually unknown to reporters because they seldom are visible in conferences with the president and his top advisers.[26]

Phase Three: Detachment

The manipulative tactics used by both sides during the competition phase create antagonisms between White House reporters and White House officials that are most visible in settings such as the press secretary's daily briefing which one former White House correspondent referred to as "bear pit."[27] There appears, however, to be a limit to how far conflict may spread. Both sides have such fundamental needs for each other that strong elements of cooperation remain at all times. Consequently the phase of competition is followed by a phase of detachment during which the relationship is carried on in a more structured, and almost formal, manner than in the previous periods.

Detachment is a phase that is usually determined by the White House. It occurs earliest in those administrations in which there is little concern for the need to rally massive support for new policies. Since there is little need to persuade reporters to emphasize the advantages of their policies to the public, the White House's media policy becomes an effort to secure maximum exposure with the least amount of risk. In the years since the onset of the New Deal, it is not surprising to find that detachment usually occurs sooner and is employed more successfully by Republican than Democratic administrations.

The most important feature of this period is the tendency of presidents to delegate their relations with the press to surrogates. The president tends to see reporters in highly controlled and structured situations. Press relations are routinized in the press office rather than carried on throughout the White House.

The third phase is often brought on when a president decides to run for reelection. Because the stakes are now greater, his contacts with reporters are more likely to be carefully structured than they were in the middle years of his term. His staff will be particularly calculating as they arrange the president's press contacts. This was evident during the 1976 campaign when the office of communication was converted from a subsidiary of the press office to a major area

[26] Interview with James Connor, Secretary to the Cabinet (Washington, D.C., December 6, 1976).

[27] Interview with Edward T. Folliard, former White House correspondent for the *Washington Post* (Washington, D.C., January 22, 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of decision making in the election campaign. A Ford official described the process in this manner.

> Once you are in here, you can predict what the press is going to do with a story. It is almost by formula. Because of this they are usable. . . . You look at how you are projecting on philosophy, policies, personality, and the blend. You figure out how you will project in each of these areas. If you know [in advance] how the press will react, then you can act accordingly.[28]

Consequently, during this period the president's staff spends increasing amounts of time arranging the chief executive's activities in order to project his image and message while freeing him to spend more time on the substance of the campaign and less with the press.

It was under these circumstances in 1976 that the White House employed a tactic that was used by every incumbent president who campaigned for reelection since 1952. In 1976, the plan, which reporters called the "Rose Garden strategy," worked in this manner: White House officials knew that the news media felt bound to run at least one story about the president each day during the campaign, even if that meant covering an activity that ordinarily would not be considered newsworthy. President Ford was thus limited by his managers to one highly structured and controlled appearance before the news media, but one in which he appeared "presidential" by participating in a ceremonial activity. At the same time, Governor Carter was appearing at four or five events each day at which he might be besieged by hecklers from the anti-abortion crusade or where his campaign fatigue might show. Frequently, the event that created the most disruption of the campaign schedule would become the featured story on the same television news program that showed President Ford in the White House rose garden. As a result of this type of coverage, the advisers to incumbents are likely to keep the media at a distance. This point was noted by Carter's campaign press secretary, Jody Powell, who said that the tendency of the media to emphasize the embarrassing moments of political leaders leads to "institutional pressures toward inaccessability" which translates to mean that presidential advisers will keep the president's appearances limited to media events where he will not pass under too close scrutiny.[29]

Another aspect of the detachment phase is the White House's relatively greater emphasis on contact with the regional press and with interest groups. The president and his aides find advantages in dealing with the regional press or interest groups without the filter of the Washington press corps. Furthermore, the administration can channel information to the regional and specialized presses where they see it as having the most value for the president. For example, in a two-week period during April 1971, the White House prepared 18

[28] Background interview, White House official, Ford administration (Washington, D.C., December, 1976).

[29] Jody Powell interview (January 11, 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

separate mailings that were sent to 146,000 groups, publications, or individuals. Samples of the mailings indicate that they included environment and reorganization booklets sent to 1,100 reporters and news organizations; a statement by the president opposing abortions to 198 Catholic news organizations; a labor mailing to 1,364 labor and finance writers; a senior citizens proclamation that was sent to 100,000 groups concerned with the aging; and a copy of an article by the conservative columnist James Jackson Kilpatrick that was sent to 9,273 academics and Republicans.[30]

The response of some reporters during this phase is to begin to explore the use of investigative techniques involving attempts to reach independent sources of information in Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, the departments, and among lobbyists. Reporters are also more likely to engage in joint endeavors with other reporters in their own news organizations and thus reap some of the benefits from the division of labor and specialized expertise in the form of a more thorough analysis of what the White House is trying to do.

The Future of the Continuing Relationship

The emphasis in this article has been on the permanent characteristics of the relationship between the White House and the news media. The fact that both sides are locked into a close and cooperative relationship by their mutual need is balanced by their need to exploit each other. The rules and habits of the relationship perpetuate themselves because of the importance of the latent functions they perform. The complexity of the organizational worlds of both the White House and news organizations required arrangements that form the basis for the continuation of the major features of the relationship from one administration to the next. In theory, it would be possible for a president to alter radically the basis of the relationship, but such efforts were made and failed during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Thus, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter recognized that attempts to effect those sorts of changes are not only undesirable but also potentially damaging. Reporters' styles of covering the White House today show some residual strains from the era of Vietnam and Watergate. Many correspondents eagerly demonstrate in their public conduct at briefings or television talk shows that they do not trust the White House. Nevertheless, the actual manner in which reporters go about their routines in producing stories at the White House would be familiar to observers of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, or early Johnson years.

Yet the fact that it may be described as a "continuing" relationship does not mean that there have been no changes. Most noteworthy, perhaps, is that the relationship itself has become news. Whereas at one time the difficulty reporters might have in getting interviews or information was regarded as their own prob-

[30] U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, "Mailings and Distributions," April 12–17, 19–24, 1971, memorandum.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lem, today it may be featured on the evening news. The fact that Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter have regarded good media relations as a basic policy objective of their administrations is undoubtedly a result of the increasingly public nature of the relationship and of the public's interest in and awareness of the importance of the media.

A second change that can be observed is that the institutional changes brought about during the phases of one administration are carried over to the next. For example, the bureaucratic organizations of both the White House and the media have resulted in the creation of permanent offices in the White House that permit the president to develop relations with editors, publishers, the regional press, and interest groups even while he is still developing his relations with the White House press corps. The structured mode of the period of detachment could be seen early in the Carter administration in examples such as the twice-monthly scheduled meetings with editors and publishers, the regional town meetings, and phone-ins. Perhaps most significant of all was President Carter's employment of Patrick Caddell, a pollster, at the beginning of his term.

The assertion of the typical pattern of the phases can be seen if we look at a president's effort to be different and presumably "more open" than his predecessors. When President Carter began his term, the office of public liaison, which had been an important vehicle for rallying the support of interest groups and regional political leaders to the White House, was transformed, under Midge Costanza, into an office at the White House where outsiders such as the Gay Liberation Front could get a hearing. By 1978, Costanza was moved to the White House basement and shortly thereafter she resigned. Anne Wexler was appointed to a position of representative to interest groups that appeared to be very much like that of the old director of the office of public liaison, even if she did not hold that title as 1978 drew to a close.

A second example of the reappearance of the traditional pattern may be seen in President Carter's appointment of Gerald Rafshoon, who handled public relations and advertising during his campaigns for governor of Georgia and as president, as a senior adviser to serve as coordinator of White House publicity functions. Rafshoon, whose appointment was announced during the summer of 1978 when Carter's status in the polls had seriously declined, occupied a position that appears to be similar to or even more important than that of the director of the office of communications in the Nixon and Ford administrations.

In summary, it appears that throughout the terms of all recent presidents, the relationship between the president and the news media has been characterized by strong elements of continuity. No recent president has been so successful in his dominance over Congress, the bureaucracy, his political party, or private sector leaders that he has been able to downgrade media relations from its position in administration policymaking. For their part, no major news organization has been able to find ways of covering the presidency without the cooperation of the president and White House officials. When the needs of both sides converge, as they usually do at the beginning of an administration, the cooperative

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

elements are dominant. Later, when the president's need to use the news media to build a basis of support for his administration conflicts with reporters' interests in producing stories that feature conflict and inconsistency, each side uses manipulative tactics to achieve their goals. Yet the level of conflict that might be engendered by some of these tactics is limited by continuing mutual needs. That is why detachment follows the phase of competition in the relationship between the White House and the news organizations as a period of detente that lasts until a new president takes office and the process begins again.*

* The research for this article was supported by grants from the Ford Foundation and the Towson State University Faculty Research Committee.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia

JIRI VALENTA

On August 3, 1968, at the peak of the Czechoslovak crisis, Leonid Brezhnev and other members of the Soviet delegation to the Bratislava conference, together with the leaders of several Warsaw Pact countries—East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria—appeared to have reached a *modus vivendi* with Alexander Dubcek's leadership. Simultaneously, Warsaw Pact forces were ordered to cease their maneuvers on Czechoslovak territory. Many observers of Soviet politics interpreted these events as a victory for the Czechoslovak reformers. Yet only seventeen days later the agreement was broken by the sudden military invasion of Czechoslovakia by these same countries—all partners of Czechoslovakia in the Bratislava agreement.

Among observers of Soviet politics, there were some skeptics who doubted that the Bratislava rapprochement would last for long, but few expected a military move so soon. Also, as former commander in chief of the U.S. Army in Europe, General James H. Polk, recently noted, both U.S. government and NATO officials considered a Soviet invasion to be highly unlikely.[1] Even

[1] General James H. Polk, "Reflections on the Czechoslovakian Invasion 1968," *Strategic Review* V (1977):36–37. The author of this article arrived at the same conclusion while discussing the issue with several former high officials in the Johnson administration.

JIRI VALENTA is assistant professor and coordinator of Soviet and East European studies in the Department of National Security Affairs of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He is the author of the recently published *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision;* coeditor of the forthcoming volume *Eurocommunism between East and West;* and the author of numerous articles on Soviet and East European affairs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Charles Bohlen, one of the most pessimistic U.S. officials, frankly admitted that he underestimated Soviet timing on the use of military force.[2]

Why did so many policymakers and analysts fail to predict the Soviet decision to intervene? Recent literature on American foreign policy suggests that such failures often arise from a tendency to treat the state as a unitary actor, rather than analyzing bureaucratic conflict and consensus building within that state. Thus, some analysts tend to see Soviet foreign policymaking in the post-Stalin era through the conceptual "lenses" of what Graham Allison has christened the "rational policy paradigm."[3] Surprisingly, many explanations of why the Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia seem to fit this characterization. Some observers such as Hans Morgenthau and Herman Kahn conclude that the invasion was aimed at preventing Czechoslovakia from shifting its orbit closer to West Germany.[4] Others, like Boris Meissner, emphasize the importance of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, which stresses the "limited sovereignty" of socialist states in Soviet decision making.[5]

Can a better explanation of the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia be found by applying the bureaucratic politics paradigm? Who were the central figures in Soviet decision making? What were the interests of these decision makers and how did these interests affect their stands on the Czechoslovak issue? Who were the advocates of military intervention? Who were the skeptics? Did coalition politics evolve and how did various factors (for example, sources of information; external pressures) affect this evolution and the shaping of the final decision to invade Czechoslovakia? This essay seeks to test the validity of the bureaucratic politics paradigm by placing these inquiries in perspective and applying the paradigm to Soviet management of the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968.

The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm

The general argument of the bureaucratic politics paradigm can be summarized as follows: Soviet foreign policy actions do not result from a single actor, the Politburo, rationally maximizing national security. Instead, these actions result

[2] Bohlen's memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, August 13, 1968 as quoted in Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History 1929–1969* (New York: Norton, 1973), pp. 530–531.

[3] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). Also see Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974).

[4] See for example, Hans Morgenthau, "Inquisition in Czechoslovakia," *New York Review of Books*, December 4, 1969, pp. 20–21; Herman Kahn, "How to Think about the Russians," *Fortune*, November 1968, pp. 231–232.

[5] The document usually referred to as the locus of the Brezhnev doctrine is an article by S. Kovalev, "Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries," *Pravda*, September 26, 1968. For a discussion see Boris Meissner, *The Brezhnev Doctrine*, East Europe Monograph 21 (Kansas City: Park College Governmental Research Bureau, 1970). Most published studies of the Czechoslovak crisis depend more or less upon a rational policy model.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from a process of political interaction ("pulling and hauling") among senior decision makers in the Politburo and the heads of several bureaucratic elites at the Central Committee level. The methodology of the bureaucratic politics approach used here does not suggest that purely abstract institutional and organizational interests motivate Soviet foreign policy actions. Bureaucratic politics is seen instead as based upon and reflecting the division of labor and responsibilities among Politburo members in various policy areas. This division arises from two conditions: a highly bureaucratic political system; and a collective leadership in which no single decision maker possesses either sufficient power or sufficient wisdom to decide all important policy matters.

It is reasonable to assume that Soviet leaders, as their American counterparts, share a certain set of images of national security.[6] This set of images conditions the answers to questions asked by key bureaucracies: Who are our friends and who are our enemies? With whom shall we ally, and with whom shall we struggle? Undoubtedly, the shared images of national security interests affect the attitudes and arguments of Soviet decision makers in internal debates. Despite these shared images, senior Soviet decision makers may differ as to how to approach and resolve various issues.

Organizational Actors

Foreign policy formulation among Soviet leaders proceeds within a conglomerate of organizations controlled and coordinated by the Politburo. The main organizational participants in the decision-making process are the various departments of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the national security ministerial bureaucracies: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), and the Ministry of Defense and its various branches.[7] Under circumstances that will be discussed further, departments dealing with internal affairs and regional party bureaucracies in the non-Russian national republics (particularly the more important ones, such as the Ukraine) may also become involved in the decision making.

The pursuit of various bureaucratic responsibilities with respect to constituencies leads to organizational conflict—disagreements over budgetary allocations, organizational values, scope of authority, organizational sense of mission, and self-image. Organizations less concerned with the budgetary implications of their organizational missions, such as the Central Committee's Interna-

[6] On the "shared images" of national security interests held by American leaders, see Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics*, pp. 11–12.

[7] For an examination of institutions involved in Soviet foreign policy decision making, see Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, ed., Roy L. Macridis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962); Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1968); and Vladimir Petrov, "Soviet Foreign Policymaking," *Orbis* 17 (Fall 1973):819–850.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional Department and Department of Liaison with the Communist and Workers Parties, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are interested mainly in their self-image and influence in the Soviet decision-making process. For example, the International Department tends to assess foreign policy decisions on the basis of their effect on its mission abroad, notably in the maintenance of ties with such constituencies as the Communist parties and the pro-Communist trade unions in the West and the "progressive forces" in the Third World. In contrast, the subdivisions of the Soviet military establishment—ground forces, strategic rocket forces, air defense forces, naval forces, air forces, and rear services—themselves organizations with expensive proclivities, are greatly concerned with the budgetary implications of policy decisions.[8]

Some Soviet bureaucracies are assigned missions that can be accomplished mainly at home. Examples of such bureaucracies are the Central Committee's Department for Propaganda, the Party Control Commission, the Department of Science and Higher Education, and party bureaucracies in the Soviet national republics; all are charged with domestic and ideological supervision, indoctrination, and "party discipline." International developments and Soviet foreign policy actions are generally viewed by these departments in terms of the effect on their stated missions. As one source has observed, segments of the foreign policy establishment, such as the International Department and the divisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for relations with the Western countries, are likely to be more interested in good relations with Western countries than the bureaucracies charged with ideological supervision or with political stability in the various Soviet national republics, such as the Ukraine and the Baltic republics. The latter departments tend to view détente with suspicion, for it makes their organizational mission of ideological supervision and indoctrination more difficult.[9]

Uncommitted Thinking

Most Soviet decision makers do not head organizations with homogeneous constituencies. Some run organizations that do not have clearly defined missions or formal organizational goals. Many have broad responsibilities and sometimes overlapping foreign and domestic interests. Although there are Soviet bureaucrats who seek organizational independence, the pattern of overlap somewhat invalidates Allison's notion: "Where you stand depends on where

[8] For a discussion, see Roman Kolkowicz, "The Military," in *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, eds. H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 160-164; and Andrew W. Marshall, *Bureaucratic Behavior and the Strategic Arms Competition* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, October 1971).

[9] Dimitri Simes and Gordon Rocca, "Soviet Decision Making and National Security Affairs," Memorandum 20-KM-11-1, November 1973, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 1974, pp. 25-26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

you sit." The decisions of some senior decision makers who are less influenced by organizational parochialism are characterized by *uncommitted thinking*. Personal interests, varying backgrounds, and previous political career experience provide additional clues to a given Soviet decision maker's position on a given political issue. For example, those Soviet decision makers who, as leaders of party bureaucracies in non-Russian republics, had to deal with the volatile "nationalism" issue share a background experience that can affect their political stand. Finally, each participant's position on an important issue is undoubtedly influenced by other personal factors—prestige within the Politburo, personal idiosyncrasies, and the still unresolved question of succession.

Domestic interests of Soviet decision makers likewise affect their stand on issues. In Soviet decision making, the challenges of internal politics are much more real and forceful than alleged threats of "U.S. imperialism," "German revanchism," "Czechoslovak revisionism," or "Chinese adventurism." Domestic political constraints in Soviet foreign policymaking have grown in importance in the past two decades. Particularly under the more stable leadership of Brezhnev, Soviet decision makers are more susceptible than ever to domestic pressures.

The Nature of the Czechoslovak Crisis

The political crisis in Czechoslovakia, which initially appeared to be only a power struggle, shaped up in several months as a struggle for a more pluralistic concept of socialism.[10] Subsequent events in Prague—the resignation of Antonin Novotny's Moscow-oriented supporters, the reformist orientation of Dubcek's leadership, the revival of freedom of the press—created from the Soviet point of view a dangerous political situation in one of the most important Warsaw Pact countries with a potential impact on neighboring East European countries and the Soviet Union itself. "Prague spring," however, differed significantly from the kind of revolt that the Soviet leaders had experienced in Budapest in 1956. Dubcek's leadership did not challenge the basic elements of Soviet national security interests; it did not, for example, recommend revising Czechoslovakia's foreign policy orientation. Czechoslovakia would retain its membership in the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. Nor did Dubcek proclaim that a limited pluralism would signify loss of overall control by the Communist party; power, although somewhat diffused, would remain in the hands of the reformist party leadership. Nevertheless, from the Soviet point of view, the developments in Czechoslovakia were problematic and potentially dangerous.

Still, any threat to the Soviet Union's dominant influence in Eastern Europe was only potential and not imminent, and would have been incremental at that.

[10] For a detailed treatment of the origins of the Prague spring, see, in particular, H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); and Galia Golan, *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: Communism in Crisis 1962–1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For a long time, Soviet decision makers were unsure of their policy options with respect to Czechoslovakia. Should they reverse or merely limit the post-January changes in Czechoslovakia? What means should they use to contain Czechoslovakia's influence?

Parochial Priorities, Perceptions, and Stands

All senior Soviet decision makers must have been disturbed by Czechoslovak reformism. They evidently agreed that the political situation in Czechoslovakia had to be stabilized, and they seem to have recognized that the situation might require the use of military force. Thus covert preparations for military action and possible intervention probably began in the early stages of the crisis—February-March 1968. This military build-up during the crisis served not only as a logistic preparation for the invasion but also as an instrument of psychological pressure against Czechoslovakia. In fact, the military build-up had been accomplished by late June or early July; but the political decision to invade Czechoslovakia was taken only in late August after a long process of pulling and hauling among the senior decision makers. Each player, depending on his bureaucratic position, domestic interests, personal background, and idiosyncrasies, gave a somewhat different reading (or several readings) of the Czechoslovak issue. Consequently, the players took contrasting stands on the issue and disagreed on the means that should be used in its stabilization.[11]

The decision makers responsible for domestic affairs were especially concerned about the effect Prague reformism might have on the Soviet Union. In the perception of the Ukrainian party bureaucracy and its head P. E. Shelest,[12]

[11] The differing perceptions of Soviet officials regarding the Czechoslovak crisis can be deciphered by an analysis of the contents of their speeches and public statements. Some officials consistently attacked the "nationalists" and "right-wing revisionist" elements, "various demogogues and renegades" and "degenerates," and their "models of democratic socialism" and policies of "limitless decentralism." They called for "revolutionary vigilance" in the USSR, and some of them began to hint at offers of "fraternal assistance" to the "healthy forces" of Czechoslovakia in their struggle "against imperialist intrigues." Meanwhile, other officials, who consistently refrained from cryptic assaults on the Czechoslovak leadership, pledged respect for "each other's views," the "right of autonomy" and "noninterference in the internal affairs" of other Communist parties, some of them occasionally expressing publicly their "confidence in the Czechoslovak party." During the crisis this group, instead of attacking the "right-wing revisionists," consistently assaulted the "left revisionism" or "left adventurist perversion of Marxism" in the Chinese leadership as the main danger to the USSR. The former groups of officials, on the other hand, probably because of their preoccupation with the Czechoslovak issue, did not express any concern regarding the policies of the Chinese leadership.

Hereafter, in keeping with the purpose of this article, the public speeches and pronouncements of Soviet leaders will be referred to without going into lengthy analyses. For a detailed analysis, see Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Decisionmaking and the 1968 Czechoslovak Crisis," *Studies in Comparative Communism* VIII (Spring-Summer 1975):147-173.

[12] For Shelest's views of the Czechoslovak crisis, see his speeches in *Pravda Ukrainy*, February 17, 1968, and *Pravda*, July 5, 1968. See also an analysis by Grey Hodnett and Peter J. Potichny, *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1970).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as well as of other party bureaucrats in the Soviet Union's non-Russian republics (Belorussian leader P. M. Masherov and Lithuanian leader A. Iv. Snechkus, among others), "deviant" ideas of reformism and federalism could spill over from Czechoslovakia to encourage nationalism in their own republics.[13]

To the party bureaucrats charged with ideological supervision and indoctrination, such as A. Ya. Pelshe of the Department of Party Control Committee, S. N. Trapeznikov of the Department of Science and Education, and officials from the major cities (including Moscow's City First Secretary V. V. Grishin),[14] the Czechoslovak "disease" posed a threat to the containment of domestic affairs. This was especially true among the intellectual, scientific, and literary communities, where Prague reformism was seen as reinforcing reformist ideas among the members of the Soviet establishment (such as academician A. D. Sakharov), who hoped to see in their own society the same conditions then materializing in Czechoslovakia.

Another group of decision makers with strong organizational ties feared that Czechoslovak reformism would galvanize Soviet dissidents and reformists. To the KGB,[15] and also to the Warsaw Pact Command, reformism was a threat to organizational mission and authority in Eastern Europe. To General A. A. Epishev's Department of Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy (concerned with ideological and political supervision of the Soviet armed forces), Prague reformism and the weakening of morale observed in the Czechoslovak military posed serious threats to discipline in the Warsaw Pact. Thus, it is not surprising that early in April 1968 General Epishev expressed the willingness of the Soviet military to respond to an appeal from "healthy forces" (that is, antireformists) in Czechoslovakia "to safeguard socialism."[16] Chairman of the Supreme Soviet N. V. Podgorny, who was probably among the uncommitted players, signaled a hard-line stand on the Czechoslovak issue.[17] His position was probably influenced by his own experience with "nationalism" as the head of the Ukrainian party apparatus, where he was Shelest's predecessor.

Decision makers with responsibilities for foreign affairs appear to have taken a somewhat different reading of the Czechoslovak issue, concluding that in-

[13] For Masherov's views, see *Sovetskaia Belorussiia*, May 11, 1968. For Snechkus's views, see his article, "The April Session and Some of Our Tasks," in *Kommunist* [Journal of the Central Committee of Lithuania] 6 (June 1968):3–7, and *Kommunist* 10 (October 1968):9–10.

[14] For Pelshe's stand, see *Neues Deutschland*, May 4, 1968, and *Tribuna* (Prague), March 26, 1969. Trapeznikov's militant view on the Czechoslovak issue is developed in his book *At the Turning Points of History* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), pp. 73–78. For Grishin's stand, see *Pravda*, April 23, 1968.

[15] For KGB position on Czechoslovak reformism, see Ladislav Bittman, *The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1972), pp. 167–215. See also Josef Frolik, *The Frolik Defection* (London: Leo Cooper, 1975), pp. 130–179.

[16] As reported in *Le Monde*, May 5–6, 1968.

[17] For Podgorny's views, see Radio Moscow, May 6, 1968, and *Pravda*, July 20, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tervention would be too costly. What was primarily a domestic issue to officials responsible for domestic affairs was primarily an issue of external relations and ties with constituencies in the West to officials responsible for foreign affairs. M. A. Suslov, chief coordinator of Soviet policies in the international Communist movement, and B. N. Ponomarev and his deputy V. V. Zagladin, leading bureaucrats in the International Department, were concerned with the impact of the events in Czechoslovakia. A military intervention would undermine their organizational mission, their personal prestige, and the maintenance of good ties with their constituencies—the Communist parties and trade organizations in the West and the "progressive" forces in the Third World. Moreover, it would threaten the coming world Communist conference scheduled for November 1968.[18] And, they warned, the intervention would push the Chinese into the American camp.[19]

Premier A. N. Kosygin, who at that time was responsible for governmental diplomacy and was an advocate of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and an early start to SALT talks with the United States, probably feared the detrimental effects of intervention.[20] Bureaucrats at the International Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed to feel that intervention would be detrimental to ongoing foreign policy strategies, would strengthen American opposition to SALT, and would enhance the electoral prospects of Richard M. Nixon—the presidential candidate who at the time was perceived as a staunch anticommunist and an advocate of U.S. strategic "superiority."[21]

The Secretary General

In contrast to an American president's capacity to accept or reject the views of the National Security Council and to alter the composition of the government, the secretary general of the CPSU must have the support of most of his colleagues in the ruling elite. Even though the events surrounding Nixon's resignation have shown that an American president can be removed from office by the threat of impeachment, the chief executive cannot be deposed by a mere coali-

[18] For Suslov's views, see *Pravda*, February 28 and May 6, 1968. For Zagladin's views, see *Pravda*, April 29, 1968, and Radio Moscow, March 21, 1968.

[19] Dimitri Simes, "The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Limits of Kremlinology," *Studies in Comparative Communism* VIII (Spring-Summer 1975):178. See also hints in "The Political Course of Mao Tse-tung on the International Scene," *Kommunist* (May 1968):95–108.

[20] For Kosygin's views, see his speeches in *Sovetskaia Belorussiia*, February 15, 1968; *Izvestiia*, July 2, 1968. As late as July, Kosygin expressed "confidence in Czechoslovak Communists," *Pravda*, July 15, 1968. For Kosygin's stand on SALT, see Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), pp. 484–485; John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), pp. 91–94; and an interview with Dr. Walt W. Rostow, July 26, 1974, Austin, Texas.

[21] Simes, "The Soviet Invasion," p. 178. See also A. Grigorysants and V. Rogov, "Leninist Ideas Are Invincible: The Policy of Anticommunism Meets with Failure, Richard Nixon Again," *Trud*, August 13, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of National Security Council or cabinet members. In Soviet politics this outcome is quite possible, as Khrushchev's fall in October 1964 demonstrates. Whereas the American president has come to exercise "the power to persuade," the secretary general in the Soviet Union acts as first among equals and thus is required not only to persuade but also to identify himself with, or better, to create, a winning coalition in the Politburo. (This was even more true in the late 1960s, when Brezhnev's personal influence as secretary general was relatively minor compared with that of the 1970s.) These constraints of the office could be observed in Secretary General Brezhnev's behavior during the Czechoslovak crisis. In trying to play the game according to the rules of first among equals, Brezhnev vacillated between the interventionist and noninterventionist coalitions during the several stages of the crisis in an attempt to identify himself with the prevailing one.[22] Brezhnev's indecisiveness became obvious when he apologized in June 1968 to one of the most outspoken Czechoslovak reformers, J. Smrkovsky, for attacks of Soviet "propaganda" against him, explaining that this had happened because of a lack of information.[23] Also, some shifting of stands by other players, particularly those with no organizational commitments, obviously took place during the protracted crisis. The continual changes in Soviet decisions, especially during the last strenuous phase of the crisis, indicate that some of the decision makers, including Brezhnev, altered their stands several times.

East European Players

As in the Soviet Union, there appear to have been two schools of thought among the East European elites regarding the Czechoslovak situation. One was represented by East German leader Walter Ulbricht and the Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka; the other by Hungarian leader Janos Kadar. Whereas Ulbricht and Gomulka considered Czechoslovak reformism a threat to their bureaucratic positions and saw intervention as an opportunity to improve their domestic as well as interbloc postures, Czechoslovak reformism was a boon to Kadar's cautious pursuit of greater domestic flexibility in Hungary. Gomulka hated Dubcek and envied his popularity in Czechoslovakia. This animosity was fueled by the March 1968 student demonstration in Warsaw and the ongoing factional struggle in Poland, presumably influenced by Prague reformism.[24] Ulbricht feared the effects of the "cancer" of Dubcekism in his own country.[25]

[22] For Brezhnev's views, see Radio Leningrad, February 16, 1968, and *Pravda*, February 23, March 30, and July 4, 1968; E. Weit, *At the Red Summit: Interpreter behind the Iron Curtain* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 209–210.

[23] An interview with Josef Smrkovsky published posthumously in *Listy* (Roma), no. 2 (March 1975):11–12.

[24] Weit, *At the Red Summit*, p. 205; Alexander Dubcek's letter to the Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia and the Slovak National Council, October 1974 (hereafter referred to as Dubcek's letter) in *Listy*, no. 3 (April 1975): 14.

[25] Dubcek's letter, p. 14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kadar's tolerance and benign neutrality toward Czechoslovakia[26] were probably motivated, in his perception, by the chance of a nonmilitary resolution, which would allow the continuation of Hungary's moderate domestic policy, for example, the experiment with economic reform begun early in 1968 known as the New Economic Mechanism (NEM).

Contrary to most reports of the situation, during the 1968 crisis the Czechoslovak leadership was divided into two competing coalitions—reformists and antireformists. The antireformist coalition was composed of heterogeneous elements, including those who in the early stages of the crisis supported Dubcek (D. Kolder and V. Bilak) but later, for a variety of reasons, began to fear loss of their power at the forthcoming Congress of the Czechoslovak Party. After its defeat at the regional and district party conferences in June and July, the antireformist coalition intensified its efforts to discredit the reformists in Dubcek's leadership and to secure Soviet "fraternal assistance"[27] by providing "proofs" to the Soviet Politburo of the presence of "counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia.

Playing Coalition Politics

Politics in the Soviet Union, as in Western countries, makes strange bedfellows. As suggested by a survey of several cases, most notably Robert Tucker's and Stephen Cohen's analyses of Soviet politics in the 1920s, and Michael Tatu's study of Soviet politics in the 1960s,[28] coalitions in Soviet politics are loose, temporary, issue-oriented, heterogeneous alliances of convenience among different subgroups powerful enough to carry out their policies. Moreover, in the Soviet Union the prime motivating factors in the formation of coalitions are not necessarily ideological considerations but rather calculations of expected payoffs (including that of being on the winning side), or calculations of compatibility and conflicts of interest.[29] Although a winning coalition in Soviet politics at minimum is composed of a majority of senior Politburo members, it must also include influential Central Committee bureaucrats.

The composition of such coalitions can change unexpectedly and dramatically.

[26] For Kadar's views on Czechoslovakia, see his interview in C. L. Sulzberger, *An Age of Mediocrity: Memoirs and Diaries, 1963–1972* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 476–477.

[27] Dubcek's letter to Comrade K. Smrkovsky, *Listy*, no. 2 (May 1974): 5; and an interview with Smrkovsky, *Listy*, no. 2 (May 1974): 15; and Zdenek Mlynar, *Ceskoslovensky pokus o reformu 1968* (Köln: Index-Listy, 1975), p. 233.

[28] Robert Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary* (New York: Norton, 1973); Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888–1938* (New York: Knopf, 1973); and Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin* (New York: Viking, 1969).

[29] The concept of calculatons of expected payoffs is developed in William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). For an important modification of Riker's theory, see Robert Axelrod, *Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Application to Politics* (Chicago, Ill.: Markham, 1970), esp. pp. 165–185.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As stressed earlier, there was a diversity of opinion among senior decision makers on *how* to cope with the "Czechoslovak threat." The decision makers favoring Soviet intervention, in building up an interventionist coalition, conceptualized the Czechoslovak situation as a *zero-sum* game—one side's gain was the other side's loss. Although some differences of opinion about the implementation of military intervention probably existed among members of this coalition, they probably perceived it as the only option available. Their aim was the removal of Dubcek and his supporters by military force. The payoff of such a policy, as seen by the various segments of this coalition, rested in excising the "cancer" of Czechoslovak reformism. Some members appear to have joined the interventionist coalition to obtain other kinds of payoffs, mainly bargaining leverage on other issues. Ideological bureaucrats like Trapeznikov may have hoped that the crush of Czechoslovak reformism would strengthen their positions in dealing with dissidents and reformers at home.

On the other side, members of the noninterventionist coalition, citing the high risks of military intervention, conceptualized the Czechoslovak crisis as a *non-zero-sum* game and thus recommended resolution of the crisis by political or economic means. Undoubtedly, a range of opinion existed among those Soviet officials who questioned the wisdom of military intervention, some advocating political bargaining, others perhaps political or economic coercion, or even actions aimed at "the destabilization" of Dubcek's regime. For example, in April 1968 Zagladin, one of the skeptics of the intervention, was reported by D. Voslensky, an eyewitness and adviser to the Central Committee of the CPSU, to have stated that the situation in Czechoslovakia "should not be dramatized" since "it cannot be compared with Hungary" (in 1956). Zagladin agreed with Voslensky that the USSR's policy should be politically supportive of Dubcek against both extremes in Czechoslovak politics: the discredited supporters of Novotny as well as the anti-Soviet forces.[30] What united these policymakers were perceptions of the high risks of military intervention; but they apparently differed among themselves as to the means for dealing with the "Czechoslovak threat." Thus they recommended resolving the crisis by a variety of means *short of invasion, and at considerably less political cost.*

These differences between coalitions were highlighted several times during the crisis. Whereas a Soviet military delegation (which included the interventionist Epishev) used pressure and coercion during its May visit to Czechoslovakia, Premier Kosygin used persuasion.[31] Whereas Kadar displayed a moderate stand toward Czechoslovakia at the Warsaw Conference in July, Ulbricht pressed for

[30] See excerpts from the diary of a Soviet eyewitness Professor M. Voslensky, a former arms control expert of the Central Committee of the CPSU, now living in Munich. "This Will Only Help Americans," *Der Spiegel* 34 (August 21, 1978): 126.

[31] Kosygin's moderate behavior was reported on Prague television, May 22, 1968; and in *Zemedelske noviny*, May 22, 1968. Here I benefited from an interview with a former deputy prime minister of the Czechoslovak government, Ota Sik, June 5, 1974, St. Gallen.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intervention.[32] Shelest tried to break up the bargaining during the negotiations between the Czechoslovak and Soviet leaderships at Cierna-on-Tisa by insulting the Czechoslovak reformists and accusing them of actively supporting separatist tendencies in the Transcarpathian Ukraine; Suslov, under pressure from several influential Communist parties (Italian, Spanish, Yugoslav, and Rumanian), and perhaps fearing for the forthcoming world Communist conference, argued in favor of a political resolution of the crisis.[33]

Consensus Building

During the crisis, *a deadline* imposed by circumstances, together with the requirements of consensus building, had an impact on coalition formation. The deadline, as projected by the interventionist coalition, was September 9, 1968, the date of the Fourteenth Extraordinary Party Congress in Czechoslovakia, during which most of the pro-Soviet Central Committee members would be expelled and a new pro-Dubcek slate would be elected, thus legitimizing his program. The interventionists argued that a decision must be made *before* the Congress took place. According to one interventionist, Ulbricht, the date of the Czechoslovak Congress set a deadline for the Warsaw Pact countries, because afterward "they would be faced with a completely new situation. . . . All the good Communists would lose their posts." Thus, "the Warsaw Pact must react before this Party Congress can take place."[34] In short, the Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist party provided the occasion for resolving the issue.

Various maneuvers took place in an effort to create a consensus on policy. The interventionist coalition evidently tried to enlarge the decision-making circle by bringing in new participants. For example, in April 1968 K. F. Katushev, a regional party official with no previous experience in foreign affairs, replaced an experienced, but not "hard enough," foreign policy bureaucrat, K. V. Rusakov, in the important post of party secretary in charge of the Department of Liaison with Ruling Communist Parties. Another regional bureaucrat, Y. V. Ilnitskii, who as party secretary from Transcarpathia was even more obscure than Katushev, particpated with Katushev in postintervention diplomacy. Ilnitskii,[35] along with another bureaucrat from the West, Latvian party leader A. E. Voss, [36] also spoke at the important July session of the Central Committee of the

[32] Weit, *At the Red Summit*, pp. 201–202.

[33] Pavel Tigrid, *Why Dubcek Fell* (London: MacDonald, 1971), pp. 86–87; and an interview with Smrkovsky, *Listy*, p. 13.

[34] Ulbricht quoted in Weit, *At the Red Summit*, pp. 202–203.

[35] Ilnitskii wrote several articles at the time expressing his concern about the Czechoslovak influence on the inhabitants of his region. See *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 29, 1968; "Our Light: Internationalism," *Kommunist Ukrainy* I (1969): 85–93; and an analysis of Hodnett and Potichny, *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis*, pp. 144–45.

[36] For Voss's view, see "Some Questions of Ideological Work of the Party Organization," *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* 10 (September 30, 1968): 7–15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CPSU, which dealt exclusively with the Czechoslovak issue. The very fact that the rules of the game were probably being readjusted and tuned to the interests of the intervenionist coalition (both Ilnitskii and Voss, thought to be nonmembers of the Central Committee of the CPSU, spoke in this forum) suggests that the interventionists succeeded in expanding the circle to include participants who could dramatize the danger of Czechoslovakia's influence upon the non-Russian republics in the Soviet West. In general, bureaucrats from this part of the Soviet Union belonged to the interventionist coalition and constituted one of its most important factions. At the July session, almost half of the speakers were representatives of these republics. These officials, because of geographic proximity and cultural and social peculiarities of their republics, seem to have been much concerned about "contamination" from the Czechoslovak "disease."

Maneuvers in Influencing the Decision

The maneuvering among Soviet decision makers during the Czechoslovak crisis took place within an organizational context. An illustration is the performance of the Warsaw Pact Command and its commander in chief, Marshal I. I. Iakubovski, during the June-July military exercises on Czechoslovak territory. According to a Kosygin-Dubcek understanding, the regular Warsaw Pact units originally were not scheduled to participate in these exercises. But Iakubovski reportedly insisted on deploying Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia until September 20—the closing day of the Party Congress—and he was reluctant to order their withdrawal despite earlier assurances from Kosygin to Dubcek.[37]

The resignation of the chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact, General M. I. Kazakhov, signaled that even at the top of the Warsaw Pact Command there were fears that military intervention against the only "natural ally" of the Soviet Union might have a detrimental effect on the Soviet Union's defense system in Eastern Europe. Moreover, for the Soviet military services, resolution of the Czechoslovak crisis probably had important budgetary implications. Perhaps it was not accidental that long-time advocates of the Soviet version of "flexible response" and ground forces lobbyists, Generals Iakubovski and S. M. Shtemenko[38] (who replaced the reluctant General Kazakhov shortly before the invasion),[39] were numbered among the interventionists, and that General I. G. Pavlovski, the new commander in chief of the Ground Forces Command reestablished in December 1967, was in charge of the invasion. Perhaps, the

[37] Tigrid, *Why Dubcek Fell*, p. 68.

[38] For Shtemenko's and Iakubovski's views, see General Shtemenko, *Nedelia* 6 (January 31–February 6, 1965); and General Iakubovski, "Ground Forces," *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 31, 1967, and his articles "Friendship Born in Battle," *Krasnaia zvezda*, June 23, 1968, and "The Battle-ready Community of Armies of the Socialist Countries," *Kommunist* 5 (1970): 90–100.

[39] John Thomas, *Soviet Foreign Policy and Conflict Within the Political and Military Leadership* (McLean, Va: Research Analysis Corporation, September 1970), p. 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ground forces lobbyists within the armed forces saw in the crisis an opportunity to improve their organizational mission. There were also signs, however, that other branches of the armed forces, in particular Marshal N. I. Krylov's Strategic Forces, whose organizational mission was hardly affected by developments in Czechoslovakia, may have had doubts about the wisdom of military intervention.[40]

The Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), particularly officials responsible for East European and domestic affairs, aligned itself with those bureaucracies whose organizational mission was adversely affected by Prague reformism. KGB men in Prague had been dismissed, their security surveillance system dismantled, and past KGB activities revealed. It is therefore not surprising that the KGB engaged in various maneuvers to influence the Soviet decision, including producing such "proofs of counterrevolution" and "Western subversion" in Czechoslovakia as fabricated leaflets threatening the people's militia, and the discovery of a "secret cache" of American-made weapons (packed in Soviet-made bags) near the Czechoslovak-West German border.[41] Moreover, the KGB conducted covert actions against reformists (which entailed distributing anti-Dubcek leaflets) and probably produced resolutions, letters, and articles threatening and discrediting Czechoslovak Minister of the Interior J. Pavel and other Czechoslovak reformists.[42] All of these actions, which dramatized the situation in Czechoslovakia, served to build support among Soviet bureaucracies and the public for intervention.

The Role of Information

The collection and processing of information is an important function of several Soviet foreign policy bureaucracies. The fiercely competitive atmosphere of the bureaucracies could conceivably compel an agency to "manage" its information in the hope of enhancing its organizational or ideological mission or scoring an advantage over a rival agency.[43]

Soviet decision makers, as their Western counterparts, receive incomplete and distorted information from their agencies abroad. A case study relating to Czechoslovakia shows how information sent to Soviet decision makers can be manipulated. During the Novotny era, Soviet leaders received more or less accurate information from Czechoslovakia through established organizational channels of the information and communication systems. With the personnel

[40] John Erickson, "Towards a 'New' Soviet High Command: 'Rejuvenation' Reviewed," *Royal United Service Institute Journal* (England) 9 (September 1969): 37–44.

[41] An official Czechoslovak investigation of the "secret cache" of weapons concluded that this allegation was "a provocation." See an interview with Smrkovsky, *Listy*, p. 15.

[42] For the activities of the KGB see Bittman, *The Deception Game*, p. 214; and Frolik, *The Frolik Defection*, p. 148.

[43] See *The Penkovsky Papers* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 255–277, and a report in *Die Welt*, November 1, 1975.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

changes made under Dubcek's leadership, they lost control over these channels and many times appeared not to have adequate or accurate information. Thus, Soviet decision makers were forced to seek alternative East German, Polish, and Czechoslovak antireformist sources of information on the critical Czechoslovak issue. Furthermore, they relied heavily on information and intelligence estimates of the KGB, which were affected by that organization's self-serving interests. Similarly, the reports of the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Chervonenko, appear to have been influenced by his background experience as Soviet ambassador to China, by his relationship with Czechoslovak reformists, and by his possible fear of becoming the man who "lost Czechoslovakia." The reports may also have been influenced by Chervonenko's fear that if the intervention did not occur, Czechoslovak reformists would succeed in convincing the Soviet leadership (as Smrkovsky had attempted to do during negotiations with Brezhnev in June 1968) to recall him from Prague.[44]

The KGB and Ambassador Chervonenko were ill-prepared to assess correctly the configuration of the non-Communist forces in Czechoslovakia, the balance of forces between reformist and antireformist coalitions, and Dubcek's popularity; as a result, the picture they presented to the Soviet Politburo was a distorted one. Dubcek and other reformists were portrayed as a minority force in the Czechoslovak leadership who relied mainly on the support of "radical" pressure groups and who were potential agents of the "imperialist" powers. The antireformists in turn were characterized not as what they were—a small rival group fearing a loss of power—but as representatives of a widespread opposition among the healthy party cadres and as dedicated Communists opposed to the right-wing coup in Czechoslovakia.[45] The significance of certain developments during the Prague spring—for example, the emergence of various political clubs, and radical pronouncements such as the famous "Two Thousand Words"—was vastly overrated and presented as proof of the counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia.

The Bureaucratic Tug-Of-War

The negotiations at Cierna-on-Tisa between the Czechoslovak and Soviet leaderships (where nine of the eleven members of the Soviet Politburo were present) brought about an uncertain *modus vivendi*. Although no written agreement materialized and only verbal promises were made by both sides, selected teams from the Soviet and Czechoslovak contingents pledged to defuse the crisis. Shortly afterward, on August 3, the conference of Warsaw Pact members

[44] Smrkovsky told Brezhnev that Chervonenko did not inform the Soviet leadership "accurately," and indicated that Czechoslovak reformists hoped that he would be recalled. See an interview with Smrkovsky, *Listy*, p. 15.

[45] Tigrid, *Why Dubcek Fell*, p. 98. Soviet leader Ponomarev reportedly complained about the "incompetence of Chervonenko" after the invasion, in ibid., p. 227.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(minus Rumania) took place in Bratislava. Here, despite the objections of Ulbricht and Gomulka, the ambiguous promises of the Cierna negotiations were incorporated in the loose ideological language of the Bratislava declaration. The provisional and ambiguous nature of the agreement was underscored by the fact that the Soviet leadership ordered the withdrawal of Warsaw Pact units *from Czechoslovakia, but not those units concentrated around the Czechoslovak borders*. The latter units did not return to home stations but remained in encampments on the Czechoslovak borders.[46] The divided Politburo decided against intervention; but at the same time it did not order the dismantling of the military build-up. The outcome of the negotiations was perceived only as a provisional settlement that did not exclude intervention if the Czechoslovak reformists failed to implement the agreement.

The bureaucratic tug-of-war within the Soviet Politburo intensified after the negotiations. The Soviet leaders must have returned to the Soviet Union with differing expectations of the compromise—the noninterventionists hopeful that it would work, the interventionists convinced that it would not. Some elements of the noninterventionist coalition were satisfied with the results, particularly the removal of the direct threat to the world Communist conference[47] and of a possible indirect threat to the SALT negotiations. The interventionists, on the other hand, were disappointed because their strongly felt bureaucratic demands were not included in the Bratislava declaration. As before the Bratislava accord, the interventionists sought to build a consensus for ending the temporary truce with Czechoslovakia.

At this crucial stage, elements of the interventionist coalition—the party establishment in the Soviet Union's Western non-Russian republics, the departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU concerned with ideological supervision and indoctrination, the interventionists in the KGB, and the interventionists in the armed forces—communicated to the Politburo their dissatisfaction with the sudden moderation of Soviet policy and intensified their efforts to reverse the trend. The bureaucrats responsible for ideological supervision and indoctrination used cryptic language to express their disapproval with the agreement, which did not call for reimposition of censorship in Czechoslovakia.[48] The interventionists in the non-Russian republics, particularly in the Ukraine, similarly communicated their disapproval of the policy of nonintervention.[49] Ukrainian party boss Shelest redoubled his efforts to mobilize the bureaucracies to undo the Cierna-Bratislava compromise, reportedly by supplying the Polit-

[46] Polk, "Reflections," p. 37.

[47] See hints of this in the authoritative article "Strength in Unity," *Pravda*, August 5, 1968.

[48] For example, see hints in "The Political Milk of *Literarni listy*," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, August 14, 1968; G. Kibets and A. Stepanov, "Dictatorship of the Proletariat: Its Content and Forms," *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, August 9, 1968.

[49] *Pravda Ukrainy*, August 1, 1968; "Fidelity to Marxism-Leninism: Source of the Strength of Socialist Cooperation," *Kommunist Ukrainy* 8 (August 1968): 3–13; *Sovetskaia Estoniia*, August 4–7, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

buro with accounts of the alarming situation in Czechoslovakia and the stimulation of nationalist sentiment in the Ukraine.[50]

In not criticizing Czechoslovakia's dismissal of KGB agents from Prague (in whose behalf a high KGB official, Vinokurov, intervened unsuccessfully with the Czechoslovak Minister of Interior Pavel),[51] the Cierna-Bratislava agreement did not reinstate to its former prominence the KGB organizational mission in Czechoslovakia. This further angered the KGB leadership. Some Soviet generals who believed that during the Prague spring Czechoslovakia's defense capabilities were seriously shaken and weakened considered the Bratislava declaration provisions too ambiguous and were probably displeased with the Politburo's decision to withdraw Warsaw Pact troops from Czechoslovak territory.[52]

Pressure from East European Interventionists

Polish leader Gomulka, fearing that appeasement of the Czechoslovaks would intensify factional tension at home and possibly weaken his position at the November 1968 Congress of the Polish Communist Party, probably signaled to the Soviet leadership that he could give no guarantee of political stability in his country unless the Soviet Union used military force to restore order in Czechoslovakia.[53] East German leader Ulbricht, who in June had tried to create a political crisis with West Germany over Berlin, in August (shortly after the conference at Bratislava) unexpectedly proposed an exchange of missions of economic cooperation with West Germany's "revanchists." He also undertook a visit to Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia for negotiations with Dubcek shortly before the invasion on August 12. Ulbricht's actions were aimed at convincing the coalition-ridden Soviet Politburo that the "soft" nature of the Cierna-Bratislava understanding might have unfavorable consequences for East Germany and that Dubcek's regime was not complying with the Cierna-Bratislava agreement and should be removed.[54] To the Czechoslovak antireformist coalition, the Cierna-Bratislava compromise was seen as contributing to a defeat at the forthcoming Extraordinary Party Congress in Czechoslovakia on September 9. Accordingly, shortly after Bratislava they apparently transmitted urgent

[50] See "The Removal of Shelest," *Listy*, no. 4 (July 1972): 33; "The Unexpected Soviet Initiative-Thaw in Prague," *Le Monde*, June 17–18, 1973.

[51] Robert Little, ed., *The Czechoslovak Black Book* (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 80–81; Frolik, *The Frolik Defection*, p. 150.

[52] Czechoslovak Prime Minister Cernik reported that this had been concluded by the Soviet generals prior to the intervention. See Tigrid, *Why Dubcek Fell*, p. 95. For hints of military dissatisfaction with the Bratislava agreement, see *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 18, 1968.

[53] Jan B. Weydenthal, "Polish Politics and the Czechoslovak Crisis," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 14 (January 1972): 46, and Weit, *At the Red Summit*, p. 205.

[54] For an analysis see Melvin Croan, "Czechoslovakia, Ulbricht, and the German Problem," *Problems of Communism* 1 (January-February 1969): 1–5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reports to the Soviet Politburo, depicting the Congress as leading to disintegration of the Czechoslovak leadership and to the generally unstable political conditions in Czechoslovakia.

The Final Debate: Logistic and Rational Arguments, Shared Images, Costs, and Deterrence

The scattered evidence suggests that the Politburo's final decision was based on information and estimates provided by the KGB and Ambassador Chervonenko, and on "urgent" reports from Ulbricht, Gomulka, and the Czechoslovak antireformists, D. Kolder, A. Indra, and V. Bilak who forecasted a "right-wing" takeover at the Extraordinary Party Congress.[55] All these signals and pressures probably made it easier for interventionists in the Soviet Politburo to argue that military intervention *after* the Congress would be much more difficult and costly, and that dealing with the impact of Czechoslovak reformism on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, should it be validated at the Congress, would be much more problematic. The argument that military intervention could not be delayed any longer was apparently reinforced by logistic considerations of the Soviet armed forces, particularly the Rear Service. Their commander in chief, General S. S. Mariakhin, in evaluating the so-called rear service exercise that took place in July (actually a preparation for a military build-up on the Czechoslovak borders), implied that if the Politburo were to decide to withdraw these troops, he could not guarantee the success of a military intervention in the future without disruption of the Soviet economy and its transportation system.[56] The rear service exercise, during which thousands of reservists were called up and thousands of motor transport vehicles were mobilized from civilian resources, was probably detrimental to the collective harvest in the Soviet Union. In short, the "logistics" argument held that after Bratislava only two options were available: either dismantle the military build-up or intervene. The command of the Rear Services apparently did not consider an indefinite military presence around Czechoslovakia to be a viable organizational option.

Meanwhile, the United States—caught up in Vietnam, racial disturbances, and presidential politics—was either unable or unwilling to do anything on behalf of embattled Czechoslovakia. This posture was implied by the public statements of Secretary of State Dean Rusk in July 1968, by the Johnson administration's continued interest in the SALT negotiations, and by the behavior of the U.S. armed forces in West Germany. (In July, strict orders were given

[55] Dubcek, *Listy*, p. 5; and Mlynar, *Ceskoslovensky pokus*, p. 233; and Tigrid, *Why Dubcek Fell*, p. 98. Also see hints in "The Letter of Warning of the Soviet Politburo" of August 17, 1968, reported on Radio Prague, August 20, 1969.

[56] An interview with General S. S. Mariakhin, *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 14, 1968; and Polk, "Reflections," p. 32.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the U.S. command in West Germany forbidding all activity, including an increase of air or ground patrols, on Czechoslovak borders that might be interpreted by the Soviets as support of Dubcek's regime.) This state of affairs probably strengthened the case of the interventionist coalition.

Furthermore, Dubcek's dismissal of General V. Prchlik under pressure from the antireformist coalition shortly before the negotiations at Cierna and Bratislava signaled the possibility that Czechoslovakia would not use its military forces to resist an intervention. Prchlik, head of the Security Department of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist party, was perhaps the only military man in an important position who suggested military defense as a possible government option in case of a Soviet invasion.[57] Dubcek's naivete and indecisiveness and his inexperience in foreign affairs (which contrasted with his expertise in internal politics) were seen in his performance during the Cierna negotiations, when he apparently gave Brezhnev some awkward assurances about the composition of the Czechoslovak leadership.[58] His focus on intergovernmental games, while ignoring the mounting pressures on Czechoslovakia and the implications of intensified debate in the Soviet Politburo, hardly prepared him to expect or to deal with intervention.

Soviet decision makers increasingly came to share ideas propagated by certain bureaucracies that disposed them toward intervention. The view that the Soviet Union should prevent the spread of anticommunism and "the unnecessary shedding of the blood of Czechoslovak Communists,"[59] along with the analogy of Czechoslovakia as a "second" Yugoslavia or Rumania,[60] apparently struck a chord among uncommitted senior decision makers. Also, the one-sided characterization given in Czechoslovakia, in Eastern Europe (particularly Rumania and Albania), and in the West which portrayed the Cierna-Bratislava agreement as a Czechoslovak triumph and a Soviet defeat, while noting other signs of Soviet "weakness," probably moved Soviet decision makers in the direction of intervention.[61]

It is unlikely that in their arguments the interventionists invoked the threat of Western intervention in the near or foreseeable future in Czechoslovakia, for

[57] Jiri Pelikan, "The Struggle for Socialism in Czechoslovakia," *New Left Review* (January-February 1972): 27. (Pelikan was the former chairman of the Czechoslovak Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee.) For an argument stressing the importance of the deterrence of East European countries facing Soviet intervention, see Christopher D. Jones, "Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: The Dynamics of Political Autonomy and Military Intervention," *World Politics* 29 (January 1977): 216–241.

[58] Tad Szulc, *Czechoslovakia Since World War II* (New York: Viking, 1971), p. 374; and Dubcek's speech, September 26, 1969, as reported in *Svedectvi* (Paris), no. 38 (1970): 275–276.

[59] Interview with Czechoslovak leader J. Piller, Prague Radio, September 17, 1969.

[60] Brezhnev reportedly said that Czechoslovakia was not Rumania or Yugoslavia and that the Soviets would not let Czechoslovakia go. Reported by M. Vaculik in *The Secret Vysocany Congress*, ed. J. Pelikan (London: Allen-Lane, 1971), pp. 26–27.

[61] See hints in "The Letter of Warning of the Soviet Politburo," reported by Radio Prague, August 20, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

such an argument would not have been taken seriously by Soviet officials. It was clear to them, particularly after Bratislava, that the Dubcek government would not "deviate" in its foreign policy orientation,[62] and that NATO intervention in Czechoslovakia was highly unlikely. This is not to say that the argument of the "threat from the West" was not *employed* in the debate preceding the invasion in order to "move the bureaucracies" and create public support. However, for the most part, the interventionists probably based their arguments on the need for the Soviet Union to be in a position to cope with the unpredictability of internal developments in Czechoslovakia after the Czechoslovak Party Congress and to control the impact of these developments on the Soviet Union (primarily in the Ukraine), on Soviet dissidents and reformers, and on the unstable conditions in Poland and East Germany.

Anatomy of a Decision

In the face of the growing consensus emerging from Soviet bureaucratic politics and the pressures from Eastern Europe, the arguments of skeptics of the wisdom of the invasion grew less persuasive. Secretary General Brezhnev, in particular, was concerned with the domestic political effects of a policy of nonintervention. In the post-Bratislava period he apparently decided to join the interventionist coalition because of the various bureaucratic pressures that may have threatened to undermine his position in the Politburo. It seems that he assessed the Czechoslovak issue not only according to its national security implications but also according to the increasingly powerful influence of the interventionist coalition. The desire to be on the winning side might also explain how Brezhnev and other uncommitted players made their final decision.

Brezhnev's final stand on Czechoslovakia may also have been affected by his disappointment with Dubcek. Brezhnev in particular seems to have trusted Dubcek at the beginning of the crisis, but may have believed himself cheated by Dubcek during the negotiations at Cierna. Brezhnev could not afford to be seen as weak and indecisive, or "soft" on revisionism and anticommunism.[63] He was acutely aware that *something* had to be done about Czechoslovakia, and in the final bureaucratic conflict he was a member of the coalition that argued in favor of intervention rather than equivocation. While Hungarian leader Kadar was engaged in secret negotiations with Dubcek to find a political solution to the crisis, a new consensus with the Soviet leadership materialized on August

[62] A. Snejdarek (a former foreign policy adviser to Dubcek's leadership) in Kusin, *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement*, p. 51. Even Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko never complained about Dubcek's foreign policy. See the interview with Czechoslovak Foreign Minister J. Hajek, *Reporter* (Prague) III (October 16–23, 1968): 45.

[63] At the crucial Poltiburo session on August 17, 1968, several Politburo members reportedly were critical of the "hesitation and weakness in dealing with the Czech question." Tigrid, *Why Dubcek Fell*, p. 97.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

17–18, culminating in the reluctant decision to use military force. Still, some noninterventionists such as Kosygin may have felt that the effects of the intervention could be minimized in the realm of foreign policy, as implied by diplomatic notes to the Western powers regarding Czechoslovakia and by Kosygin's message of August 19 to President Johnson agreeing to a summit meeting and an early October start to the SALT negotiations in Leningrad. His message was an attempt to moderate the probable U.S. reaction to the invasion and a reassurance that arms control negotiations were expected to continue.

According to preintervention intelligence reports from the KGB and Ambassador Chervonenko on August 20, at the last session of the Czechoslovak presidium prior to the convening of the Slovak Party Congress (which was to take place on August 26), the reformist coalition would be defeated and the antireformists would stage a coup. They would then create a new "revolutionary" government and petition the Soviet Union for "fraternal assistance."[64] However, although they tried, the Czechoslovak antireformists succeeded neither in carrying out the coup nor in proclaiming a new government. This failure suggests that the Politburo was not properly aware of the enormous popularity of Dubcek's "right-wing opportunist" minority or of the weaknesses of the antireformists. This erroneous intelligence appears to have been the main cause of the initial political mismanagement of a militarily perfect intervention.

Conclusions

It is beyond the scope of this study to provide a general analysis of Soviet decision making in foreign policy. The bureaucratic politics paradigm is only one of several means of approaching the subject. The conclusions of the study must be tentative, for, although some data are available, the study depends greatly on the author's interpretation of cryptic and incompletely known communications among the Soviet decision makers. Nevertheless, application of the bureaucratic politics paradigm to the Czechoslovak case demonstrates that the early Soviet "soft" policy toward the Dubcek regime was not a ruse calculated to lull that regime into a false sense of security while plans for intervention were being perfected. The findings of the study generally support the arguments of writers who hold that the rational policy approach alone is inadequate in predicting Soviet foreign policy decisions. The Soviet decision to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia was not based on a uniform set of perceptions of national security (such as fears of a "West German threat"), but was shaped by many factors: the bureaucratic interests and perspectives of senior decision makers, manipulated information, East European political instability and pressures, intergovernmental games in Czechoslovakia, signals of U.S. noninvolvement,

[64] An interview with Smrkovsky, *Listy*, pp. 16–19; Havlicek in Little, *The Czechoslovak Black Book*, 23–39.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

logistic considerations, and, finally, shaky compromises among various elements in the Politburo.

The prediction of Soviet actions is a venturesome exercise, and this study does not make the Soviet decision-making process any less mysterious. It does make the point that the failure of Dubcek's advisers and of many Western observers to understand the significance of the internal dynamics of Soviet decision making or of the signals among its members accounts in part for their being unable to anticipate the invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968. Furthermore, Dubcek's advisers had not seriously researched Soviet politics; nor did they take seriously the signs of debate and the changing "bureaucratic mood" in the Soviet Politburo. These deficiencies proved fatal. The bureaucratic politics paradigm does not guarantee foresight. The demand that an analyst be able to predict precisely an upcoming invasion is unrealistic. But the bureaucratic politics paradigm can improve the chances of detecting signals of serious debate in the Soviet Politburo. Perhaps the Soviet press is so boring that we sometimes ignore it. But as the Czechoslovak case demonstrates, signs of bureaucratic conflict as reflected in the Soviet press can shed light on the politics of intervention. Judicious application of the bureaucratic politics paradigm, then, focusing upon the dynamics of the role played by the bureaucracies involved, can be useful in the analysis of Soviet national security and foreign policy decision making. The Czechoslovak case points to the possibility of usefully studying Soviet decision making from this perspective.*

* I would like to thank Professor Ota Sik, Jiri Pelikan, Professor Antonin Snejdarek, Dusan Havlicek, and Radovan Selucky for their private accounts of Prague spring; Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Professor Walter Rostow, Henry Owen, and several Soviet emigrees living in the West for their help and information. I would also like to acknowledge my debt to my wife Virginia, Professor Vernon Aspaturian of Penn State University, Dr. I. M. Destler of The Brookings Institution, Dr. Bennett Ramberg of UCLA, Professor David Burke of the Naval Postgraduate School, and Dr. Ross Johnson of The Rand Corporation for their useful comments and suggestions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Statist Interpretation of American Oil Policy toward the Middle East

STEPHEN D. KRASNER

There has long been a disjuncture between the paradigms used to analyze domestic and international politics. For domestic politics, interest group (or liberal) and, to a lesser extent, Marxist theories have predominated, at least in the United States. For international relations, state-centric, unified actor models have, until very recently, provided the basic orientation. So long as international relations and foreign policy centered on strategic and military considerations this analytic fissure could be glossed over. Since all groups within a society could be presumed to support the defense of territorial and political integrity, each perspective could treat the state as a unified actor: a Marxist perspective (in which only economic groups count); a liberal one (in which all groups count); and a state-centric one. For core objectives the potential divergence between domestic and international modes of analysis could remain latent. However, as economic issues have become more prominent, the analytic strain has increased. Unlike strategic policy, most foreign economic issues have a differentiated impact on societal groups. It is not plausible to assume that groups will naturally accept the preferences of central decision makers. The assumption that the state can be treated as a unified actor, the personification of a single individual, appears increasingly hollow, a shell without an egg.

One response to the intellectual problem posed by the disjuncture between international and domestic modes of analysis has been to extend Marxist and liberal approaches into the area of foreign policy. The Marxist perspective has built upon the foundation that has as its cornerstone the discussions of imperialism by Hobson, Hilferding, and Lenin. Advocates of the Marxist inter-

---

STEPHEN D. KRASNER is associate professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He has written *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* and numerous articles on international economic relations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pretation have argued that to escape from declining rates of profits and from the growing contradiction between the socialization of economic activity and the private appropriation of profits and control, capitalists must find foreign investment opportunities, export markets, cheap labor, raw materials, and excuses for high military expenditures. These are all familiar arguments.

In recent years, however, there have been important developments in Marxist theories of the state. The traditional approach that closely linked state behavior with the expressed preferences of leading capitalists groups, what has been termed instrumental Marxism, has been supplanted by the view that the purpose of the state is to preserve the coherence of capitalist society as a whole. This latter position, which has been termed structural Marxism, assumes the state has considerable autonomy and is free from specific societal pressures. Thus the state can formulate policies necessary to preserve long-term stability more effectively than any particular group of capitalists or the capitalist class as a whole. Indeed, structural Marxists contend, the bourgeoisie is so riven with internal rivalries that it cannot act as an effective political force. This is precisely why any Marxist analysis that hopes to account for the longevity of capitalism must, according to a structural Marxist position, treat the state as an autonomous entity.[1]

There is also a straightforward extension of liberal theorizing into foreign economic policy—namely, the interest group model. Schattschneider's, *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* (Prentice-Hall, 1935) used this approach to explain the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. There have also been some new theoretical developments along liberal lines reflected in the elaboration of bureaucratic and transnational models. In the bureaucratic model, the state is disaggregated: it is no longer viewed as a unified actor. The notion of national interest disappears; policy is viewed as an outcome of intragovernmental bargaining. In the transnational model, the boundaries around countries become permeable. The state is no longer a meaningful focus of attention because transnational actors, such as multinational corporations (MNC's), operate in many countries and because bureaucracies in one country may make alliances with their counterparts in other countries. The analyst must cast his gaze over a wide range of actors. Governmental institutions are one kind of interest group, acting among many others. There is no coherent center. For bureaucratic and transnational approaches, the state is not the solid mass of a billiard ball, but an egg whose yolk has been scrambled or whose shell has been cracked.

The purpose of this paper is to present a mode of analysis that illustrates how a state-centric or statist model can be used to analyze problems associated with foreign economic policy in which concentrated benefits are enjoyed by specific groups and costs are diffused throughout the rest of the society.[2] By examining

[1] For a discussion of instrumental and structural Marxism see David A. Gold, Clarence Y. H. Lo, and Erik Olin Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State," *Monthly Review* (October 1975): 29–43.

[2] An elegant typology of issues according to whether costs and benefits are concentrated or distributed can be found in James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (New York: Basic Books,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

four cases of oil-related policy in the Middle East, I hope to demonstrate that a statist argument can offer a powerful descriptive and analytic framework—one that is unambiguously superior to either instrumental Marxist or liberal interest group arguments. Distinguishing between a structural Marxist and a statist position is far more difficult, for both have a similar view of the relationship between the state and the society. No definitive evidence for preferring a statist position is offered here, although some strengths and weaknesses of these two theories are discussed in the concluding section of this essay. Nevertheless, American policy toward the Saudi concession during World War II, the tax treatment of payments to Saudi Arabia in 1950, the Iranian nationalization in the early 1950s, and exporting country demands in the early 1970s cannot be understood without treating the state as an autonomous actor. Conventional society-oriented approaches of either the pluralist or Marxist variant are inadequate.

A statist approach treats the state as a unified actor that must confront internal as well as external constraints. Most state-centric approaches to foreign policy have emphasized the limitations imposed by the international system—by the power of states interacting in a fundamentally anarchic situation. However, in its pursuit of the national interest, the state may also have to overcome resistance from domestic groups. This vision, in which the state stands against both external and internal opponents, has its historical antecedents in the writings of the early analysts of state building.[3]

For operational purposes the state can be conceived of as comprising those central governmental institutions that are charged with protecting the general well-being of the society and are relatively insulated from particular group pressure. For the United States, the White House and the State Department are the most obvious candidates. A wide range of other public institutions may also, at times, assume the characteristics of the state, but they also frequently voice more parochial concerns either because their explicit responsibilities are more limited (such as the Anti-Trust Division of the Justice Department or the Environmental Protection Agency) or because they have closer ties with specific societal groups (such as the Agriculture and Commerce Departments). The degree of "stateness" may also vary among countries. In Japan and France, for example, many more institutions are concerned with general societal well-being and are well insulated from pressure groups.[4]

1973), chap. 16. Alternative analyses of the differing political processes that arise from different kinds of political issues can be found in Theodore J. Lowi, "Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice," *Public Administration Review* 32 (July-August 1972): 298–310; and E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), chap. 1.

[3] For the major discussion of policies and writings explicitly concerned with economic questions see Eli Heckscher, *Mercantilism* (New York: Macmillan, 1955).

[4] J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20 (July 1968): 559–592; Peter Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States," *International Organization* 30 (Winter 1976): 1–46; Peter

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A statist approach must deal with two analytic problems: the aims of the state, and its ability to implement them. If it is impossible to identify a coherent and persistent set of collective goals, a statist image will not be convincing. If the goals of central decision makers vacillate over time, a liberal perspective that emphasizes the possibilities of changing coalitions among both governmental and societal groups would be more fitting. If the state pursues a consistent policy, but one that benefits large corporations at the expense of other groups, a Marxist paradigm would be more appropriate.

While scholars associated with a statist approach have generally treated the national interest as an assumption (the most well known is Morgenthau's dictum that states seek to maximize their power), the national interest can also be defined empirically by inducting a set of transitively ordered objectives from the actual behavior of central decision makers. This essay will try to demonstrate that in the area of oil policy in the Middle East, it is possible to specify a coherent, persistent set of objectives pursued by American central decision makers. Specifically, this essay argues that the American state has been more concerned with the nature of regimes in oil exporting states than with security of supply, at least through the mid-1970s; and more concerned with either of these two goals than increasing competition in the industry.

However, defining what central decision makers want is not enough. They may not be able to get it. The second basic task of a statist model is to analyze the constraints imposed upon the state. The focus in this essay will be on domestic rather than international considerations. The primary variable in this analysis is the power of the state vis-à-vis its own society. Policymakers may not have the power to overcome resistance from the private sector or from nonstate governmental institutions such as executive bureaus with specific constituencies, legislative committees, or local governments.

In America, the state is weak because power is fragmented and decentralized. The Constitution is designed to prevent any concentration of political power. The founding fathers were wary of government power; they wanted individual freedom. They preserved state governments, gave Congress and the president specific not unlimited power, established a bicameral legislature, and created an independent judiciary.[5]

The weak American state is not simply a reflection of the peculiar beliefs of

---

Katzenstein, "Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy," *International Organization* 31 (Autumn 1977): 879–920; Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and American Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), chap. 3.

[5] For examples of analyses that emphasize the weakness of the American political system see Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), chap. 2; Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: Norton, 1970); Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1966); and Theodore J. Lowi, "Making Democracy Safe for the World: National Politics and Foreign Policy," in *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1967).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the founding fathers; it is intimately related to the social and economic development of the United States. In America it was not necessary to have a strong government because the society itself was so robust. The country was endowed with abundant natural resources. There was no feudal class that had to be destroyed before modernization could take place. Until very recently, the nation had not faced any serious external threats; indeed, it has not been invaded since 1812. Social conflicts have been mitigated more by American abundance than by public action: people could have more even if the distribution of wealth and income remained relatively unchanged. America has not had a strong state not simply because of the Lockean proclivities of the founding fathers, but also because it has generally not needed one.[6]

The Oil Industry

In their efforts to further state aims in the area of international oil policy, U. S. leaders were often frustrated by the power of private groups. The American corporations involved in the international movement of oil are very large. Five out of the seven companies that dominated the world petroleum industry until the 1970s were American. Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Gulf, and Standard Oil of California have all regularly ranked among the fifteen largest U. S. companies in terms of sales. Such large enterprises possess attributes that confer political power in the United States. They are well represented in Washington through individual lobbyists, law firms, and trade associations. They hold information that public officials cannot procure through other means. They have competent leadership. They can (covertly) contribute money to political campaigns. They often have privileged access to particular congressmen, executive departments, and the White House itself.

The oil industry is also politically powerful because of its importance in specific geographic areas within the United States. In 1970 petroleum was the largest source of mineral income for thirteen states. For a number of states, the value of natural gas and oil production has accounted for a substantial proportion of total economic activity. For instance, in 1966 the value of oil and gas production was equal to 45 percent of total personal income in Wyoming, 39 percent in Louisiana, 22 percent in New Mexico, 17 percent in Texas, and 15 percent in Oklahoma.[7] This geographic concentration has made the weight of oil industry power particularly telling in Congress, where the committee system can give individual congressmen great leverage.

The presence of powerful private groups in a fragmented political system has

[6] For discussions of why America has not needed a strong state see Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955); and David Potter, *People of Plenty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

[7] U.S., Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1971*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 650; U.S., Bureau of Mines, *Minerals Yearbook 1967*, vol. III(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

most often resulted in stasis. The state has not, as an instrumental Marxist or liberal perspective would suggest, simply been the handmaiden of economic interests. The White House and the State Department have frequently endorsed policies that the oil industry opposed. On the other hand, central decision makers have confronted major difficulties in pursuing national objectives when their policies conflicted with the preferences of particular domestic groups. This has been particularly true when the issue could not be decided in the White House and State Department, but has involved other executive agencies, Congress, or local governments. Most often, decision making in the United States has resembled a black-ball system: the opposition of one member of the club (private or public) has been enough to prevent a policy from being adopted. American behavior appears indecisive and inconsistent not because central policymakers do not know what they want, but because they cannot implement their preferences.

Four episodes involving oil in the Middle East—the attempt to get greater government control over Saudi Arabian oil during and after World War II; the decision to allow tax payments to Saudi Arabia to be deducted from U. S. tax liabilities in 1951; the establishment of the Iranian consortium in 1954; and the response to nationalization and rapidly rising prices in the 1970s—illustrate both the goals of the state and the constraints imposed by private actors.

World War II: Aramco, the Pipeline, and the Anglo-American Oil Agreement

American oil companies first secured concessions in the Middle East around 1930. Standard Oil of New Jersey and Standard Oil of New York (now Exxon and Mobil) took shares of the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1928. Gulf became a 50 percent owner of the Kuwait Oil Company. Texaco and the Standard Oil Company of California (Socal) established the Bahrein Petroleum Company. Most importantly, in 1933 Socal, joined by Texaco in 1936, was awarded control of Saudi Arabia's oil. In 1946, Jersey Standard and Mobil also became part owners of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco).

Before World War II, production in the Middle East did not amount to much. Only Iran, where the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had a monopoly, was a major exporter. It has only been in recent years that Middle East crude has become significant. This is indicated by the following statistics.

The production potential of the Middle East first came to the attention of American decision makers during World War II. In the 1930s, there had been little concern with security of supply because depressed economic conditions and new discoveries in the American southwest had eliminated fears of any immediate shortages; but the war effort, which greatly increased demand, brought new fears. During the mid-1940s American central decision makers, among whom Harold Ickes was the most active, initiated three proposals to enhance security of supply for Middle East oil for the United States. These proposals

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

Middle East Oil Production (millions of tons)

Year	Iran	Iraq	Bahrein	Saudi Arabia	Kuwait	Total Middle East	Middle East as Percent of World
1930	5.94	.12	–	–	–	6.34	3.2
1940	8.62	2.65	.94	.68	–	13.90	4.8
1950	31.75	6.50	1.51	25.90	17.00	86.60	16.7
1961	59.40	49.00	n.a.	69.20	82.70	280.00	24.0
1971	226.20	83.40	n.a.	223.40	147.10	803.00	32.4
1976	279.00	100.00	n.a.	409.00	100.00	1034.00	38.3

Sources: Benjamin Shwadran, *Oil, The Middle East and the Great Powers* (New York: Public Affairs Press, 1959), pp. 368–69; British Petroleum Company, *BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry, 1971* (London: British Petroleum Company, 1972), p. 18; U.S., Executive Office of the President, *International Economic Report of the President, January 1977* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 174.

were: the purchase of the Saudi concession by the American government; the construction of a government-owned pipeline across the Arabian peninsula; and an oil agreement with Great Britain. All of these attempts were defeated by the opposition of segments of the American oil industry.

World War II presented the owners of the Arabian concession, Texaco and Socal, with acute problems. First, they were worried about being attacked or occupied by Axis countries: Saudi Arabian operations were in fact closed down for three years because of shipping difficulties and an Italian bombing raid on Dhahran in 1940.[8] More importantly, the companies saw their position threatened by British encroachments and political instability in Saudi Arabia. Most of the Arabian peninsula had been unified by King Ibn Saud during the 1920s; but it was still more a collection of tribes held together by Saud's prestige, military prowess, and economic subventions than a unified state. The war cut pilgrimage fees and import duties, the king's two primary sources of revenues. Saud put pressure on Socal and Texaco for higher payments. In 1941 they made a loan of $6 million, but then tried to pass the burden to the American government: corporate officials asked the Roosevelt administration to extend lend-lease to Saudi Arabia, but they were turned down. Roosevelt was afraid that if he supported a feudal monarch with funds allocated in the name of preserving democracy, it could precipitate an isolationist reaction. He was content to let Britain use American aid to meet the king's demand. This, however, only increased the anxiety of corporate managers, for they saw the extension of British power into Saudi Arabia as a threat to their concession. In February

[8] Mira Wilkins, *The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 248–278.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1943, therefore, Socal and Texaco renewed their efforts to secure assistance from the U. S. Treasury.[9]

Then ensued one of the more bizarre episodes in the history of corporate-state relations in America. Having been convinced of the strategic importance of Arabian oil, Harold Ickes, the petroleum administrator for war and secretary of the interior, decided that the United States should buy the concession. He secured the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of war mobilization, the secretary of war, the secretary of the navy, and the president. Ickes commenced negotiations with the corporations. Socal and Texaco officials were flabbergasted, but they did not reject the government's request outright. Instead they demanded an extremely high sum—several hundreds of millions of dollars. The government reduced its proposed share from 100 percent to 33⅓ percent. Still, no progress was made. After three months the negotiations collapsed.[10]

Ickes was undaunted. Having failed to purchase the concession, he then proposed that the U. S. government build a pipeline from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. In return, the United States would get preferential access to Arabian oil. Ickes felt that this was "practically as good as an interest in the oil concession."[11] Ickes's proposal was supported by Gulf, Socal, and Texaco, the three companies that would benefit from the pipeline. It was strenuously opposed by the rest of the industry, Jersey Standard and Mobil as well as the independents, because they saw additional production from the Arabian peninsula as a threat to their share of the market. By the spring of 1944 the pipeline proposal was dead.[12]

Ickes tried yet another tack. During 1944 he developed the idea of concluding with Great Britain an oil agreement that would increase market stability and guarantee equal access for American corporations. This effort had the support of all five of the American major international oil companies. For a period in 1945, it was also endorsed by the independents (companies which were smaller than the five majors and were, at the time, producing exclusively in the Western Hemisphere). But this support did not last long. By the time that hearings were held before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1947, domestic producers were up in arms. Not only did they see the proposed Anglo-American oil agreement as a device for bringing cheaper Middle East oil to the American market, but they also feared that an international treaty would undermine state regulatory agencies, such as the Texas Railroad Commission, where the in-

[9] Herbert Feis, *Three International Episodes Seen from E.A.* (New York: Norton, 1966), pp. 107–09; U.S., Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense, *Petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia*, Hearings, Part 41, 80th Cong., 2d. sess., 1948, pp. 2459–60; U. S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *Multinational Oil Corporations and U. S. Foreign Policy*, Committee Print, 93rd Cong., 2d. sess., 1975, pp. 37–38.

[10] U. S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *A Documentary History of the Petroleum Reserve Corporation, 1943–44*, Committee Print, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974.

[11] U. S. Senate, *Petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia*, p. 2544.

[12] U. S. Senate, *Multinational Oil Corporations*, p. 41.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dustry had enormous influence. While the Foreign Relations Committee sent the treaty to the full Senate with a favorable recommendation, it was never ratified.[13]

How did all this happen? Here was a series of proposals developed during America's most serious foreign war. High officials from the president on down saw outright purchase, the pipeline, and the Anglo-American oil agreement as measures that would further the national interest by increasing security of supply. The two other major western powers, Britain and France, both had oil companies at least partially owned by the government. Why were central decision makers unable to implement their policy preferences?

The answer lies in the fragmented political structure of the American system. All three proposals would have required congressional approval: the purchase of Aramco and construction of the pipeline, because they involved large outlays of money that would have to be appropriated by the legislature; the oil agreement because it was a treaty that had to be approved by the Senate. In the Congress opposition came from two sources: oil states and political conservatives. Congressmen from oil states were being responsive to their constituents; conservatives had an ideological antipathy toward the New Deal and its efforts to increase public participation in the economy. None of the three proposals was ever considered by the full Senate or House where particularistic proclivities might have been overcome. The Senate established a Special Petroleum Committee in 1944 in response to the pipeline proposal. Five of its eleven members were from oil-producing states. At least one other, Owen Brewster of Maine, was strongly opposed to Roosevelt's economic policies. Consideration of the Anglo-American oil treaty was delayed in 1946, because of the objections of Tom Connally of Texas, the committee's chairman. The center of opposition to the agreement was the Texas oil industry. This delay proved fatal, for it gave the treaty's opponents time to martial their forces, and, as circumstances changed (it became apparent that Britain was weak and there would be no glut on the market), the enthusiasm of public and private policymakers waned. Nothing happened.

This episode clearly indicates how the weakness of the American political system can frustrate central decision makers. It also suggests that political leaders are not the servants of particular societal interests. It is difficult to explain the effort to buy Aramco in the first place, unless the state is viewed as an autonomous actor. Neither an interest group nor an instrumental Marxist perspective can easily account for a policy initiative so strongly opposed by the most directly affected economic interest. From a structural Marxist perspective the behavior of official policymakers is also peculiar; for in this instance the state violated the basic tenet of capitalism, private ownership, under circumstances where there was no threat to the stability of the society as a whole. It must, however, be admitted that the state did not succeed. Thus, the treat-

[13] U. S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Petroleum Agreement with Great Britain and Northern Ireland*, Hearings, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment of Saudi oil during World War II presents theoretical anomalies, particularly for liberal and instrumental Marxist perspectives. While this case is more compatible with a statist view, it does not clearly contradict structural Marxist arguments.

Tax Treatment

The second episode that illustrates the fragmentation and decentralization of power in the American political system, as well as the primacy that American policymakers accorded to the goal of preserving conservative noncommunist regimes in oil exporting areas, relates to the tax treatment of payments to Saudi Arabia. Here too state officials ignored some of the preferences of the oil companies, a problem for liberal and instrumental Marxist perspectives.

By 1950 King Saud was again pressing the oil companies for higher revenues. Payments were being made primarily in the form of royalties, as was true for almost all of the early oil concessions. That is, they were based on the volume of output and not price or profits. As oil company earnings soared in the late 1940s, and as Saudi officials learned of more lucrative tax arrangements secured by Venezuela in the mid-1940s, these officials demanded more money. One Aramco official told the State Department that operations might be shut down if higher cash payments were not made.[14]

The American government was responsive to Saud's position. This was not because Saudi Arabia was such an important source of oil: global production and reserves in 1950 were more than adequate to meet projected demands. It was because central decision makers feared communist encroachment in the Middle East. In September 1950, the State Department gave the oil companies a policy paper which expressed concern not only about a "rupture of the flow of Middle East oil," but also about "the threat of Communist aggression."[15] A crisis leading to a shutdown in Saudi Arabia would not only deprive the West of oil, but would deprive the royal treasury of income. Under such circumstances Saud's regime might crumble, or he might feel compelled to look elsewhere for revenues. In either case an uncontrollable chain of events, culminating in greater communist influence, could ensue.

Corporate officials, particularly those working in the United States as opposed to Saudi Arabia, did not want to make higher payments. Although Gulf was more sympathetic, in general managers were anxious to avoid higher outlays not only because of reduced profits, but also because they wanted to protect the sanctity of their concessions. For the majors, the ideal situation was one in which their concessions were treated in precisely the same way as contracts

[14] U. S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *Multinational Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Hearings, Part 8, 93rd Cong., 2d. sess., 1975, p. 349.

[15] U. S. Senate, *Multinational Oil Corporations*, p. 81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between private parties. Still, the companies had accepted changes before, and they had much to lose from a real showdown with the king.[16]

A solution was arrived at which met at least the pecuniary concerns of both Saudi Arabia and the oil companies: in effect, higher payments were made to the king from the American treasury. This was not done directly through foreign assistance. Such action might well have encountered considerable congressional and popular opposition. It was done by altering the U. S. tax status of corporate payments to the Saudi treasury. A team of lawyers from the companies and the Treasury Department rewrote the Saudi tax code. The companies agreed to shift their payments primarily from royalties to what were called income taxes. Under the American tax code, foreign direct (income) taxes could be written off dollar for dollar against American tax liabilities, while indirect taxes, such as royalties, could only be counted as a cost of doing business; they could be subtracted from income, but not directly from taxes.

The oil companies were allowed to credit their tax payments to Saudi Arabia against their American tax liabilities, even though Aramco was virtually the only enterprise affected by Saudi legislation. Furthermore, the calculation of profits was based on arbitrary posted prices used by the owners of Aramco (Mobil, Exxon, Texaco, and Socal) to sell crude to their subsidiaries. The Saudi income tax hardly conformed to the conventional notion of a direct tax based on profit as opposed to an indirect tax that was merely a cost of doing business.

The decision to treat Saudi payments in this way was made not by the agency with ostensible responsibility, the Internal Revenue Service, but by the National Security Council. U. S. leaders did not want a confrontation with Ibn Saud, but they did not have the power to compel American oil companies to absorb the higher cost of doing business. To avoid any political difficulties, higher payments to Saud were in effect made by the American treasury.

In this episode, the basic goals of U. S. central decision makers were political, not economic. They equated economic deprivation with political unrest, political unrest with communism, and communism with Soviet influence.[17] The State Department did not support a defense, in principle, of the sanctity of contracts, which is what the companies wanted. But the U. S. government did not have the power to force the companies to increase payments at their own expense. In transferring funds to Saudi Arabia the companies were used as instruments of foreign policy, but American taxpayers absorbed the costs.

Here, as in the earlier episode in Saudi Arabia, behavior is consistent with a statist interpretation. It is also consistent with a structural Marxist approach. Given how well the companies did (for the years 1962 to 1971 the percentage of taxes paid to the United States by the five largest U. S. oil companies ranged

[16] U. S. Senate, *Multinational Corporations*, Part 8, pp. 346–50; John M. Blair, *The Control of Oil* (New York: Pantheon, 1976), pp. 196–199.

[17] Robert Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from 7.3 to 2.6 percent)[18], the Saudi tax case does not offer any definitive evidence against instrumental or interest group arguments. Nevertheless, American central decision makers were not receptive to corporate demands that concessions should not be unilaterally breached.

IRAN, 1951–1954

The next major oil-related crisis in the Middle East to confront American decision makers occurred in Iran. Here, between 1951 and 1954, the nightmare scenario of American policymakers seemed to be playing itself out. A new premier, Mohammed Mossadegh, who had the support of the left-wing Tudeh party, nationalized the British-owned oil industry in April 1951. The British first broke commercial, and then diplomatic, relations. They tried to submit the dispute to the World Court, but Iran rejected the court's jurisdiction. The oil industry imposed an extremely effective embargo: Iranian exports were almost completely halted in 1952 and 1953.

American policymakers were alarmed by these developments. This was not because they threatened the West's oil supplies: Iranian losses were easily made up by increasing production from other Middle East sources. It was not because American companies were directly threatened, none was involved in Iran. It was because Mossadegh, and the nationalization of Anglo-Iranian, was perceived as increasing the danger of communist influence or even control in Iran.

At first American officials acted as intermediaries. They urged the British to be moderate. They indicated that they would oppose armed action unless there was a Russian invasion, communist coup, invitation from the Iranian government, or need to evacuate British nationals.[19] Averill Harriman was dispatched as a special presidential envoy. These efforts were not intended to introduce American corporations into Iran, but to get oil flowing again by more or less restoring the position of Anglo-Iranian. They all failed.

It was only at the end of 1952, after American officials became convinced that nationalist sentiments precluded a settlement that would involve only British interests, that they developed plans for introducing American corporations into Iran. Meetings were held with Gulf, Standard of New York, Jersey, Standard of California, and Texaco.[20] However, bringing these companies into Iran presented two major problems: the companies were not enthused, and the Justice Department was about to bring a criminal antitrust suit against them.

The U. S. majors did not want to jump into Iran; they had enough oil. Indeed, the ease with which they had replaced Iranian production suggested that they

[18] U. S. Senate, *Multinational Corporations*, Part 9, p. 133.

[19] Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 506.

[20] U. S. Senate, *Multinational Oil Corporations*, p. 61; and U. S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium and U. S. National Security*, Committee Print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, p. 26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had more than they needed. Reintegrating Iranian crude into the world market would require careful coordination, so as not to destroy the market control of the large companies. But with a major antitrust suit looming, such fine tuning presented real difficulties. Although the antitrust laws have not been enforced very often, they are the one policy instrument possessed by the government that can deal a decisive blow to the structure of a particular industry.

Only late in 1953 did the companies finally accede to the government's request to establish an oil consortium for Iran. They explained their action in terms of national, not corporate, interest. However, by the time the majors dragged themselves to the altar they had gotten one thing that they wanted very much: a downgrading of the antitrust suit from a criminal to a civil action. The State, Defense, and Interior Departments had all vigorously opposed the criminal charge, and their suggestion that the suit be changed to a civil action was adopted by the National Security Council. Shortly before leaving office Truman personally ordered the Justice Department official in charge of the antitrust action to drop the criminal proceedings. In January 1954 the Justice Department ruled that American participation in an Iranian oil consortium would not constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade given the national security interests involved.[21]

However, the majors did not get everything they wanted. In 1955 seven independent American companies were given one-eighth of the 40 percent share of the new Iranian consortium (5 percent of the total) held by American interests. While this may have been tokenism in 1955, it had a dramatic impact in later years. It accelerated the introduction of independent firms into the Middle East. The growth of these independents was a major force, perhaps the major force, in undermining the corporate oligopoly enjoyed by the "seven sisters" (the seven largest world oil companies: Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Gulf, Socal, British Petroleum, and Royal Dutch Shell).

Of all of the episodes involving American companies and the state in the Middle East, this was certainly the most successful from the government's point of view. Broad foreign policy objectives were achieved. With the help of the CIA, the Iranian army overthrew Mossadegh. While the criminal antitrust suit was abandoned, the introduction of a number of American independents increased competition, although not with the expected results. Security of supply was not threatened.

Some Marxist scholars have interpreted American behavior in Iran as an effort to further the interests of American oil companies.[22] Although the oil companies did not suffer, this argument is hardly convincing given the attempt by American officials to restore Anglo-Iranian's position in 1951 and 1952. The United States wanted oil flowing because, as in Saudi Arabia, economic disloca-

[21] U. S. Senate, *The International Petroleum Cartel*, pp. vii and 58; and U. S. Senate, *Multinational Corporations*, Part 8, pp. 5 and 561.

[22] Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 417–420.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion was equated with political turmoil. American oil companies entered the scene at the request of the State Department, and only when it became apparent that nationalist sentiments in Iran precluded the restoration of a British operation. They had to be bought off, but they can be seen as instruments of state policy. The high level of state initiative in this case is not compatible with either instrumental Marxist or interest group explanations. It is compatible with statist or structural Marxist arguments.

The Oil Crisis

The settlement of the Iranian dispute ushered in a decade and a half of quiescence. All major exporting countries now had approximately equal profit sharing with the oil corporations. This 50–50 division had a neat logic. It was a salient solution: between zero and one hundred it is the most obvious stopping place.[23] Even after the formation of OPEC in 1960 there were no dramatic changes. The producing states pressed for and got a halt in the decline of posted price and different tax treatment for royalty payments, but these measures involved modest sums.

Despite the limited leverage of the American government, its international oil policy can only be described as a spectacular success to 1969. Even though there was an unprecedented increase in demand for energy after 1945, oil prices declined in real terms during the 1950s and early 1960s. Energy availability facilitated the industrial growth of the United States and Western Europe and the attainment of broad political objectives that American policymakers perceived as being intimately related to that growth.

However, in 1969 things began to come unglued. In that year Libya demanded higher oil payments. This set off a chain of events that culminated in the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and 1974 and the virtual complete nationalization of the oil industry. These developments had very serious political costs for the United States. They strained the cohesion of the western alliance. They increased the military, economic, and political dangers emanating from the conflict in the Middle East. They made the international monetary system more unstable by creating a new source of potentially volatile international liquidity, petro-dollars (excess reserves held by oil exporting states in the form of short-term funds). These developments also helped plunge the industrial West into its most severe economic crisis since World War II: in 1975 unemployment in developed market economies was at a 40-year high. They imposed additional economic burden on some less developed states.[24] Changes in oil procurement

[23] For a discussion of tacit solutions see Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 74–77.

[24] For a particularly grim assessment see Edward Friedland, Paul Seabury, and Aaron Wildavsky, "Oil and the Decline of Western Power," *Political Science Quarterly* 90 (Fall 1975): 437–450. See also Robert W. Tucker, "Oil and American Power—Three Years Later," *Commentary* 63 (January 1977): 29–36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

did not mean the downfall of the West; but nationalizations, and especially higher prices, did impinge upon the core objectives of American central decision makers.

It is not clear what could have been done to prevent this outcome. Nevertheless, the United States did not explore options that might have been productive because of both the weakness of the political system (manifest in the state's inability to change the behavior of corporations) and because of the fixation of American policymakers on the possibilities of political turmoil and communist encroachment. Until 1974, little attention was given to the price of oil.[25] Two incidents, the first Libyan price hikes and the Teheran negotiations, illustrate these propositions.

When Qadhafi came to power in Libya he was anxious to demonstrate his anti-imperialism and the corruption of the Idris government by getting more from the oil companies. He targeted Occidental, which was extremely dependent on its Libyan production. Armand Hammer, the president of Occidental, appealed to Exxon's chief executive for help in the form of alternative supplies should strong resistance lead to a shutdown of operations. Exxon refused. Occidental capitulated.[26]

Had the U. S. government stepped in decisively, all that was to follow might have been avoided. If Occidental had been strongly backed, the 50–50 profit-sharing arrangement might not have been so unambiguously breached. Such action would have shown that the American government was concerned about prices and that it was prepared to defend its corporations against host country pressure. Although this would not have mattered much to Qadhafi, it might have had much more impact on Feisal of Saudi Arabia and the Shah, both of whom were, in the final analysis, very dependent on continued American support. Yet the present public record indicates that no American official participated in the initial dealings between Libya, Occidental, and Exxon. Had Occidental been a French or Japanese company, it is hard to imagine that the responsible ministries would not have been actively involved. Political systems in which the state is stronger have more mechanisms for intervening in the private sector and traditions of more intimate contact between public and private policymakers. In the United States these mechanisms and lines of communication are largely absent. U. S. leaders were probably not aware of what was going on; and if they had been aware, they would probably not have cared. The reaction to Libyan pressure, which set in train the events that culminated in the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973–74, was taken by private firms and based on corporate, rather than national, concerns.

The 1971 Teheran negotiations offer a second example of governmental ineffectuality, as well as U. S. solicitude toward conservative regimes. Once Libya had gotten higher returns, other oil-producing states increased their demands.

[25] In fairness it must be noted that few expected the price of oil to rise above six or seven dollars per barrel, which was thought to be the opportunity cost for alternative sources.

[26] U. S. Senate, *Multinational Oil Corporations*, pp. 123–25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The oil companies saw that this posed a threat of continuous price escalation. They indicated to OPEC members that they wanted joint negotiations. However, Saudi Arabia and particularly Iran refused. The Shah argued that all parties would benefit from discussions which were limited to prices in the Persian Gulf. He preferred to leave Libya (a Mediterranean producer) out of the picture; this created the obvious possibility of further price increases as the Libyans made new demands on the basis of any settlement in the Gulf. Faced with opposition from the Shah, the companies abandoned their proposal for joint negotiations. But they devised a clever device, termed the "hinge," for tying Mediterranean prices with those in the Gulf: they proposed that negotiations with Gulf producers should also cover crude that traveled by pipeline from Iraq and the Arabian peninsula to the Mediterranean. If a firm price was set for this oil, Gulf and Mediterranean prices would be linked.[27]

However, this too came to nothing, and for a very odd reason: it was undermined by the American government. On January 16, John Irwin, the under secretary of state for economic affairs, was dispatched to the Middle East supposedly to support the companies' position. He left on one day's notice. In both Saudi Arabia and Iran he found great resistance to global, rather than regional, negotiations. The Shah apparently convinced him that if such negotiations were held, all oil-producing states would be forced to accept the highest common denominator, and this would be established by the most radical states. This contention made some sense with respect to the original corporate notion of negotiating jointly with all members of OPEC, but none with respect to the hinge proposal. Still, Irwin accepted the Shah's position. Without consulting the companies he recommended that discussions about Persian Gulf prices be severed from any talks concerning Mediterranean sales. This recommendation was endorsed by Secretary of State Rogers and passed on to the oil companies. By the end of January the oil companies had accepted the Shah's demands.[28] And in the next couple of years the ratcheting effect that they had predicted clearly came to pass. The Teheran Agreement, which was supposed to provide price stability for five years, lasted barely one.

How can one account for this strange incident? Irwin's own explanation was that he believed the Shah.[29] But given the lack of validity of the Iranian position in relation to corporate proposals for tying Gulf and Mediterranean prices through the hinge, this testimony is not satisfactory. A more convincing argument is that Irwin acted out of ignorance. He might not have even known or understood the idea of linking pipeline and tanker prices. He went to the Middle East with almost no time for preparation. But Irwin's behavior must be understood in the context of a weak political system that has permitted even industries that clearly affect core values to function with great autonomy. Irwin was ignorant at least in part because the state was weak.

[27] U. S. Senate, *Multinational Corporations*, Part 5, pp. 138–140.
[28] U. S. Senate, *Multinational Oil Corporations*, pp. 130–132.
[29] U. S. Senate, *Multinational Corporations*, Part 5, p. 172.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Irwin's behavior, however, is manifestly consistent with more general U. S. policy objectives. Since the end of World War II American central decision makers have been obsessed with the dangers of communist takeovers. Conservative governments, such as those in Teheran and Riyadh, have been accepted with little question. The United States was not anxious to offend Saudi Arabia or Iran, even though its potential leverage over both countries was considerable: where could they turn if America abandoned them? At Teheran in January 1971, the United States acted as it typically had in the postwar period, general political goals outweighed specific economic ones.

Price increases between September 1970 and October 1973 set the stage for the quadrupling of prices that occurred in the winter of 1973–74. In retrospect the amounts involved during the earlier period were small—an increase of about two dollars per barrel, as opposed to the eight dollar increase that came between October 1973 and January 1974. Still, these earlier developments could only have suggested to OPEC states that they had more power than they had realized. The major exporting states were planning to increase prices significantly even before the 1973 war.

In retrospect, most things look inevitable. However, the oil crisis was not inscribed in heaven, or even in demand and supply schedules. The price of oil is an adminstered price, and has been for more than fifty years. It has been affected, but never determined, by market conditions. The chief administers are now a group of extremely conservative regimes bordering the Persian Gulf. Had the United States acted decisively against higher prices in the early 1970s, the oil crisis might have been avoided. Ironically, such decisive action would have conformed quite closely to instrumental Marxist or interest groups analyses, because it would have been consistent with the preferences of major American corporations. However, such firm resistance does not appear to have been seriously considered. In part, this was because the problem was not perceived as being acute. But it also reflected the weakness of the American government as manifest in policymakers' lack of understanding of critical arrangements in the oil industry, such as the "hinge," and the nature of the overall goals pursued by the United States, which gave more emphasis to regime types in exporting states than to security of supply or price stability.

Conclusion

American oil policy in the Middle East, from the efforts to buy Aramco during World War II to the oil crisis of 1973–74, indicates that the United States pursued a coherent set of objectives. If security of supply and the regime type in exporting states were not at issue, U. S. leaders were willing to press for more competition, as in the inclusion of independents in the Iranian consortium. If security of supply was at stake, greater competition (with the potential for lower prices) was abandoned. If conservative regimes in producing countries were threatened, economic goals were downplayed as in the reaction to demands for higher prices in the early 1970s.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Furthermore, the state often rejected private preferences. The efforts to buy Aramco, build a trans-Arabian pipeline, and sign an oil agreement with Great Britain were opposed by some segments (in the case of the purchase, all segments) of the industry. The 1950 Saudi tax decision relieved the oil companies of financial burdens, but did not uphold the sanctity of their concessions. The inclusion of independents in the Iranian consortium was opposed by the majors. The government's failure to support the "hinge" proposal at Teheran in 1971 undermined the bargaining position of the corporations. This is not to say that central decision makers did not frequently support their corporations or to suggest that the final outcome of policy placed major American companies in jeopardy. The oil firms have not gone out of business. But it is to say that no interest group or instrumental Marxist approach will offer a fully adequate explanation because it cannot account for state initiatives, even those that fail.

The goals *sought by* American central decision makers are consistent with a statist interpretation, which sees the state as an autonomous actor seeking to maximize the national interest. This does not imply, however, that the *outcome of policy* will be identical with these goals. U. S. policymakers were often unable to get what they wanted because of the fragmentation of power in the American political system. They failed in their efforts to buy Aramco, build a pipeline, and sign an oil agreement with Great Britain because of the oil industry's influence in Congress. U. S. leaders were able to get more money to Ibn Saud through the oil companies in 1950, but then only by having the American treasury foot the bill. They were able to bolster a conservative regime in Iran not only through covert and overt aid to the military commanders who overthrew Mossadegh, but also by reintegrating Iranian oil into the world market with the help of the American majors; but the price was the downgrading of the Justice Department's antitrust action from a criminal to a civil proceeding.

The increasing importance of economic issues in international relations, and the inevitable intrusion of societal groups into the policymaking process that this entails, does not mean that state-centric approaches to foreign policy need be abandoned. The state must, however, be conceptualized as standing against internal as well as external opponents. It is not a passive reactor to pressures from the society. Neither an instrumental Marxist nor a liberal perspective can give a fully satisfactory explanation for the coherence and consistency of American objectives, or for the instances where state officials opposed private preferences. A statist approach can, provided that it is recognized that the structure of the domestic political system (the strength of the state vis-à-vis its own society), not just the international distribution of power, sets limits to what central decision makers can accomplish.

Finally, it must be noted that the cases examined here provide very little basis for deciding between statist and structural Marxist approaches. Both approaches see the state as an independent actor. Both assume that the state will pursue goals related to preserving social stability rather than serving the specific preferences of private actors. The only evidence related to American oil policy in the Middle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

East that bears on the merit of a statist versus a structural Marxist position is the attempt to buy the Arabian concession during World War II. Here, central decision makers were prepared to violate the principle of private property even though there was no compelling social pressure to prompt such action. Yet an advocate of a structural Marxist position could legitimately point out that the effort failed and write it off as a manifestation of Ickes's personal idiosyncracies. One must, in the end, look to nonempirical criteria, to the internal logic and elegance of the two positions, to establish a basis for preferring one over the other.

For analysts who work within a Marxist perspective the structural approach has major advantages over the instrumental approach: it makes it possible to explain a wide range of developments associated with both the welfare state and the general expansion in the scope of governmental activity—developments that remain anomalous from an instrumental Marxist perspective because virtually all of these measures were opposed by the business community. But this wider scope is purchased at a price: the link between the underlying economic structure, the bedrock of the Marxist approach to capitalism, and the superstructure, particularly ideology and government, becomes more and more attenuated. The state assumes a life of its own. It appears more and more capable of frustrating the dialectic of history, of saving the capitalists from their own shortsightedness and folly, of resolving contradictions. Instead of a dialectic formulation in which both cause and effect are inextricably bound, economic structure, state behavior, and ideology become quasi-exogenous variables capable of interacting in a wide variety of ways. Much of the elegance of Marxist positions that tightly tie the state to the economic structure is lost.

The statist formulation begins by radically severing the state from the society, by assuming that the state is an autonomous actor with purposes of its own. This radical assumption, however, presents its own difficulties. State goals must at least meet the minimal criteria of consistently not benefiting certain societal groups at the expense of others or vacillating over time. Were this the case then Marxist or interest group formulations would be more appropriate. There are, however, many sets of objectives that do not consistently benefit one group rather than another and whose transitive ordering could persist over time. The most satisfactory explanations for why a particular state has pursued one set of goals rather than another will almost certainly involve reference to the society within which the state is imbedded. For instance, American policymakers may have been so intense in their anticommunism because of the totalitarian hold of Lockean precepts in American society.[30] Thus, a statist analysis is likely, in the end, to reintroduce societal elements to complete its argument, to explain why the state has accepted one set of goals rather than another.

Thus the nexus of relations between the state and the society is the central

[30] The primary source for this argument is Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

issue for both the structural Marxist and statist perspectives. To pose a problem is not to solve it, but seeing the state and society as independent analytic constructs is, in itself, a great improvement over what had been conventional wisdom for both Marxist and non-Marxist analysts until very recently. Instrumental Marxism and interest group liberalism present the state as an epiphenomenon. This formulation is inadequate for low as well as high politics.[31]

[31] The most blatant recent example of the contention that the oil companies run the country, and that the state is merely their handmaiden, is Robert Engler's *The Brotherhood of Oil* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). Engler's discussion of developments in the early 1970s in chapter 5 of his book should be contrasted with the arguments presented here.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Realignment of the Jewish Vote?

ALAN M. FISHER

The Jewish vote has long been of concern to national political managers because of the strategic location of the Jews in metropolitan areas of states with considerable electoral impact and because of high electoral participation. Since the development of survey research students of politics have had a more precise means to monitor the Jewish vote, although general ethnic voting patterns have been discernible for many decades. All of the early surveys found the Jews to be strongly liberal and Democratic. The consistency of this liberalism over a twenty-year period, in spite of demographic characteristics which normally lead to conservative, Republican sympathies, suggested an almost inborn Jewish affinity for liberalism. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, as a result of some important racial and political developments, a number of observers close to and even within the Jewish community—the "insiders"—noted the breakdown of Jewish liberalism and of the tie with the Democratic party. Dissemination of these observations was sufficiently widespread to convince people that change had occurred. But the observations were made by people with limited access to systematically collected data. Examination of this evidence will show that theories of increasing conservatism and erosion of Jewish liberalism are premature.

The Jews were not always liberal Democrats—in part because the Democrats were not always liberal, in part because of the composition of the Jewish community. The first American Jews, descended primarily from the Sephardic community of Holland, had become a respectable, middle-class, propertied community by the period of American independence. There is clear evidence of

ALAN M. FISHER is assistant professor in the School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, California State University, Dominguez Hills.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Jewish attachment to the democrat Jefferson and to his party, renamed the Democrats under Andrew Jackson.[1]

The second major immigration of Jews, primarily from Germany and Austria-Hungary, occurred between 1830 and 1860. Largely of petty bourgeois background, a number of men were liberals who had supported the abortive revolutions of 1848. A combination of Democratic tolerance for slavery and Whig nativism drove the northern Jews—geographically, the dominant community—to suppport the new Republican party under Lincoln.[2]

The third and largest Jewish immigration, the villagers and urban poor of Eastern Europe, lasted from the 1870s to 1924. The first group of these immigrants adapted to the voting patterns of the already Americanized Jews. Republican support became strengthened under Theodore Roosevelt's administration, although the local Democratic party was building strength in the eastern, urban ghettos. Sign of a major movement to the Democrats can be found in strong Jewish support for the intellectual moral reformer, Woodrow Wilson, and the increasing local Democratic (and Socialist) vote.[3] Jewish support for the Democrats was greatest precisely when Democratic candidates were ideologically (liberally) most clearly differentiated from Republicans (1912–1920, 1928–1948).

Although there are some doubts about the vote of American Jews in the presidential contests of 1920 and 1924, there are indications of a strong vote—one projection is as high as 38 percent—for the Socialist candidate, Eugene V. Debs, in 1920 and 22 percent for the Progressive Lafollette in 1924.[4] Rather than a return to normalcy, there was a growing left-wing ferment in the Jewish ghettos of New York as the culture of proletarian Russian-Polish Jewry became more adjusted to its new environment. As Wolfinger has shown for other ethnic immigrant groups, it is not upon initial settlement that the ethnic vote becomes crystallized as a bloc vote but rather with the second generation, after strong ethnic organizations and new political consciousness have developed.[5] It was during the first quarter of this century that the young,

[1] The best historical source for the Jewish vote in America is Lawrence H. Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of American Jews* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956); see pp. 23–30.

[2] Ibid., pp. 31–50; also Eric Hirshler, ed., *Jews From Germany in the United States* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, 1955); Bertram W. Korn, *American Jewry and the Civil War* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1951).

[3] Fuchs, *Political Behavior*, pp. 50–73; Irving Howe, *World of Our Fathers* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), pp. 287–394; Arthur Silver, "Jews in the Political Life of New York City, 1865–1897" (Ph. D. diss., Yeshiva University, 1954).

[4] A Republican majority is suggested by Fuchs, *Political Behavior*, pp. 62–69 *passim*; a Democratic majority in 1924 is suggested by Stephen D. Isaacs, *Jews and American Politics* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1971), p. 151. Evidence supporting both sides is found in William Schneider and Douglas E. Schoen, "The Centrist Phenomenon: The Jewish Vote and the Changing Structure of Coalition Politics in America" (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, n.d.), pp. 51–54.

[5] Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," *American*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American-born Jews were exposed to a dynamic, articulate expression of radical-liberal-Socialist thought, a tradition whose impact they would carry forty years later.

As for other poor, urban, immigrant groups, the critical national election was 1928, at which time Jews moved clearly into the Democratic camp with an estimated vote of 72 percent.[6] The Jews were an integral part of the New Deal coalition. The vote for Franklin Roosevelt increased in both 1932 (82 percent) and thereafter (85–90 percent); even the Socialist vote became Democratic. During the Depression, it was natural for the foreign-born, poor, unskilled, urban Jews to support a party and candidate whose economic and ethnic policies were clearly more liberal than those of the other major party.

The test of Jewish attachment to liberalism came in the postwar period with the rising economic-occupational-educational mobility of the Jews. According to one classic study done in 1947, the Jews were already one of the highest economic-status religious groups although, unlike all other groups, they were also the most liberal on social and economic issues.[7] Even during the Eisenhower 1950s, when the New Deal coalition showed signs of weakening, Jews remained clearly Democratic. During this period, as survey research graphically pointed to voting differences between Jews and the nation as a whole, a number of analysts began to attempt to explain why the Jews persisted in their Democratic affiliation.[8]

For virtually all other groups there is a correlation between economic status and party vote: the greater the income of the group, the higher the conservative, Republican vote. Only the Jews stood out as a major exception. They were both the highest status white group and the most Democratic. The decline in the Jewish presidential vote in the 1950s might have been seen, at the time, as a process of normalization—the inevitable movement toward the Republican party. Elections in the 1960s, however, indicated that although their economic status

---

Political Science Review 59 (1965): 896–908; also Edgar Litt, *Ethnic Politics in America* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1970).

[6] For the notion of critical elections, see V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics* 17 (1955): 3–18, and "Secular Realignment and the Party System," *Journal of Politics* 21 (1959): 198–210; Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970); Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and Charles D. Hadley, *Transformations of the American Party System* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975). The projected total of 72 percent is presented, without methodological explanation, by Isaacs, *Jews and Politics*, p. 151; support is offered by Schneider and Schoen, "Centrist Phenomenon," pp. 51–54.

[7] Beverly Allinsmith and Wesley Allinsmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12 (1948):337–389.

[8] See Fuchs, *Political Behavior*; Werner Cohn, "The Politics of American Jews," in *The Jews*, ed. Marshall Sklare (New York: Free Press, 1958), pp. 615–626; Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960); Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960); Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William S. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 1

Voting in Presidential Elections, 1948–1976



X Reliable figures not available for whites and non-whites.

[a] In 1948 the proportion of the population (and Jewish vote) was: Henry Wallace - 2.3% (10%); Truman - 50% (75%); Dewey - 45% (15%); Thurmond - 2.4% (0%).

[b] Some survey data suggest a figure as high as 73% for Jews.

[c] George Wallace won 13.6% of the total vote; the percentages among different groups were: whites (15%), non-whites (3%), Jews (2%).

[d] Jewish total includes both Carter (70–73%) and Eugene McCarthy (1–2%).

Sources: Surveys by Louis Harris, Inc., American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), and Survey Research Center-Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, some of the Michigan material done by secondary analysis and in Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960); Angus Campbell et al., *The Voter Decides* (Chicago: Row, Peterson, 1954), p. 71; Bernard Berelson et al., *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 62, 71; Wm. Ray Heitzmann, *American Jewish Voting Behavior* (San Francisco: R and E Research Associates, 1975); precinct analysis in Lawrence Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of American Jews* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), Stephen Isaacs, *Jews and American Politics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 151–52, Mark Levy and Michael Kramer, *The Ethnic Factor* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consistently improved, Jews voted significantly more Democratic than they had in the 1950s; they seemed to be moving back to the Roosevelt era (see Figure 1).

The liberal Jewish Democratic orientation was tested by two related developments in the late 1960s. The first involved the blacks, toward whom Jews long had ambivalent feelings: sympathy because the blacks had suffered persecution and oppression, just like the Jews, and fear because of the violence of black communities. Involved in black civil rights organizations for many years, the Jews were removed by the nascent young black leadership. In metropolitan areas like New York, the blacks vented much of their antiwhite hostility against the Jews, partly an assertion of their autonomy against the perception of the Jews as patronizing, partly because as small merchants and civil servants, particularly teachers and social workers, the Jews were highly visible and often without strong defenses. The most traumatic and drawn-out episode, the Ocean Hill-Brownsville school board confrontation with the United Federation of Teachers (1968–69), filled with visual demonstrations of black anti-Semitism, left long-lasting scars in the Jewish community. This series of incidents contributed to the increasing concern for law and order, especially among Jews living in and near high-crime neighborhoods.

The second area, of particular concern to the Jews, was the increasingly hostile position against Israel taken by the New Left, including outspoken black elements. During the 1967 war in Israel, American Jewry had become united in defense of Israel. An attack on Israel was perceived as an attack on Jews; strong support of Israel was support for the Jewish people. And the resurgence of ethnic consciousness, in part a response to black nationalism, meant greater cultural legitimation for both international and local Jewish group concerns.

Skepticism about continued Jewish liberalism reached its height before the 1972 election in which Nixon, who had become a public champion of Israel and its government and who was known for his tough position on law and order, ran against a South Dakota neopopulist. McGovern was not known for his position on Israel but was identifiable by the company he kept—the young, nonwhites, and radical as well as counterculture elements. In the months before the 1972 election a spate of articles, many of them written by people within the Jewish community, announced the death of Jewish liberalism and the realignment of the Jews with a political posture dictated by their advantaged socioeconomic status.[9] It was left only to look at the vote.

[9] See Edward S. Boylan, "Are Jews Converting to Republicans?" *National Review*, October 27, 1972, pp. 1174–5, 1196; "The Jewish Swing to Nixon," *Time*, August 21, 1972, pp. 12–13; Roland Evans and Robert Novak, "Nixon Woos Jewish Voters," *Washington Post*, June 21, 1972, p. A23; Richard Reeves, "McGovern, Nixon and the Jewish Vote," *New York Magazine*, August 14, 1972, pp. 26–29; Jack Nusan Porter, "Jewish Conservative Backlash," and Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Jewish Vote," *Commonweal*, October 13, 1972, pp. 30–33, 33–37; Gerald S. Strober, *American Jews: Community in Crisis* (New York: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 179–210; C. Daniel Chill, "Changing Jewish Voting Patterns," *Jewish Life*, September, 1968, 14–21; Richard Hersh, address at Central Conference of American Rabbis (June, 1971), cited in Andrew J. Glass, "Nixon Gives Israel Massive Aid But Reaps No Jewish Political Harvest," *National Journal*, January 8, 1972, pp. 57–72; "Judaism

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Focus and Methods

The ultimate test of political orientation is political behavior and one of the simplest political acts to measure is the vote. Other studies have indicated that Jews persist in maintaining liberal attitudes in several spheres: the only questionable area was internationalism.[10] In order to check extensiveness of the party vote, the focus here is on the vote in both local-state and national elections. Both presidential and congressional elections have been included in the latter category because the campaigns are addressed to national issues. A number of state campaigns in the mid-1970s, for example, California's 1974 gubernatorial election, have been excluded because they were not marked by clear ideological cleavages. More attention has been given to a number of earlier campaigns, at that time when Jewish liberalism was most open to question.

There are two separate, though related, perspectives in viewing the data. The first looks at changes in the Jewish vote over time, or at least (primarily) since 1952 when the first large accessible (University of Michigan Survey Research Center) surveys were started. Second, in order to check the larger political sphere, a cross-sectional analysis compares the vote of Jews with other ethnic/racial and general population support. Thus one can evaluate the context in which specific elections take place, the kinds of issues and climate which lead to a distinct Jewish response, and the degree to which political changes among Jews parallel changes among other Americans.

There are some serious methodological problems in studying a small group like the Jews. The exact Jewish vote is often problematic. National surveys rarely include more than 35–40 Jews although the Michigan Presidential Political Surveys include up to 60 Jews. When there are several reliable national surveys, especially with a sample size of 50, it is possible to average findings for meaningful results. According to the central limit theorem, even an N of 30 becomes meaningful if there are a number of such studies. Unfortunately, often these results are not published publicly.

The other alternative, chosen by most of the journalists, focuses on election districts, the smallest electoral breakdown. The size makes it possible to isolate precincts with very high concentrations of Jews. (In the figures cited for the

---

and Liberalism—Marriage, Separation or Divorce," in *Judaism* 21 (Winter 1972), especially Steven S. Schwarzschild, "The Radical Imperatives of Judaism," pp. 9–15, Alan W. Miller, "Liberalism Is Indispensable," pp. 24–31, and Seymour Siegel," An Anatomy of Liberalism—A Conservative View," pp. 34–41; Harold Schulweis, "The New Jewish Right," *Moment* 1 (May 1975): 55–61.

[10] Alan M. Fisher, "Continuity and Erosion of Jewish Liberalism," *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* 66 (1976):332–348; Norman Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 256–258; sensitive discussions are found in Bernard Rosenberg and Irving Howe, "Are American Jews Turning Toward the Right?" *The New Conservatives*, eds. Lewis A. Coser and Irving Howe (New York: New York Times Book Co., 1974), pp. 64–89, and Irving Louis Horowitz, *Israeli Ecstasies/Jewish Agonies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 102–120.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

presidential and congressional races in this paper I have attempted to average the most reputable precinct and survey studies, giving greater weight to studies with larger samples. Except for some discrepancies in the presidential elections in 1952 and 1976, and congressional races in 1952, most of the findings have been approximately equal.) The major problems with precinct analysis are related to the distortion (ecological fallacy) created in reducing from macro or aggregate relationships to micro or individual relationships.[11] Two related, though different, issues appear. First, relatively few areas are completely Jewish; thus distortion may occur through the votes of non-Jews. Second, districts which are almost totally Jewish may not be accurate pictures of the entire Jewish community. It may be that only certain kinds of Jews are likely to live in highly ghettoized Jewish areas. Because of the dynamics of real estate, exclusion, and mobility, there are more likely to be precincts with high proportions of lower-middle class rather than rich or poor Jews. To avoid or at least to minimize the distortion of precinct analysis, it is necessary that: the district contain a very high proportion of Jews (or a very low proportion for control groups); the non-Jews in each district be politically similar to the Jews—a condition more often met in lower income than in middle or high income areas; and for a picture of all the Jews, a weighting procedure be used to balance any particular biases of communities with high concentrations of Jews.

Local-State Elections

Not all Jewish communities are equivalent. Not only are there socioeconomic differences, but different regions and cities have developed different traditions. Cincinnati and San Francisco, both settled early by German Jews, had long Republican traditions. Ohio Jews, in general, have been more conservative and Republican than other Jews whereas Manhattan Jews have tended to be more liberal.[12] Nevertheless, the overriding similarities are much more impressive than the differences. Of particular import are the greater New York and Los Angeles communities because they contain about 60 percent of the American Jews. New York is generally recognized as the Jewish capital.

The period of racial tension in the late 1960s presented the strongest challenge to New York liberalism. In 1966, 55 percent of the Jews voted against a racially-tinged Police Civilian Review Board referendum. The qualifying factor is that this figure was significantly lower than the figure (82 percent) for other whites.[13]

[11] See William S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review* 15 (1950):351–357; W. Phillips Shively, "Ecological Inference," *American Political Science Review* 63 (1969); 1183–1196; Eric A. Hanushek, John E. Jackson, and John F. Kain, "Model Specification, Use of Aggregate Data, and the Ecological Correlation Fallacy," *Political Methodology* 1 (1974):87–106.

[12] For data on several communities, Lucy S. Dawidowicz and Leon J. Goldstein, *Politics In a Pluralist Democracy* (New York: Institute of Human Relations, 1963).

[13] David W. Abbott, Louis H. Gold, and Edward T. Rogowsky, *Police Politics and Race* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the 1969 mayoral election, the conservative Democratic candidate, Mario Procaccino, won the primary by attracting heavy white non-Jewish ethnic support. In Manhattan, a plurality of Jewish voters supported the liberal confrontationist, Herman Badillo; outside Manhattan, former mayor Wagner (35 percent) ran ahead of Procaccino (27 percent), and the liberals: Badillo (21 percent), Scheuer (10 percent), and Mailer (5 percent).[14] The three liberal candidates did almost 40 percent better among the Jews than did Procaccino who ran well behind the moderate Wagner. A very similar pattern occurred in 1973 when the two main challengers on the left, Blumenthal and Badillo, equalled or slightly outpolled a moderate Jewish candidate (Abe Beame) among Jews. Although he won about 44 percent of the Irish vote and 69 percent of the Italian vote, the conservative Biaggi attracted only about 10 percent of the Jewish vote.[15] The majority of New York City Jews are Democrats and usually support the Democratic candidate. Nevertheless, in the 1969 general election, at the nadir of his popularity in the Jewish community, Lindsay, running solely on the Liberal party, attracted 45 to 48 percent of the Jewish vote.[16]

Mayoral elections in Philadelphia in 1971 and 1975 follow a similar pattern. Cohen and Sandrow show that the Jews, especially among the young and middle class, expressed more opposition in Democratic primaries than did (particularly white) non-Jews to Frank Rizzo, a strong law-and-order candidate who later supported Nixon. In the 1971 primary, 42 percent of the Jews as opposed to 67 percent of other whites supported Rizzo against a moderate. Against a liberal in 1975, Rizzo's support among Jews dropped to about 35 to 38 percent although it increased among other whites.[17] In both years, Rizzo fared better in the two-party election than in the primary, similar to the sequence in New York.

The 1969 and 1973 mayoral elections in Los Angeles closely resembled those in New York and Philadelphia. Tom Bradley, a black candidate, lost in 1969 but was successful in 1973 and again in 1977. Running against incumbent Sam Yorty, a conservative but with a very outspoken record of support for Israel, Bradley's support among Jews increased from about 55 to 60 percent—about 10

[14] Figures are those of NBC, cited by Arnold Schwartz, "Jewish Voting in Recent Elections" (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1969), p. 10, and Howard Yagerman, "The Changing Voting Pattern of Jewish Ethnic Identifiers in New York City," (M.A. Thesis, Political Science, University of Delaware, 1972); Schneider and Schoen, "Centrist Phenomenon," pp. 8–9.

[15] Figures are from a Harvard University poll, reported by Richard Reeves, "Splitting the Jewish Vote," *New York Magazine*, June 18, 1973, pp. 57–63; Schneider and Schoen, "Centrist Phenomenon," pp. 43–48; private communication from Howard Yagerman, based on examinations of voting in several Jewish districts.

[16] Evidence derived from Schwartz, "Jewish Voting"; Yagerman, "Changing Voting Pattern"; Arthur Klebanoff, "Is There A Jewish Vote?" *Commentary*, January, 1970, pp. 43–47; also Steven E. Frieder, "Intergroup Relations and Tensions in New York City," *American Jewish Yearbook*, vol. 71 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1971), pp. 717–720.

[17] Henry Cohen and Gary Sandrow, "Philadelphia Chooses a Mayor, 1971" (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1972); Henry Cohen, "Philadelphia Jews, Mayor Rizzo, and The Northeast' " (Philadelphia: American Jewish Committee, May 28, 1975).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

points more than he received among other whites and higher than what he received in the poor Chicano community.[18] In 1977, running primarily against a Jewish legislator whose major issue was opposition to forced busing, Bradley increased his support among Jews to about 72 percent of the two-candidate vote. Bradley's Jewish opponent did better among white non-Jews than among Jews.

In the gubernatorial election in California (1970), where there were clear ideological differences between the candidates, the Jewish vote was about 76 percent liberal. In comparing two demographically (upper-low class) similar areas, one almost totally Jewish in Fairfax, Los Angeles, and one almost totally non-Jewish district in Long Beach, Blumenthal found that in the 1970 election, Unruh, running against Reagan, received more than twice as much support in the Jewish area (80 percent to 38 percent).[19] In the New York gubernatorial election of the same year, the defeated liberal Arthur Goldberg captured even more of the vote from Jews and blacks (about 75 percent) than from Puerto Ricans (71 percent).[20] Undoubtedly, Goldberg gained additional Jewish support because of his ethnic identity although at least part of this gain was offset by Rockefeller's long incumbency and his identity as a well known moderate-liberal. Four years later, when the candidates' political differences were much sharper, the non-Jewish Democratic-Liberal Hugh Carey (80 percent) bettered Goldberg's proportion of the Jewish vote in defeating the Republican-Conservative Malcolm Wilson.[21]

Studies of three state propositions in California permit examination of commitment to specific policies. In 1970, 51 percent of the voters in the Jewish districts voted against Proposition 21, the so-called antibusing measure, compared with a statewide total of about 34 percent among whites. On the anti-(Mexican-American) Farm Workers Union Proposition 22, 71 percent in the Jewish areas opposed, compared with the statewide total of about 52 percent among whites. In 1976 a similar proposition (14), extending protection for the labor rights of farm workers, received the support of about two of every three Jews, but went down to defeat because of the opposition of almost two of every three white non-Jews.[22]

[18] Slightly lower figures have been reported by Mark R. Levy and Michael S. Kramer, *The Ethnic Factor* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), pp. 111–112. Figures in this paper are an aggregate from Schwartz, "Jewish Voting," Maurice Goldbloom, "Is There A Backlash?" *Commentary*, August, 1969, pp. 17–26, Neil C. Sandberg, "Report on Jewish Voting Patterns" (Los Angeles: American Jewish Committee, 1972), and Robert Blumenthal, "Fairfax as a Grey Area Ethnic Community" (M.A. Thesis, Urban Planning, University of Southern California, 1973).

[19] Blumenthal, "Fairfax Community," pp. 73–76.

[20] Amy Malzberg and Geraldine Rosenfield, "America Votes, 1970" (New York: American Jewish Committee, December, 1970); Levy and Kramer, *Ethnic Factor*, pp. 92–3, 119.

[21] *New York Times*, November 6, 1976, pp. 28–30, and November 7, 1976, pp. 1, 29; also *Jewish Press*, October 29, 1976, pp. 1, 22 and November 12, 1976, pp. 1, 2.

[22] For 1970, see Sandberg, "Jewish Voting Patterns," pp. 1–2. Unpublished data on the Jews for the 1976 proposition come from a California Field Poll, generously contributed by Mervin Field, and from local precinct analysis.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

National Elections

In searching for theories of political voting, political behaviorists have tended to overlook the uniqueness of presidential elections. Different issues have polarized electors at different times: in 1960 it was the Catholic question; in 1964 the fear of war overshadowed important ideological differences; in 1972 it was how to end the war and the threat of a new cultural style; in 1976 it was alienation and religion again. According to the insiders, in 1972 the setting was right for a major realignment of the Jewish voters. The push of McGovern's radicalism and the pull of Nixon's recent strong support of Israel were to attract Jewish voters to the Republican camp, led by a number of intellectuals who had long been identified with liberalism. If repetition in print is persuasive, the attentive reader was convinced that Nixon had a good chance to win a majority of the Jewish vote.

In fact, McGovern won 65 percent of the Jewish vote but only 31 percent of the white non-Jewish vote. Except for 1948 and 1968, that difference is greater than in any other election for which we have records. (See Figures 2–3, which provide data for Jews and *all* non-Jews.) McGovern received a higher percentage of the Jewish vote than had Adlai Stevenson in 1956. There is evidence suggesting that the Jewish vote would have been more Democratic if a more mainstream liberal, like Humphrey, had been a candidate. McGovern trailed far behind Humphrey among Jewish voters in every major primary. And an unusual number of normally Democratic Jews did not vote in the general election; most of these nonvoters would have voted for Humphrey.[23]

What ambivalence the Jews had felt about Nixon disappeared by 1974. In one 1974 poll, fewer than 6 percent of the Jews approved of Nixon's presidency and 85 percent disapproved. Whatever support he had was based on foreign policy (56 percent approval); on domestic policy, fewer than 4 percent of the Jews approved and 94 percent disapproved. Jews were consistently more critical than non-Jews of Watergate and in one survey only 6 percent of the Jews voiced displeasure with Nixon's resignation; among non-Jews the figure was 29 percent. Jewish antipathy toward the Republican administration continued with Ford's elevation. In September 1975, 24 percent of the Jews approved of the Ford presidency as opposed to 46 percent of all respondents; 61 percent of the Jews disapproved as opposed to 37 percent of all respondents.[24]

[23] For the primaries, see Levy and Kramer, *Ethnic Factor*, pp. 225–243; for the low Jewish turnout, Milton Himmelfarb, "The Jewish Vote (Again)," *Commentary*, June 1973, pp. 81–85, additional data are found in Michigan CPS and NORC General Social Surveys; also William Schneider, Michael D. Berman, and Mark Schultz, "Bloc Voting Reconsidered: 'Is There A Jewish Vote?'" *Ethnicity* 1 (1974):345–392.

[24] Data for attitudes toward the Nixon and Ford presidencies come from American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) polls of July, 1974 (unpublished), and August-October, 1975, reported in *Gallup Poll Reports* no. 124 (October, 1975), p. 1. Access to these unpublished data was generously granted by the Gallup organization.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

Voter Profiles: 1976 Democratic Primaries[a]

Candidates	N/H		MASS		FLA		ILL		N/C		WIS		PA	
	Jews	Non-Blacks	Jews	Non-Blacks	Jews	Non-Blacks	Jews	Non-Blacks	Jews	Non-Blacks	Jews	Non-Blacks	Jews	Non-Blacks
Wallace	–	–	1%	14%	4%	34%	4%	15%	4%	33%	0%	10%	1%	10%
Jackson	–	–	37%	19%	62%	17%	–	–	13%	3%	31%	6%	38%	23%
Carter	0%	28%	4%	13%	22%	30%	47%	43%	35%	44%	7%	35%	19%	41%
Udall	36%	26%	29%	18%	...	...	–	–	–	–	62%	39%	38%	18%
Church	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Harris	17%	11%	13%	15%	–	–	22%	7%	–	–	–	–	–	–
Shriver	6%	5%	2%	6%	–	–	27%	9%	–	–	–	–	–	–
Brown	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bayh	20%	14%	7%	7%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Candidates	IND		MICH		MD		ORE		OHIO		CAL		N.Y.[b]	
	Jews	Non-Blacks	Jews	Non-Blacks	Jews	Non-Blacks	Jews	Non-Blacks	Jews	Non-Blacks	Jews	Non-Blacks	Jews	White/non-Jews*
Wallace	...	12%	...	6%	...	5%	...	...	2%	4%	...	3%	X	X**
Jackson	30%	12%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	63%	26%
Carter	60%	70%	29%	41%	12%	35%	15%	38%	23%	53%	13%	21%	3%	35%
Udall	–	–	67%	46%	14%	6%	10%	3%	47%	23%	15%	5%	28%	24%
Church	–	–	–	–	–	–	50%	32%	14%	14%	20%	9%	X	X
Harris	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	X
Shriver	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	X
Brown	–	–	–	–	69%	52%	X	X	–	–	50%	56%	X	X
Bayh	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	X

– Candidate not listed on the ballot or did not campaign.
... Too few respondents to be accurate.
X Data missing.
*4% of the Jews and 17% of the white/non-Jews voted for candidates designated as "Others" by *New York Times*-CBS Poll.
**Errors due to rounding, neither adds to 100%.
Sources: [a]NBC polls, run by William Schneider.
[b]Recalculated *New York Times*-CBS Poll, *New York Times*, April 8, 1976, p. 30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Elements of the 1972 presidential election appear again in 1976. The Jewish vote was uncertain until the very end of the campaign, largely because of Carter's candidacy. For the Jews, Carter was probably the least attractive of all the major Democratic candidates. He was seen as a reborn Christian—and a Southern Baptist—who wore his religion publicly, a Southerner, a neopopulist, a man with no previous position on Israel, and few campaign positions of any substance. All the primaries indicate that Carter was a distant choice by Jews in virtually every state for which we have data (see Table 1). Only in Indiana did Carter score a clearcut victory among the small Jewish population, largely because most of the leading contenders did not campaign. In Illinois, where the major candidates most attractive to the Jews did not campaign, Carter won a plurality but he fell short of the total of the liberals, Harris and Shriver. In general, a combination of liberals outpolled Henry Jackson, a staunch supporter of Israel and Russian Jewry. Before Jackson dropped out, Morris Udall, the most progressive major candidate, had become the choice of the Jewish voters. Even toward the end of the primaries, when Carter almost had the nomination, in both Michigan and Ohio, Udall did better than 2 to 1 against Carter among Jews. Including the other liberal candidates makes that figure considerably higher. When Udall started to lose votes, his support switched to the liberal Senator Church and Governor Brown. Even by May, when he was the choice of 38 percent of Protestant Democrats, Carter attracted only 11 percent Jewish support. On the other end of the scale, it is interesting that George Wallace, just as in 1968 and 1972, did not appeal to the Jews though he was supported by 12 percent of the Protestants in May and 13 percent of the national Democrats in April.

As Tables 2 and 3 make clear, the real choice of the Jews was still Humphrey. For Democratic Jews, there was no contest. Although he had defected on the Vietnam issue, Humphrey's liberal credentials were more profound than were Carter's. Humphrey's popularity with the Jews lies not only with his strong support of Israel and Jewish causes but with his long-standing position as an articulate spokesman for the poor and oppressed. The source for his greater appeal than Jackson lies precisely in his more consistent role as a liberal. It is of note that as late as May, among the Jews, Carter trailed not only Humphrey but Udall and Brown as well, and was running even with Church who was just entering the campaign. Among non-Jewish Democrats, however, Carter was the most popular choice.

Although he made politically "correct" statements about Israel, appeared at Jewish functions, and even had some close Jewish advisers, Carter's image was foreign to the Jews. Intensity of support was weaker among Jews who voted for Carter than among non-Jewish Carter supporters.[25] His low prenomination score among Jews indicates that the Jewish vote would have been more Democratic had any of a number of more traditional liberal candidates been nominated.

On the other side, the Republicans offered in Ford a man who could attract

[25] *Harris Poll*, August 19, 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

Choices of Democrats for 1976 Nomination (April 9, May 17, 1976)

	Brown	*Carter*	*Church*	*Humphrey*	*Udall*	*Wallace*
Jews (May)	14	11	10	43	17	0
Protestants (May)	14	38	5	19	4	12
National (April)	6	28	2	31	5	13

Source: Gallup polls.

the Jews because he was more experienced, more conservative, and had recently announced the sale of sophisticated weaponry to Israel. Certainly Ford was going to attract all of the conservative vote plus those who were not keen about Carter. Again, the scene was set for a large Republican vote if, indeed, the Jews had become more conservative. And, again, the vote belies the hypothesis of Jewish conservatism. There are some interesting differences in various calculations of the Jewish vote but it probably falls in the range of 70 to 73 percent for Carter, 26 to 28 percent Ford, and 1 to 2 percent McCarthy and other left candidates.[26] Even the weak Carter candidacy attracted almost three out of every four Jewish voters—higher than Stevenson's vote in the 1950s but lower than the vote in the 1960s. Tallying the difference between the Jewish Democratic-liberal vote and the white non-Jewish vote, Carter-McCarthy receive a differential of about 24 percentage points. Since 1948, the highest such differential was 43, in 1968; the lowest was 19, in 1956. (Figure 3 presents differences between Jews and *all* non-Jews.)

TABLE 3

Presidential Choice of Democrats: Carter v. Humphrey (March–April, 1976)

	Carter	*Humphrey*	*Undecided/Don't know*
Jews	20	75	5
National	41	50	9

Source: Merged findings of a Gallup poll, April 27, 1976, and a Harris poll, March 13, 1976.

The Jewish Democratic vote in 1976 is even stronger in congressional and senatorial races. Carter consistently trailed other Democrats on the ticket, indicating that 70 to 73 percent is a minimum Democratic percentage. In Los Angeles city and Beverly Hills, the liberal Democratic senatorial candidate Tunney ran ahead of Carter in every single one of 42 sample precincts with at least 60 percent Jewish population. In the most fashionable Beverly Hills precincts with a substantial Jewish population, Carter won only 43 percent of the vote

[26] Sources include Gallup, Harris, NBC, CBS, and California Field polls, CPS 1976 Election Survey, as well as assembly district and precinct analyses of New York and Los Angeles.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whereas Tunney won 64 percent. In a comparable income area but with very few Jews, the vote for both Carter and Tunney was 40 percent. In the lower-middle class areas, more predominantly Jewish, Carter won 73 percent of the vote compared with 84 percent for Tunney. In every precinct, the proportion of Jews registered as Democrats was higher than the proportion of non-Jews, thus suggesting an even higher Jewish vote for Carter and Tunney. Jewish support for Tunney was about 7 to 8 percentage points higher than for Carter, or about 77 to 80 percent.

The figures for the New York senatorial race and other congressional races provide weighty evidence of continued Jewish attachment to the Democratic party. In New York, Daniel Moynihan, a classic New Deal liberal and a staunch, outspoken supporter of Israel, ran against the Conservative-Republican James Buckley in another clear test of liberal-conservative differences. (Though he quarreled with the New Left and served under Nixon, as well as under Kennedy-Johnson, Moynihan has long been identified as a liberal and was so characterized by his opponents in the election. Moynihan's Senate voting record, scored at 70 and 83 by the liberal ADA and COPE, is congruent with popular identification of his liberal proclivities. In the primary, the Jewish vote was split between Moynihan and Bella Abzug, an outspoken, publicly-identified Jewish liberal.) Moynihan won about 87 to 88 percent of the Jewish

FIGURE 2

National Congressional Vote of Jews and Non-Jews, 1952–1976

[a]Small sample size for Jews makes this the least reliable score.

Sources: Survey Research Center-Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan; 1954 Congressional data from Angus Campbell and Homer C. Cooper, *Group Differences in Attitudes and Voting* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), pp. 23, 35; and analysis of precinct vote in Los Angeles and New York.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 3

Differences between Jews and Non-Jews in Support of Democratic Candidates, Presidential and Congressional Elections, 1948–1976[x]



[a]Figures as: (% Democratic vote by Jews) – (% Democratic vote by Non-Jews).
[b]No Congressional scores for Jews available.
[c]Small sample size for Jews makes this the least reliable score.
[x]X^2 significant at .01 for all years, partly a reflection of large (non-Jewish) sample size ($500 < N < 2000$).
Sources: See Sources for Figures 1 and 2, and Isaacs, *Jews and Politics*, p. 152.

vote as opposed to about 48 percent among non-Jews.[27] Buckley's 13 percent exactly matches the figure he received from Jews six years earlier when he defeated a Democrat and a Liberal-Republican. Moynihan's total is only slightly higher than reported Jewish voting in other congressional races, the percentages slightly higher in the 1970s than in the 1960s. In Los Angeles, as in New York, within similar income areas, the more Jewish the precinct the higher the Democratic vote for Congress as well as president. When compared with precincts of similar economic level but with few Jews, the differences are very significant.

Political Affiliation

The third and most indirect measure of party loyalty and political orientation is party affiliation. Fortunately, surveys have asked about party affiliation for a number of years. What has happened to most white Americans in the last twenty years has generally happened to the Jews: there has been a decline in both Democratic and Republican affiliation and an increase in the percentage of independent voters. This is also true for the Jews if we use 1956 instead of 1952 as

[27] *New York Times*, November 3, 1976, pp. 1, 19 and November 4, 1976, pp. 1, 29; also *Jewish Press*, October 29, 1976, pp. 1, 22, and November 12, 1976, pp. 1, 2 *et passim*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the base year. The Jews are not as numerous in their Democratic affiliation as they were in the late 1940s and early 1960s, but considerably greater than in 1936. Yet the drop in Democratic affiliation did not accrue to the Republicans. Figure 4 tells only part of the story and minimizes the Democratic orientation because the category "Independents" includes people with some preferences. About three-fifths of the Jews who label themselves as Independents express Democratic leanings as opposed to about one-fifth with Republican proclivities. Nor is there much indication that the Republicans have been making noticeable inroads since McGovern's candidacy, a fact also reflected in the vote. If there has been a realignment of Jewish voters it should be seen in the change of party identification. Compared with other major white groups, the Jews are more Democratic in 1976 than in 1956; and their total change—from 1956 to 1972—was less than for all other major white groups.[28]

Nie et al. explain that for the Jews (78 percent) more so than for other groups, the change in party affiliation is attributable to the entrance of new (young) voters since 1960.[29] The change refers to stated party affiliation, however, and not to vote. This is important because young Jewish voters, although they indicate more independent affiliation than older Jews, also vote more liberal. Thus the force which decreases informal Democratic allegiance actually seems to make the group more liberal and, in fact, more Democratic. McGovern, for instance, received his strongest support among young Jews as he did among the young at large. Among young Jews, however, McGovern won overwhelming support whereas among young white non-Jews, Nixon received a slight majority.

An interesting, though methodologically questionable, means of looking at Jewish party affiliation is comparing the party identification of clearly identifiable Jewish and non-Jewish names in mixed precincts.[30] The advantages are the ease of access, the large sample size, and the natural control on most economic-demographic variables. The assumption is that voters' listed party preference is a meaningful choice; in California, as in the South, that is sometimes debatable since Republicans always do better at the polls than during registration. In a sample of neighborhoods in Los Angeles city and Beverly Hills, people with identifiable Jewish names are significantly more likely to list the Democratic party; the lower the median income of the area the greater the percentage of Jewish Democrats but the higher the income, the greater the difference between Jews and non-Jews. Even in the most expensive Beverly Hills precincts, Jewish Democratic registration in 1976 is about 72 percent. In the upper-low ("working") class neighborhoods it is close to 90 percent. (The mean

[28] Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, *Changing Voter*, pp. 210–242; Schneider, Berman, and Schultz, "Bloc Voting"; David Knoke, "Religion, Stratification and Politics," *American Journal of Political Science* 18 (1974):331–345.

[29] Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, *Changing Voter*, p. 238.

[30] A similar tool is examined by Fred Massarik, "New Approaches to the Study of the American Jew," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 8 (December 1966):175–191; for information on Jewish names, Dan Rottenberg, *Finding Our Fathers: A Guidebook to Jewish Genealogy* (New York: Random House, 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 4

Party Identification Among Jews, 1936, 1952–1976



Sources: 1936 Gallup polls (cited by Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and Charles D. Hadley, *Transformations of the American Party System* [New York: Norton, 1970], p. 62); from 1952 until 1972, Michigan Survey Research Center (copied from Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, *Changing American Voter* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976], p. 230); Gallup polls (July, 1974, and June, 1975); Center for Political Studies survey (1974, 1976); NORC General Social Surveys (1973–76).

of those who refused to state party preference is 4 percent; the rest are Republicans. A comparison of *absolute* percentages of formal party registration and party affiliation in popular surveys is not meaningful because there is a real reward for formal party registration—the right to vote in the primaries.)

Demography of the Jewish Vote

It is difficult to examine many differences among Jews because most of the samples are relatively small and precinct analysis permits only gross economic differentiation. In addition, there are overlaps among education, age, income, and country of birth. Moreover, results from 1972 seemed to contradict earlier and later patterns. In the 1960s, like other groups, the poorer Jews tended to be Democratic and the richer tended to be Republican and economically conservative. In an analysis of several areas in New York in 1972, Himmelfarb found that the upper-middle class Jewish communities gave more electoral support to McGovern than did the poorer areas, a pattern similar to support for Eugene

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

McCarthy in the 1968 primaries.[31] But this was contrary to most previous election studies and was contradicted by a study done in 1972 in Los Angeles.[32] As aforementioned, an analysis of Los Angeles precincts in 1976 showed that the "working" and lower-middle class areas gave a higher percentage to Carter and other Democratic candidates than did the upper-middle and upper class areas, although the most expensive neighborhoods have greater percentages of non-Jews. Newspaper reports from New York districts in 1976 were inconclusive; part of the reason was the large size of the districts. Schneider's examination of NBC data suggests that the strongest Carter support came from the $10,000–$15,000 range, but the lowest range vote came form the lowest income bracket.[33]

In support of Himmelfarb's hypothesis, several studies in the New York City area found that young and highly (secularly) educated Jews are more liberal than highly educated non-Jews and Jews with less education; additional support comes from the Los Angeles and Philadelphia mayoral elections.[34] In a 1976 poll of university faculty, Carter and more liberal candidates received the support of 90 percent of the Jews.[35] Jewish university students have strong liberal dispositions as do salaried Jewish professionals.[36]

The apparent contradiction between some of the findings in the 1972 and 1968 elections and those of the 1950s and early 1960s probably reflects the changing nature of the issues. When there are salient political issues like war, civil liberties or social-cultural change, income decreases in importance as a factor in voting decisions. The attraction of both Eugene McCarthy and George McGovern to upper-middle class Jews can be explained primarily by their vociferous antiwar sentiment and in part by their identification as educators and intellectuals, and proponents (or tolerant) of a new cultural and political style.

[31] Himmelfarb, "Jewish Vote Again," and "Jewish Class Conflict," *Commentary*, January 1970, pp. 37–40.

[32] Los Angeles data found in Blumenthal, "Fairfax Community," and Sandberg, "Jewish Voting Patterns"; also Schneider and Schoen, "Centrist Phenomenon," pp. 51–54; Levy and Kramer, *Ethnic Factor*, pp. 104–108; mixed, but generally supportive evidence found in Evelyn Lewis, "The Jewish Vote: Fact or Fiction" (Ph. D. Diss., Ball State University, 1976); mixed evidence in Fuchs, *Political Behavior*, pp. 84–85.

[33] William Schneider, private communication.

[34] Reeves, "Splitting Jewish Vote"; Schwartz, "Jewish Voting"; Cohen and Sandrow, "Philadelphia Chooses"; Cohen, "Philadelphia Jews"; Sandberg, "Jewish Voting Patterns"; Blumenthal, "Fairfax Community"; Louis Harris and Bert E. Swanson, *Black-Jewish Relations in New York City* (New York: Praeger, 1970); James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[35] Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset, "It's 2 to 1 for Carter," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, November 1, 1976, pp. 4–5.

[36] For a review of studies of student radicals; Kenneth Keniston, *Radicals and Militants* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973); also Charles S. Liebman, *The Ambivalent American Jew* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society), pp. 160–176; David E. Drew, "A Profile of the Jewish Freshman" (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1970). Data on differences between salaried and independent professionals in Paula Goldman Leventman and Seymour Leventman, "Congressman Drinan S.J., and His Jewish Constituents," *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* 66(1976):215–248.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In addition, some of McGovern's statements about the Middle East led to doubts by the strongest identifiers with Israel, a disproportionate percentage of whom were (and continue to be) among the poor.

The Future

Some critics have argued that it is impossible to talk about a "Jewish vote," that intragroup and individual differences outweigh vague notions of shared communal interests. Indeed, there are important differences among Jews: social, economic, educational, geographic, age, vocational, religious (practices), and even ethnic. Nevertheless there has also been a common thread; otherwise the vote of Jews ought to be distributed more randomly or cluster clearly on the Republican side. In fact, for the past half century Jews have voted strongly Democratic, long after most Jews ascended to economic plateaus normally associated with a Republican predilection. The data from national elections indicate that Jews have, in general, remained consistently more Democratic-liberal than the rest of the population. The data also show that Jews are not insulated from the main currents of American politics. There is considerable graphic aggregate evidence to substantiate a historical sociological principle: *wie es christelt sich so judelt es sich.* In spite of some special group interests, Jews are subject to the same major political, economic, and social factors as other Americans and their aggregate response patterns, over time, are closely parallel.

Major party realignment occurs when an individual or group perceives that the previously preferred party takes a stand against the interest of the voter(s) and/or the less preferred party takes a stand representing the voters' interests. This might follow naturally as a result of demographic change, for example, movement from rural to urban areas, or because of a salient political issue which divides the parties, for example, the Civil War. As a group, the Jews already achieved a significant upward mobility by the post-World War II period. If realignment were to come as a consequence of that major change, there should have been clear signs at least a decade ago. So far there are few significant political changes. Yet realignment is still possible under at least two conditions. If the Democrats turn against and the Republicans support specific important Jewish interests, there may be change. The most important Jewish ethnic concern is defense of Israel and of Jews throughout the world. Were the Democrats to nominate a series of (perceived) anti-Israel candidates while the Republicans selected supporters of Israel, there would likely be a shift. There is a recent, though imperfect example: after the New Left became increasingly anti-Israel, many Jews dropped out of the movement although they remained sympathetic to the basic left critique of American society. But, practically, it is unlikely that the Democrats will nominate candidates who are known to be anti-Israel, especially given the important role which Jewish voters play in the large-state primaries and the role of Jewish political figures within and tied to the Democratic party. A related theoretical development is the adoption by the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Democratic party of positions which would harm American Jews domestically. Such a potential issue is "reverse discrimination" or quotas in areas of employment previously decided by merit. But, again, for practical reasons—widespread public opposition—neither major party could afford to support the issue.

The second major possibility of realignment rests with the disruption of the American Jewish political culture. Except for a few particular issues like tax shelters, busing, quotas, and active support for the United Nations, Jews continue to support liberal policies. On tax policies Jews are significantly more liberal than non-Jews of similar economic background; in civil rights, Jews still express strong support for equality; very few Jews want the United States to leave the United Nations even though it has assumed a clear anti-Israel posture. Attitudinally, Jews are still found in the liberal camp. The most recent surveys indicate that Jews are united behind civil equality, equal opportunity, protection of civil liberties (except for Nazis), aid to the poor and to education, and resistance against the use of physical violence—united much more so than most other demographic groups. No candidate can oppose these positions and expect much Jewish support.

In local races, which tend to be parochial, there will be important differences and Jews will not always vote liberal or Democratic. On national issues, which are broader in scope, differences within the Jewish community will probably continue to be small except for economic questions. The most important political division among Jews is based on age and education. Although they tend to be less tied to Democratic party affiliation, the young and educated are the most liberal and vote the most Democratic; this relationship is not true for all demographic groups. If the young Jews maintain their political orientation, it is likely that Jews will continue to think liberal and vote Democratic in the immediate future. In any given election for national office, the Jewish vote for a liberal Democrat may drop to *as low* as 65 to 70 percent. And this is, indeed, lower than the reputed 90 percent the Jews gave to Franklin Roosevelt his last term. But the contemporary Jewish vote is not much different from Roosevelt's first three terms (82 to 85 percent). The Jewish vote today is certainly more Democratic than in the 1950s and not even close to 50 percent Republican.

In 1972 two astute political observers noted: "With or without McGovern as their presidential nominee, shrewd Democrats perceive this Jewish affair with President Nixon as ominously portentous."[37] Realignment is still more portent than real.*

[37] Evans and Novak, "Nixon Woos Jewish Voters," p. A23.

* This is a revised version of "Jewish Liberalism and Conservatism in 1976," a paper presented to the Association for the Sociological Study of Jewry (Chicago, September 1977). Many of the data utilized in this paper were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The Gallup organization and Professor William Schneider generously provided access to additional data. Neither the original collectors of any of the data nor the consortium nor the other sources bears any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Interest Groups in the Postpartisan Era: The Political Machine of the AFL-CIO

HARRY HOLLOWAY

When George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, in late 1973 called for the election of a veto-proof Congress, he drew public attention to the impressive political potential of labor forces in national politics.[1] Certainly there was little tendency to scoff either by friends or foes. Activity on this scale manifestly embodies large-scale interest group intervention in the political process. Meanwhile accumulating evidence points to the continuing decomposition of the political party system. Perhaps the most authoritative analysis to appear to date concludes by comparing the evolution of national political processes to the kind of factionalism found by V.O. Key years ago in his analysis of the one-party South. And although the authors found today's electorate to be more sophisticated and issue-oriented than the earlier Southern electorate, they did project a "politics of issue-based factions" in a "post partisan era."[2] The politics of an issue-based factionalism may be complex and uncertain but it surely suggests the value of interest group analysis, at least as a supplement to other forms of analysis.[3] The federation's large-scale political operations, a rather remarkable extension of interest group activity, are the focus of this study.

[1] See *Daily Proceedings and Executive Council Reports*, Tenth Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO at Bal Harbour, Florida, on October 18-23, 1973, vol. 1, p. 28.

[2] Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 355-6.

[3] Political money from interest groups increased greatly over a short period of time, according

HARRY HOLLOWAY is professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma. He is coauthor of *Party and Factional Division in Texas* and author of *The Politics of the Southern Negro*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In this context the federation's politics are an especially appropriate subject.[4] For one, it is an influential group. George Meany has said of the federation that it is "the single most effective political organization in this country. . . ." The union authority, Martin Estey, concedes that "perhaps" Meany is right, although he adds that it is not an "irresistible force."[5] Any group that seriously entertains the prospect of achieving a veto-proof Congress is manifestly powerful, even if not irresistible. Second, the federation is a good example of a highly developed mass based political organization. This organization performs many political functions like those of the parties. But it operates within the framework of the existing parties, not as a separate labor party. George Meany unabashedly refers to their organization as a "political machine."[6]

To view this political organization as a machine blends our concept of interest group politics in a postpartisan era with the functional case for political machines stated by Raymond E. Wolfinger. Wolfinger argued that political machines were a response to needs not otherwise met and that machines did in fact continue to exist.[7] There was little reference to national politics or to labor; but this statement of the functional value of machines has potential application here. Labor evolved an expanded political organization to meet the needs of its members in an era of decaying political parties. But the federation does not see itself as solely a force for business unionism, that is, union activity focused narrowly on the interests of union members only.[8] While rejecting "revolutionary"

---

to Common Cause. From 1974 to 1976 the number of Political Action Committees created to channel interest group money into the political process jumped from 516 to 1,166. The volume of funds contributed rose from $12.5 million in 1974 to $22.6 million in 1976. See Common Cause issue of *Frontline*, April-May, 1977.

[4] Labor is not much studied politically, in contrast to the writings available on corporations and the medical and legal professions. One major exception is J. David Greenstone, *Labor in American Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969). Other sources on labor politics include Norman Blume, "Control and Satisfaction and Their Relation to Rank-and-File Support for Union Political Action," *Western Political Quarterly* 26 (March 1973): 51–63; Norman Blume, "The Impact of a Local Union on Its Membership in a Local Election," *Western Political Quarterly* 23 (March 1970): 138–50; Charles M. Rehmus and Doris B. McLaughlin, eds., *Labor and American Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967); Harry M. Scoble, "Organized Labor in Politics: Some Questions for the Discipline," *Western Political Quarterly* 16 (September 1963): 666–86; Harold L. Sheppard and Nicholas A. Masters, "The Political Attitudes and Preferences of Union Members: The Case of the Detroit Auto Workers," *American Political Science Review* 53 (June 1959): 437–47; Vivian Vale, *Labour in American Politics* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971).

[5] Martin Estey, *The Unions*, 2d ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 36.

[6] Meany's words were: "We don't have any political party, but we have a political machine." See Haynes Johnson and Nick Kotz, *The Unions* (New York: Simon and Schuster Pocket Books, 1972), p. 86.

[7] Wolfinger, "Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts," *Journal of Politics* 34 (May 1972): 365–399.

[8] One idealistic labor leader who disliked business unionism cynically defined it as meaning, "I must get all I can for my members, and I don't give a good goddam for anybody else." See A.H. Ruskin, "Is the Picket Line Obsolete?" *Saturday Review World*, October 19, 1974, p. 16. This leader offered as a "best example" the civil-service unions of New York City.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unionism and "uplift" unionism, labor does accept the role of "social" unionism. The latter seeks to "improve the general condition of their members by improving the general condition of everyone in the community—local, state, national, and international."[9] Thus, as Meany once said approvingly, the "AFL-CIO is often called the 'people's lobby' and I believe that is true."[10] There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of these statements. But it is also true that adoption of this role is a means of gaining allies for labor's goals. In the words of Vale, labor as a pressure group "must seek coalitions. . . . These circumstances oblige union leaders in the political sphere to commit themselves to a vastly wider concept of the obligations of unionism than in the merely economic. In so doing they and their followers can constitute by far the largest and most stable body supporting liberal causes in the United States today."[11] Estey makes a similar point in observing that the "primary role" of the federation is "broadly political"; it presents labor's views on countless problems ranging from wages and hours to "public housing" and "foreign policy."[12] Small wonder, then, that Monsen and Cannon observe after examining labor's ideology that, "The tide of social forces or social philosophy in the country, labor feels, is in its favor and will eventually sweep aside opposition to those issues it favors."[13] Labor's machine serves broad needs.

To define "labor" presents some hazards. We mean by it chiefly the political activities of the AFL-CIO. Most of this activity is the responsibility of the Committee on Political Education, or COPE, supplemented by the federation's lobby. COPE often works closely with other unions outside the federation, such as the autoworkers. In addition labor tends to favor Democrats and may work closely with elements of that party, even if much autonomy persists.[14] As a "people's lobby" labor also works in tandem with other groups representing civil rights interests, consumers, and farmers. There is much labor political activity at the state and local level, especially in localities with large enclaves of union members. To this last we can here give little attention, although it is obviously interesting and important in its own right. In the present context, then,

[9] Thomas R. Donahue, "Labor: An Enduring Force for Progress," *The American Federationist*, October, 1975, p. 2. Examples of the goals of social unionism cited include national health care, full employment, and "decent housing."

[10] "Workers Want Fair Share," *The American Federationist*, p. 10. Critics may consider this characterization pretentious but it is popular. Common Cause describes itself as a "people's lobby."

[11] Vale, *Labour in American Politics*, p. 160.

[12] Estey, *The Unions*, p. 40.

[13] R. Joseph Monsen, Jr. and Mark W. Cannon, *The Makers of Public Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 75.

[14] The present analysis differs from Greenstone's study, *Labor in American Politics*, in its emphasis upon the relative autonomy of labor as an interest group functioning within the party system. Greenstone's research drew heavily upon the period of the Great Society legislation of the 1960s and argued for a complex coalition of labor and the Democrats. Since this period the party system has further decomposed and interest groups have grown in strength and influence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

references to "labor" mean chiefly the national political activities of the AFL-CIO.

One other possible problem at the outset is that of bias. Anyone who sets out to study labor politically may appear to echo the conservative charge that labor "bosses" are about to "take over."[15] Certainly labor is powerful but it is not monolithic or "irresistible." In any event, the main purpose of this analysis is not the normative task of assigning value judgments, pro or con. Judgments can hardly be avoided altogether but the basic objective is the analysis of a group that is one of the major influences on national political processes. Perhaps we need hardly add that this study is a preliminary analysis, not a definitive statement.

Federation Structure and Goals

In structure the federation is a mass based democratic organization governed by a constitution, biennial conventions, and elected executive bodies headed by the president. In practice an aging oligarchy dominates. The contrast between what David Truman in his classic, *The Governmental Process*, called the "forms of democracy" and the oligarchic realities is quite striking. As for its purpose, we have already noted in the words of union authority, Martin Estey, that its primary role is "broadly" political. Hence the federation as such does not engage in collective bargaining.

The mass base of the federation in 1974 totaled 13.6 million union members and 111 national and international unions.[16] In the same year, according to Martin Estey, there were 22.8 million American workers organized in unions.[17] Thus, union labor represented about one quarter of the work force and the federation membership amounted to about 60 percent of the organized total. As Estey notes elsewhere, the high hopes for expanding union labor and its political clout that accompanied the merger of the AFL and CIO in 1955 were not realized. The federation did grow but only quite modestly and this slow growth Estey accounts "one of the most conspicuous failures of the merger. . . ."[18] According to Estey, the shift to service industries and to white collar jobs, and the rising proportion of women in the workforce, all acted as brakes on the ex-

[15] One example is Douglas Caddy, *The Hundred Million Dollar Payoff: How Big Labor Buys Its Democrats* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1974). The book is better than the title suggests and the author himself freely acknowledges his bias.

[16] From statement released by the federation's Washington headquarters. These totals vary some from year to year. As Estey points out, affiliated national unions retain their "independence" and operate as "essentially free agents" in traditional union functions associated with collective bargaining. See his *The Unions*, p. 40.

[17] Ibid., p. 4. In spite of the tendency of union labor to decline over time as a percentage of the work force, there has been growth among government employees and teachers. Estey presents some evidence that trends in union membership have been surprisingly stable over the period 1944–74.

[18] Ibid., p. 36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pansion of union membership. In addition, as we shall note in examining George Meany's values, Meany, the president and dominant figure in the federation over the years, did not accord a high priority to expansion of membership. Still a mass base of nearly 14 million members, supplemented by their families, manifestly has much potential for political influence through an organization able to muster this potential in the form of votes, money, and political activists.[19]

As against this mass base and the formal democratic structure of the federation there was the reality of an aging oligarchy headed by the oldest of them all, George Meany. Meany was born on August 16, 1894. Some observers thought he might treat the election of 1976 as his "last hurrah" and step aside. He did not choose to do so, however; he remained in charge and without serious challenge. His tenure of power as leader of a large and influential national organization, one that placed him high among Washington's influentials, is so unusual as to defy comparisons. Meany outlived even such seemingly everlasting Washington fixtures as the late J. Edgar Hoover.[20] And by the mid-1970s other federation influentials such as Al Barkan, director of COPE, and Andrew J. Biemiller, head of the federation lobby, were also well into their sixties. Furthermore, Meany not only dominated the federation and its policies;[21] he was widely recognized as the leading spokesman for all of organized labor and for much of the great body of working people outside of unions.[22]

Given Meany's power and influence his perception of labor's role in the system counts for much. A 1972 interview revealed a good deal. Meany was not much concerned about the unorganized: "Frankly, I used to worry about the membership, about the size of the membership. But quite a few years ago I just stopped worrying about it, because to me it doesn't make any difference. It's the

[19] The use of labor money in the political process is a complex and controversial subject. On the case for the improper use of labor money in political campaigns, the best source is probably Caddy's book, *The Million Dollar Payoff*. Caddy has assembled an extensive body of evidence, much of it from labor sources. See also Caddy, *How They Rig Our Elections* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1975). Much of the controversy concerns the question of the use of dues money in partisan campaigns for federal office, as distinct from the voluntary contributions raised from union members for political purposes. Large sums are involved. In the fiscal year ending in 1973 the AFL-CIO reported annual income of over $16 million, of which nearly $15 million derived from dues. Another complication is the campaign reform act passed by Congress in 1974. An analysis of what this law permits labor to do with dues money is in *Proceedings* of the Eleventh Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO, October 2–7, 1975, vol. 2, pp. 353–54.

[20] Note the concluding comments of Joseph C. Goulden in his biography, *Meany* (New York: Atheneum, 1972), p. 463. On the turmoil that might accompany Meany's departure, see Austin H. Kiplinger and Knight A. Kiplinger, *Washington Now* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 384.

[21] Meany's dominance is best typified by the terse comment of one union leader: "Meany is the boss." See Nick Kotz, "Can Labor's Tired Leaders Deal with a Troubled Movement?" *New York Times Magazine*, September 4, 1977, p. 10.

[22] Meany's imposing stature was well summarized by a member of Richard Nixon's administration who told a reporter, "There's no place you can touch base to find out where business stands. But with labor you just go check with Meany." See *Wall Street Journal*, October 23, 1973, p. 18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organized voice that counts—and it's not just in legislation, it's any place."[23] Nor did Meany profess any desire to control a political party, the Democrats in particular. As he put it, "If we attempted to take over the Democratic Party, why, we'd have to pay more attention to that than to the labor movement. And if we set up our own political party, we'd be telling this country that we're ready to run the Government, and I don't think we're ready—I don't think we're qualified to run the Government. I don't think any special interest group is qualified to run the Government."

Meany's recognition of labor as an organized "special interest" and not an organic part of a political party still perceives labor as a special kind of interest, a peoples lobby that embraces social unionism and "broadly political" purposes. This strain of social unionism contains much of what remains of an ideology. In this vein labor spokesmen are fond of portraying themselves as advocates of the underdogs fighting the good fight against the "interests" and especially big business.[24] There are many who question labor's credentials as the major force for liberal or progressive legislation.[25] But there is little reason to question the sincerity of federation pronouncements on this score. For that matter, some criticism has arisen within the federation charging the leadership with neglecting union interests in the quest for progressive social legislation.[26]

That the federation's goals do reflect considerable breadth, a breadth not explicable as a form of business unionism, is apparent in a brief examination of legislative goals. Of Lyndon Johnson's administration Meany has said, "We go far beyond the questions of wages and hours. We're into everything." He cited civil rights and education legislation specifically.[27] Even in the 1970s with a less than congenial Republican administration in power, labor's legislative interests were quite broad. An example is lobbyist Andrew J. Biemiller's assessment of the 93rd Congress ending in 1974.[28] The plusses on labor's scorecard included

[23] *U.S. News and World Report*, February 21, 1972, pp. 27–8. For an update on this sentiment, see Kotz, "Can Labor's Tired Leaders Deal with a Troubled Movement?" p. 30.

[24] A reader of the weekly *AFL-CIO News*, especially of the editorial pages, will quickly encounter examples. One gathers that many social scientists who pride themselves on being informed nonetheless ignore the labor press.

[25] One prime example is the work of the well-known social critic, John Kenneth Galbraith. His widely hailed *The New Industrial State*, which appeared in a second edition in 1971, treated labor as a part of the Establishment and looked for reform to the scientific-educational estate. Contact with a limited number of labor leaders suggests impressionistically that union leaders are aware of such criticism and resent it.

[26] *Washington Post* reporters, Haynes Johnson and Nick Kotz, in their examination of labor remarked upon labor's "almost total failure to win legislation on strictly labor issues." They found that some federation leaders were urging the federation to "concentrate more on strictly trade union issues." See Johnson and Kotz, *The Unions*, p. 99. Labor's pressure on the administration of Jimmy Carter following the election successes of 1976 suggests that federation leaders felt that union interests had been neglected and that some "catching up" was in order.

[27] Ibid., p. 96.

[28] *The American Federationist*, February 1975, pp. 1–2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the following: pension reform, railroad retirement, campaign financing, minimum wages, legal services, consumer product warranties, collective bargaining rights for workers in nonprofit hospitals, temporary unemployment compensation, restraints on Eximbank credits to Russia, aid to elementary and secondary schools, public service jobs, and subsidies for mass transit. Biemiller also cited the issue of foreign trade and the problem of exporting American jobs. A further set of issues Biemiller described as in need of early action included the following: tax justice, national health insurance, reform of worker's compensation and unemployment insurance, consumer bills, and long-range energy problems. Nor does the federation ignore foreign affairs. On October 1, 1974 George Meany testified on the subject of detente before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In Meany's eyes detente was a "delusion" that could itself threaten peace. This testimony was thoroughly in keeping with the generally hawkish stance Meany has taken on foreign policy over the years. As for the troubled Middle East, Meany has, like many other labor leaders, strongly supported Israel. These issue concerns lend substance to the federation's claim to be an organization that speaks for many beyond the ranks of organized labor. They are hardly explicable as an outgrowth of a parochial and self-interested business unionism.

Social unionism and the support of social legislation usually align labor with big government. But there is one sector in which labor does not want government interference, that of collective bargaining. As Monsen and Cannon wrote of labor's ideology roughly a decade ago, "Essentially, labor is not afraid of 'big government' as long as government does not interfere with the prerogatives of labor in collective bargaining, in wage setting, and in its general relationship with business."[29] As they observed, labor has opposed controls in the fight against inflation in times past. And labor has taken a similar position in more recent years as when the Nixon administration invoked controls for a time in the early 1970s. A statement released by Meany in an interview not long before Labor Day in 1974 explains much of labor's opposition: "I think we are meeting the employer pretty much on an equal basis, and frankly, if government would let us alone and let us do battle with the employer, I have every confidence as to what the outcome would be."[30] Labor favors government action to enact social legislation but opposes interference with its interest group activities through collective bargaining. Overall, then, the federation functions as a supplement to its member unions to serve their "broadly political" purposes.

The Federation and Electoral Functions

The merger of the AFL and CIO occurred in 1955 and by 1960 an expanded program of political activism was under way. According to Johnson and Kotz,

[29] Monsen and Cannon, *The Makers of Public Policy*, p. 75.
[30] *The AFL-CIO News*, September 7, 1974, p. 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Many involved in labor's political operation say the real growth and consolidation of power date from the 1960 presidential campaign. That was the first time the unions raised money on a large scale for voter registration."[31] COPE worked not just for John Kennedy. By their own account they endorsed a total of 320 candidates seeking congressional offices. By 1974 not long after Meany's call for a veto-proof Congress, COPE endorsements extended to 422 congressional office seekers.[32] Indeed, according to *National Journal* reporters, Cottin and Culhane, COPE director, Al Barkan, by the early 1970s was willing to describe their organization as more than a match for the political parties: "We've got organizations in 50 damn states and it goes right down from the states to the cities. There's no party can match us. Every election it gets better and better. Give us ten years or fifteen years and we'll have the best political organization in the history of this country. We're at it year 'round. We've got full time people in every state in the nation."[33]

COPE is the electoral arm of the federation. Its fundamental function is to mobilize the organization's mass membership, a process that begins with voter registration. Cottin and Culhane in their examination of COPE found that the national staff devoted much of its time to this task.[34]

Johnson and Kotz described what this mobilization of the membership could mean for just one state in the early 1970s: "Today you can go into a key industrial state like Pennsylvania, sit down with Mike Johnson, vice-president of the state AFL-CIO, and get 900,000 names of workers, their wives, their children of voting age and other vital political statistics broken down accurately in terms of Democrats, Republicans, independents—all complete with latest home addresses."[35] Over the years this registration process evolved into a computerized voter identification program. One major objective was an up-to-date and accurate record of union members and their families that could be tallied in the form of precinct walking lists for the use of local activists. By 1975 COPE could claim that its data processing system had "11 million names of union members" recorded and was nearing their goal of "including 80 percent of the members of unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO." Special efforts were made to reach selected groups, such as women, blacks, Mexican Americans, senior citizens, and first-time voters. As this labor analyst noted, labor benefited from the impact of Watergate in that changes in the federal election law "shifted emphasis from direct contributions to candidates and placed a premium on what

[31] Johnson and Kotz, *The Unions*, pp. 73–74. This date conveniently sets off a major growth period in the federation's record of political mobilization. It does not mean that political activity actually began at this time. Even Samuel Gompers, who headed the AFL when it formed in 1886, was not averse on occasion to political activities that rewarded friends and punished enemies. See Estey, *The Unions*, p. 22.

[32] *The American Federationist*, September 1975, p. 21.

[33] Jonathan Cottin and Charles Culhane, "Committee on Political Education," in *Political Brokers*, ed. Judith G. Smith (New York: Liveright National Journal Book, 1972), p. 99.

[34] Ibid., p. 105.

[35] Johnson and Kotz, *The Unions*, p. 77.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

labor has always done best—getting union members registered and organizing them into effective cadres of political volunteers."[36]

Mobilization of the membership is fundamental but there is also a need for candidates. As befits an organization seen by its leadership as an interest group and not a political party, the organization selects candidates from the existing parties. Not surprisingly most candidates endorsed are Democrats, although not exclusively so. For that matter the leadership in their pronouncements on the subject affirm relatively pragmatic and nonpartisan standards. Meany in an interview that dealt with the labor endorsements admitted that most union members registered as Democrats and that most of the candidates endorsed were Democrats. Yet he insisted that labor supported some Republicans and pointed out that he had supported Republicans running for office in Maryland where he lived.[37] The action of the federation's Executive Council in 1972 in refusing to endorse either George McGovern or Richard Nixon raised some eyebrows and some tempers as well. Whatever else it did, it certainly reinforced Meany's contention that labor was not wedded to the Democrats.

A pragmatic and nonpartisan attitude toward endorsements is readily apparent as well in Al Barkan's insistence that their goal is to "win elections, not arguments. . . . I want to win."[38] Secretary-Treasurer Lane Kirkland has in his own reflective way expressed similar attitudes. He admitted, "sentimental ties" to the Democrats but added pointedly that, "The day we become an organic part of the Democratic Party, we will close up our legislative office. An American political party is a myth, a quadrennial happening. In Britain it's an instrument of government." His pragmatic focus on interest group concerns then emerged clearly: "Our main purpose is to get votes in Congress. . . . We have to work with everybody. We've got practical, programmatic fish to fry, and we have to fry them where the barbeque is."[39] These statements from the leaders and their neutrality in 1972 all point to the conclusion that the federation's ties to the Democrats are governed by perceptions of group self-interest, not by deep emotional and philosophical commitments.

Within these norms of group self-interest the actual process of determining candidate endorsements is complex and reaches down to the local units of the federation. Officially the executive council endorses presidential candidates and the branches of the federation endorse candidates within their jurisdictions at the state and local level. Yet the influence of Meany and his lieutenants is considerable even if exercised within limits. Meany punished Colorado labor leaders who sought to use parts of the federation structure to further George McGovern's presidential campaign.[40] Still, many endorsements are apt to be

[36] Rex Hardesty, "Having the Voting Tools," *The American Federationist*, May 1975, p. 5.

[37] Johnson and Kotz, *The Unions*, p. 88.

[38] Cottin and Culhane, "Committee on Political Education," p. 90.

[39] Harry McPherson, "The Democrat's Dilemma: Watergate Has Undone the Republicans, Right?" *New York Times Magazine*, September 9, 1973, p. 53.

[40] Meany's disciplinary action led to an appeal to the federation's national convention in 1973,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relatively noncontroversial. In any event they require substantial labor unity in order to be effective. An organization that endorses hundreds of candidates is likely to support large numbers of incumbents with well-established records.

In addition to the tasks of registering their members and selecting candidates, there is the task of managing labor's role in the electoral process. Much of the planning and direction for this large-scale electoral activity flows from the federation's Executive Council.[41] The Executive Council divides the nation into regions, ten in all, and assigns specific unions and their personnel responsibility for concentrated work on selected campaigns within their territory. Most effort goes into perhaps 80 to 100 marginal contests in which a friend needs support or any enemy is deemed vulnerable.[42] In such localities registration will be pressed hard long before the election. National headquarters supplemented by local unions, makes information, campaign literature, even polling services available as needed. Labor's files of information are thought by some to be the best political intelligence available anywhere in Washington. Seminars and workshops are conducted to train leaders. Labor money is made available to candidates. More important, in the eyes of Al Barkan, is the work done by labor itself in mobilizing their members.[43] Experienced labor political activists may be made available for work on a candidate's staff. In some cases labor operatives have become, effectively, the campaign managers, although reform legislation passed by Congress in the 1970s has probably curbed such practices.[44]

What the federation's political organization can do for a candidate may be dramatized by figures cited from the 1968 presidential election campaign of Hubert Humphrey. According to *Washington Post* reporters, Johnson and Kotz, COPE that year registered 4.6 million voters, distributed 55 million pieces of literature nationally and another 60 million through local unions. Unions established "638 city phone banks with 8,055 phones and 24,611 people manning them." Over 72,000 union members engaged in canvassing before the elec-

---

which as usual upheld Meany. See *Proceedings* of the Tenth Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO, vol. 1, p. 188. The airing of the dispute is itself a healthy sign in an organization that suffers from Meany's image as a stern, aging, and autocratic leader.

[41] One good summary of the federation's electoral operations is in Caddy, *The Million Dollar Payoff*, pp. 50–1. Caddy quotes at length a summary submitted in federal court by the federation's legal counsel.

[42] An intriguing glimpse of this field work is the account by Cottin and Culhane of a COPE area director whose pre-election report on a western congressional district highlighted an opponent's weakness and labor's opportunity "if we do our homework. . . . " This opponent in fact lost the next election. See Cottin and Culhane, "Committee on Political Education," p. 100.

[43] According to Cottin and Culhane, Barkan believes $5,000 in cash is worth less to a candidate than $25,000 budgeted for working union membership. See ibid., p. 108.

[44] Ibid., p. 101. Cottin and Culhane quote one COPE area director as describing himself as active "probably" in "more campaigns than anyone in America. . . . In some cases, behind the scenes, I'm the campaign director." See ibid., p. 101.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion and on election day nearly 95,000 precinct workers turned out.[45] Even the skeptical are bound to recognize that the federation's political machine is capable of electoral activity on a grand scale.

The effectiveness of the federation's electoral operations is hard to assess objectively. To judge from the federation's reports on its work, labor is highly successful at the polls. Thus the report on the 1974 election, in which COPE endorsed 422 candidates for House and Senate seats, claimed that 70 percent of this group won. Even in the more competitive contests in marginal districts, the claim was made that a "large majority of endorsees were elected. . . ." However, it was turnout figures among labor supporters that this report viewed as best proving the "increasing growth and effectiveness of COPE organization." For, nationally, only 38 percent of registered voters turned out but among their own members and families turnout exceeded 50 percent and in some key districts and precincts ranged from 70 to 84 percent.[46]

But COPE impresses others as well. When *National Journal* reporters, Cottin and Culhane, examined COPE in the early 1970s they concluded that, "If imitation is the most sincere form of flattery, COPE is surrounded by flatterers—most of them on the opposite side of the philosophical fence." The reference was, specifically, to the Business-Industry Political Alliance, "whose leaders readily concede they formed the group to counterbalance COPE's effectiveness."[47] Furthermore, in 1972 when the National Education Association announced plans for "flexing its muscles" in "nationwide political action," its political committee was described as one that would "resemble" COPE.[48] This praise and emulation are powerful, independent testimony to COPE's effectiveness.

Further evidence is available in a relatively objective study of labor's political activities conducted by a political scientist, Frederick H. Nesbitt. Nesbitt focused on an election in Pennsylvania in 1974 in which labor supported a Democrat, Milton Shapp, for governor and a Republican, Richard Schweiker, for the Senate. COPE instructed supporters to split their tickets for the Democrat, Shapp, and the Republican, Schweiker, and both candidates did in fact win. The study findings drew upon large numbers of questionnaires sent to union members to find out what happened and why.[49] The study found that union members were more active politically than the total population and that the union endorsement had a greater impact than party identification, which had little effect. Nesbitt's major finding was that a "majority of rank-and-file union members voted the way Pennsylvania COPE asked them to. . . . " In assessing consequences for the future Nesbitt concluded that labor potential for endorsing Republican candidates was greater than popularly believed and contradicted the "notion that labor must operate wholly within the Democratic

[45] Johnson and Kotz, *The Unions*, p. 81.

[46] *Proceedings*, Eleventh Constitutional Convention, vol. 2, p. 350.

[47] Cottin and Culhane, "Committee on Political Education," p. 109.

[48] *The Daily Oklahoman*, January 11, 1972, p. 6.

[49] Nesbitt, "Endorsing Candidates: A Case History," *The American Federationist*, September 1975, pp. 18–21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Party." Significantly Nesbitt also asserted that the "void left by an apparent decline in party identification may be partially filled by organizational identification, such as union membership." Nesbitt concluded that "union endorsement" and an "aggressive communications campaign" could "make a difference in an election."

And perhaps it is this "difference" which accounts in some measure for the two-tiered system of voting for president and Congress established by Ladd and Hadley in their extensive analysis of national voting patterns over the years. Their analysis determined that presidential voting responded to a national majority that was shifting away from the New Deal while Congress, responding to different and more localized majorities, retained a strong New Deal tinge.[50] Of course labor may not be solely responsible for this difference. But it is plausible to suppose that labor's persistent political work over the years has had *some* impact cumulatively on that body's composition.

As for the presidential elections, labor's impact tends to favor Democrats and may be crucial. Labor's aggressive work for Hubert Humphrey in 1968 almost won the election for him in spite of the chaos in the Democratic party. Federation neutrality in 1972 hurt George McGovern. Labor support significantly benefited Jimmy Carter in 1976. The most careful statement of labor's impact in presidential contests is that by labor reporter, A.H. Raskin: "A top-level Presidential campaign endorsement usually adds a few percentage points to the margin when the majority of the membership starts out liking the same candidates as union officialdom; similarly, an endorsement reduces the margin a bit when the tide is running in the opposite direction."[51] Union leaders cannot call forth a mass of manipulated followers but they can, under the right conditions, add a significant margin. In a competitive election, this margin can obviously "make a difference."

So far the evidence adduced points up the effectiveness of COPE. But there is another side. A study of a UAW local's effort to influence an open-housing referendum in Toledo in 1967 found the nexus between union members and political leaders to be "substantial" but not "strong." The relationship suffered partly from the members' low level of political awareness and from the low level of support for open housing.[52] More recently, national surveys

[50] Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., with Charles Hadley, *Transformations of the American Party System* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), p. 259. As formulated by Ladd and Hadley they suggest of the voters that "resistance to social and cultural change deemed excessive is expressed in balloting for its great major fulcrum, the presidency; while general support for extending the managerial/welfare state is sustained by maintaining the Democratic majority at the sub-presidential level. . . . " They are frankly somewhat puzzled by such divided perceptions by the electorate and admit they lack information for a satisfactory answer.

[51] *New York Times*, "The Week in Review," January 11, 1976, p. 4. The presidential primaries are another matter. Union involvement in them has not been notably unsuccessful.

[52] Norman Blume, "The Impact of a Local Union on Its Membership in a Local Election," pp. 144; 150. Blume notes that his own findings agreed with other studies in concluding that members supported their leaders most strongly on bread-and-butter issues and least strongly on controversial social and political issues (p. 144).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reveal that unions have declined in esteem as have other institutions.[53] During 1975 a telephone survey conducted in New York City turned up surprisingly strong anti-union attitudes, especially for a city usually considered to be liberal and pro-union. A reporter's analysis of the survey stated that, "New York may no longer be the solidly pro-union town it once was." Nearly half of the respondents felt unions had too much power and about six in ten favored renegotiating union contracts.[54] These soundings, incidentally, confirm the federation's wisdom in not seeking to build a separate labor party. Even reports on the attitudes of labor leaders find them to be acutely conscious of their slide in public esteem and as agreeing upon the importance of "achieving more favorable community perception."[55]

Labor has its limitations politically and labor leaders themselves appear to be well aware of such limits. Still, groups such as COPE may not only continue to be effective; they may even be *increasingly* effective. In a system characterized by a good deal of mass apathy and with weakened party organizations grappling with the postpartisan era of politics, those who organize are in a position to enhance their influence beyond the usual. Unions need not be enormously popular with the public or with all union members as long as their political organization can "make a difference" on election day.

The Federation and Lobby Functions

The Department of Legislation, directed by Andrew J. Biemiller, functions as the federation's lobby. An administrative committee, appointed by Meany and chaired by Biemiller, actually holds the weekly meetings during sessions of Congress to discuss issues and lobby strategy.[56] A core group of federation personnel is normally supplemented by personnel from affiliated unions and departments. The issues dealt with range broadly; over a two-year period encompassing a given Congress as many as one hundred or more legislative issues may receive attention. The department maintains files on congressional legislation and on the voting records of members. The federation's research department provides material to assist lobbying activities. Analyses of congressional voting records are compiled regularly and disseminated. The legislative department itself may communicate directly with affiliates and with state and local units for the purpose of mobilizing constituency pressures in support of the lobby.

Labor's lobby is highly regarded. Johnson and Kotz in their inquiry found

[53] One example is the Harris Survey conducted for the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, "Confidence and Concern: Citizens View American Government" (Cleveland, Ohio: Regal Books, 1974), pp. 7, 8, 19.

[54] *New York Times*, July 21, 1975, p. 1.

[55] A.H. Raskin, "The New Faces in Labor's Future," *New York Times*, September 5, 1976, "Business and Finance," p. 1.

[56] *Proceedings* of the Eleventh Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO, vol. 1, pp. 362–63.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

labor to be "not only competent and powerful. It is feared."[57] A *New York Times* reporter has described Biemiller as "hands-down the most influential lobbyist in town. . . ."[58] A *Congressional Quarterly* analysis in 1975 stated that "no one would dispute the contention that organized labor wins its share of arguments in Congress."[59] A veto-proof Congress did not materialize but in the eyes of the Kiplingers "labor is the best organized, best-funded lobbying machine on Capitol Hill. . . ."[60]

The federation's lobby is influential for a number of reasons. It is large, especially when the federation and affiliated union lobbyists join with non-federation unions. And according to *Congressional Quarterly* in citing one of the federation's top lobbyists, this large lobby works on a "broader range of issues than any group in Washington."[61] The lobby leaders have won the respect of members of Congress, including conservatives as well as liberals. The legislative department itself is regarded as well run and professional, with the resources to document its case on complex economic questions. The labor lobbyists work persistently but without threats or excessive pressure. As one conservative who is normally allied with business interests expressed it, "I wish my allies were half as tough and half as dedicated as my adversaries. They're participants, and business is a spectator most of the time." Labor has also been able to build up support on key committees dealing with labor matters in the House and Senate. Supplementing the lobby is the large scale labor constituency and electoral organization to draw upon in mobilizing support for legislation. In the words of Congressman Richard Bolling as cited by *Congressional Quarterly*, "they still have an enormous constituency that they can mobilize on the outside." Or there is the more colorful version in Biemiller's own words as reported by Johnson and Kotz: "The most help I get from the field is when I'm pinpointing, say, ten members of the House. It's up to the local guys to decide how they're best going to do it. All I can say is, This is your god-damned state, and it's your Congressman I want you to get."'[62] Nor can we forget the federation's role as a "peoples lobby" mobilizing support for social legislation. During the 1960s a coalition of groups on the left worked together quite successfully for major pieces of social legislation.[63] The temper of the 1970s was less congenial to such legislation but the labor lobby was able to form ad hoc alliances with like liberal-minded groups from time to time. According to one Senate aid cited by *Congressional Quarterly*, labor has done a "lot of work on tax reform. They're probably the most effective public interest

[57] Johnson and Kotz, *The Unions*, p. 92.
[58] *New York Times*, "The Week in Review," September 12, 1976, p. 3.
[59] "Weekly Report," vol. 33, July 19, 1975, p. 1533.
[60] Kiplinger and Kiplinger, *Washington Now*, p. 375.
[61] "Weekly Report," vol. 33, July 19, 1975, p. 1532.
[62] Johnson and Kotz, *The Unions*, p. 108.
[63] On the interaction between congressional Democrats and the labor lobby, see Greenstone's, *Labor in American Politics*, ch. X.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lobby on that." Critics may scoff but there is clear evidence that labor takes its social role seriously and gains strength from it.

Yet the labor lobby has its limitations. By Biemiller's own admission, labor can count on the support of some members of Congress on nine out of ten votes, but with the others labor may be lucky to have their support 50 percent of the time.[64] For, according to *Congressional Quarterly*, the House of Labor is large and diverse. Unions within the federation on occasion clash. The federation supported federal land use planning but the carpenters' union opposed it. The garment workers and the steelworkers took opposed positions on pension plans. The union of state and local workers clashed with the teachers' union over the issue of day care centers and their management. Some unions, especially craft unions, tend to stick to business unionism and avoid social unionism. In addition, some of the more recently elected members of Congress tend to reflect a brand of liberalism somewhat removed from the old New Deal and its economic liberalism. Their concerns may be inflation and ecology rather than unemployment and jobs. Thus union support for job related projects such as the Alaskan pipeline and the supersonic transport plane antagonized some groups associated with liberal causes. There may even be problems of coordination that afflict the lobby in its relations with COPE. Then labor's potential for constituency pressures remains largely untapped.

But perhaps the major limitation on the labor lobby is the role which also gives it strength. As we have observed in arguing that labor's claim to be a people's lobby must be taken seriously, labor has fostered coalitions that have won social legislation but has had problems passing labor legislation. Labor has been able to mobilize support as a people's lobby that it could not rally as a labor lobby. In the words of one top labor lobbyist cited by *Congressional Quarterly*, "We do our best when we're part of a coalition, . . . and you don't have a coalition on a pure labor issue."[65] Cited specifically was the issue of "right to work" laws permitted under the Taft-Hartley Act and such potential allies as Common Cause, the Committee for an Effective Congress, and Americans for Democratic Action. Ironically, the political organization created by labor to serve its interests has evidently enjoyed success chiefly as a vehicle for goals that transcend narrow business union interests. This outcome underscores the importance of perceiving the federation's large-scale political activity as functionally responsive to popular pressures that carry far beyond the ranks of organized labor.

Conclusion

The federation, it is clear, has gone far in adapting its role as an interest group to the political realities of the postpartisan era of weakened political

[64] Johnson and Kotz, *The Unions*, p. 108.

[65] "Weekly Report," vol. 33, July 19, 1975, p. 1532. What transpires during the administration of President Jimmy Carter will manifestly count for much in long-term assessments of labor and its ability to win labor-oriented legislation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parties. COPE, the electoral arm of the federation, engages in large-scale efforts to register potential supporters, educate them in the issues, and get them to the polls. COPE also endorses literally hundreds of candidates for political office and even recruits some who might not otherwise run. Much money, labor power, and organizational work is put into the campaigns of candidates who need help. Behind the field workers is a staff able to provide research, polls, media material, and other services for their candidates. After the election a large and influential lobby organization is on tap to provide follow-up contact with supporters in office. This contact includes the mobilization of supporters in the constituencies to rally grass roots pressure on behalf of the lobby's goals. In seeking allies in its role as a people's lobby to further legislative goals of concern to people beyond the ranks of labor, this organization aggregates interests in a manner not unlike the political parties.

Yet this organization, which functions in many ways like a political party, retains an interest group cast. The unions which form the base of the federation retain their independence and their powers of collective bargaining. The federation's leaders, particularly George Meany, see labor as an interest group that makes no claim to govern. They have not sought to create their own political party or to become an "organic part" of an existing one. Labor leaders see their group as a progressive force and as a people's lobby but do not claim to represent all national interests. The mass membership which the political organs seek to mobilize is made up primarily of union families. The federation through its internal processes decides which candidates are to be supported. The decision rests basically, the evidence suggests, upon issues of concern to labor, not on philosophy or partisan affiliation, even though these last are important. Labor usually works with Democrats but retains some autonomy. The money and manpower poured into campaigns derive from the unions. The planning for the federal elections and labor's concentration of effort on key marginal races occurs within the federation structure under the guidance of people known mainly as labor leaders. The lobby operation is also staffed by labor people and works chiefly on behalf of labor's concerns. In the end, the organization is one that blends interest group and political characteristics. George Meany's term, *political machine*, fits as well as any.

But even the term *political machine* presents some problems. Machines are usually defined as locally based organizations with a highly structured leadership and organization seeking immediate, tangible rewards, including public offices in which they place their own personnel. By contrast, the federation's organization functions on a national scale, does not place its own personnel in office, and does not confine itself to immediate, tangible rewards. Still, this political organization does function to meet certain needs, whether specific or "broadly political." Unless the political parties are able to reverse the process of decay, similar kinds of organizations functioning as extensions of interest groups into the political process may be increasingly evident. The sharp increase in special interest money and related political action committees during the mid-1970s as reported by Common Cause offers significant confirmation of this trend.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For labor this kind of development certainly fits the American political scene more effectively than a separate labor party. The latter is hardly the subject of serious discussion. The unionized segment of the work force remains a fairly small minority. And there is every reason to think that a labor party would fare badly in elections over much of the country and especially so if anti-union sentiments intensify. The New Politics variation on this theme, a coalition that would combine workers, the youth, the disadvantaged, and minorities, has also disappointed its proponents, not least of all in Senator McGovern's smashing defeat in 1972. For an interest group that wants to win elections, not arguments, and which seeks to advance its interests year after year regardless of fluctuations in party strength and popular ideologies, the answer is an organization much like the federation's machine. It does not mean the end of ideology or of political parties—or of unions. All have their place in serving the interests of union members and others who want "more." But group interests and the need for allies to help serve those interests in a fluid, factional politics are best furthered, given the limited alternatives, by a well-oiled political machine.*

* This manuscript is a revised version of a paper presented to the Southern Political Science Association Meeting, November 7–9, 1974 at New Orleans. I thank the University Research Council for a small grant that contributed to the early stages of the research.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
Gift Membership

Enroll friends in the Academy of Political Science, and they will receive:

- A year's subscription to the *Political Science Quarterly*, beginning with the next issue—plus this issue free.
- Two additional books a year
- Invitations to all conferences
- A membership card

The recipient will be notified of your generosity.
The membership fee is $16 (student, $12).

Enclosed is my check payable to the Academy of Political Science. Please send a gift membership to:

Name (please print)

Address

City State Zip Code

Names and addresses for additional gift memberships are listed on an attached sheet.

My name

Address

City State Zip Code

619 WEST 114th STREET, SUITE 500 / NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10025

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Incentives and Voter Participation: A Research Note

RONALD TERCHEK

Charles Hamilton reported in these pages on the disparity between voter registration and actual voting in Harlem.[1] According to Hamilton, the substantial efforts and resources that accompanied registration drives were not devoted to mobilizing voters to vote on election day.

Another explanation which supplements Hamilton's findings concerns the relevance of election issues, the symbolic importance of ethnicity to voters, and the expected competitiveness of elections. Members of minority groups have found many issues in state and local politics irrelevant to some of their most pressing needs and have detected few important differences between the major contenders for office. Though issues such as housing, welfare reform, and public employment have been more important to minorities than to whites, most candidates have not developed campaign issues that cut through the electorate in such a way as to attract black support without diminishing substantial white support.[2] With the introduction of more pertinent issues into local campaigns, the incentive to participate should increase and result in a higher voter

[1] Charles V. Hamilton, "Voter Registration Drives and Turnout: A Report on the Harlem Electorate," *Political Science Quarterly* 92 (Spring 1977): 43–46.

[2] See Penn Kimball, *The Disconnected* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), chs. 3 and 8. Also see Harlan Hahn, David Klingman, and Harry Pachon, "Cleavages, Coalitions, and the Black Candidate: The Los Angeles Mayoralty Elections of 1969 and 1973," *Western Political Quarterly* 29 (December 1976): 507–520.

RONALD J. TERCHEK is associate professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland. He is the author of *Making of the Test Ban Treaty* and several articles on political participation, protest, and ethnic cleavage.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

turnout. This reasoning resembles Robert Dahl's observation that participation increases when there are important issues for potential participants and the alternatives are perceived as significant.[3]

In addition to the material or redistributive aspects of politics, the symbolic dimension of elections and candidates also provides an important incentive for participation. Ethnic affinity has long been an important symbolic component of American politics, and ethnic identification has often provided an incentive for otherwise inactive voters to vote for a representative of their ethnic community. The presence of a minority member on the ballot might be expected to increase minority group participation, particularly when the candidate is running for an office that is considered important (such as mayor rather than clerk of courts), when the office has not been traditionally filled by members of the minority, and where the ethnicity of a candidate becomes an issue.

Even where the issues are thought to be relevant and ethnicity symbolically important, minority group voters may not vote in large numbers because their preferred candidate appears to be a certain loser.[4] As Dahl noted, participation tends to increase when people believe their efforts "will change the outcome . . . [particularly if] the outcome will turn out badly if you do not participate."[5] In this respect, minority voters resemble other voters and are unlikely to vote when they believe that their vote will make no difference.

Relevant issues, ethnic identification, and the competitiveness of the election define the incentive structure for voting and should be coupled with Hamilton's organization structure for minority group participation. Incentive and organization structures are not independent of one another. The very factors that make a candidate appealing to previously inactive voters also tend to generate other expressions of support, such as volunteer activity, money, and endorsements that serve to build an organization.

In an effort to explore the incentive structure for black voter participation, the voting behavior of eight predominantly black wards in Cleveland are analyzed for the period 1961–1969. During the early part of the decade, the incentive structure for blacks was relatively low, but later in the period the choices to be made mattered more to blacks, ethnicity was important, and the elections were highly competitive. The eight wards selected for analysis had a black population of more than 85 percent in 1960 and by the end of the decade were more than 90 percent black. Data on registration figures and voter turnout were obtained from the official records of the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections.

[3] Robert Dahl, *After the Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 46.

[4] That the mere presence of a black on the ballot for a major office is not an incentive of and by itself for other blacks to vote can be seen in the 1967 elections for mayor in Philadelphia. Cecil Moore ran as a third party candidate in order to draw votes away from the Democratic party nominee. However, in thirteen predominantly black wards, Moore, who was black, polled only 4.6 percent of the vote with the remaining 95.4 percent going to the four white candidates.

[5] Dahl, *After the Revolution*, p. 47.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

Registered Voting in Eight Predominantly Black Wards in Cleveland, Selected Primary and General Elections, 1961–1969

Year	Percent Voting in Democratic Primary	Percent Voting in General Election
1961	36[a]	46
1963	26	46
1965	29	73
1967	73	76
1969	63	76

[a]There were no mayoral primaries in 1961 and 1963, and the figures for participation in the Democratic primary for those years are based on the percentages of registered voters participating in the primary for councilman.

Since World War II, victory in the Democratic mayoral primary generally meant victory on election day, and the winner of the Democratic primary came from one of the city's many white ethnic communities. These candidates tended to avoid issues that were particularly important to black voters. In 1961, Ralph Locher successfully ran for the Democratic nomination, was victorious in the general election, and duplicated this feat in 1963 and 1965. With the exception of the 1965 general elections, the incentive for blacks to participate in mayoral primaries and general elections was low because there were no black candidates. Only about a third or less of the registered black voters in the eight wards participated in the primaries and less than half voted in the general elections. However, the 1965 mayoral general election reversed this pattern when a popular black state assemblyman, Carl Stokes, ran for mayor as an independent. With a large block of black voters and some white liberals who could be expected to desert Locher and vote for Stokes, and with the rest of the white vote divided among three white candidates—the Democratic mayor, the Republican county auditor, and the independent chairman of the school board—Stokes was given an outside chance of upsetting the incumbent. The incentive for black participation substantially improved in 1965 with the introduction of issues important to blacks, such as housing, education, and jobs; with the belief that every black vote counted; and with the presence of a well-known, attractive black candidate.[6] The vote in the eight black wards was nearly 58 percent larger than voting participation figures two years earlier (Table 1). Even though black participation increased substantially, Stokes finished a close second, carrying 35.8 percent of the vote, compared with Locher's 36.7 percent.

Two years later, Stokes ran again, but altered his strategy and entered the

[6] William E. Nelson, Jr. and Philip J. Meranto, *Electing Black Mayors: Political Action in the Black Community* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), pp. 89–95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Democratic primary, which he won. Working with an enthusiastic core of volunteers, helped by black ministers, backed by CORE, and endorsed by the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., Stokes attracted about 150 percent more blacks to the Democratic primary than had usually been participating. But unlike 1965 and previous elections of the post World War II era, victory in the Democratic primary did not appear to insure victory in the general election.[7] The Republicans mounted a strong challenge behind Seth Taft, won many white, nominally Democratic voters, and local political observers thought the election was too close to call. When the results were tabulated, Stokes was the victor, not simply because he won 95 percent of the black vote along with a handful of white votes, but also because he attracted more black voters than had customarily participated in local elections, particularly early in the decade when the incentive structure for blacks was low.

However, black registration declined in the eight wards between 1967 and 1969, a problem which greatly troubled Stokes's campaign planners.[8] Why registration fell in these districts is open to some question since there was a concerted effort to register blacks during both periods. One possible reason is the decline of population in these wards, though loss of population cannot account for all of the decline in black registration. Another possible explanation is that some blacks had become disillusioned with Stokes, not a new phenomenon among voters who invest their candidate with superior qualities and presume a deliverability of promises that he is unable to meet. Mayors in American cities are circumscribed in a variety of ways, and Stokes was no exception. Moreover, Stokes pulled back on some of his programs, and this may have disillusioned a few black voters; but he continued to press for many other programs that would have received less—if any—attention from the white Republican candidate for mayor. In short, the incentive structure for most blacks remained high although it may have contracted for some Cleveland blacks by 1969.

Even with a diminished black voter registration base in the eight black wards, the proportion of those voting in the 1969 primary declined from its 1967 high. In part, this reflected the general view that the primary was less competitive in 1969 with incumbent Stokes running against a relatively weak white challenger.

[7] Charles H. Levine, *Racial Conflict and the American Mayor* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974), p. 57.

[8] Writers like Penn Kimball were impressed, and from their analytical interest, I think correctly, with the decline in black registration that seriously endangered Stokes's chances for reelection (See Kimball, *The Disconnected*, pp. 149–154). On the other hand, I am impressed with the very high black turnouts during Stokes's campaigns, particularly when these figures are compared with registration and voter turnout earlier in the decade. From the point of view of Stokes's advisers, the decline of several percentage points in black registration could spell the difference between victory and defeat in a close election. However, a marginal decline in registration is less analytically interesting when compared with the level of black registration and voting that characterized periods of low incentives for blacks.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moreover, the Stokes campaign tended to deemphasize the primary in order to concentrate on the general election.[9] The twin factors of organizational slack and diminished competition combined to reduce voting in the eight black wards from 73 percent in 1967 to 63 percent in 1969.

However, in the general election, which had been expected to be another close contest, the participation of registered black voters again increased substantially in the eight wards. This high participation occurred without many of the organizational inducements that accompanied the 1967 election. As Kimball observed, King was gone, CORE was not invited back, energetic white volunteers were often displaced by lethargic members of the regular Democratic party organization, and Stokes decided to concentrate on winning white votes and not frightening liberal and moderate whites with a vigorous campaign in the black sections of the city.[10]

Registration is a first step in voting, but whether the second step is taken is not automatic. Hamilton correctly observed that something is missing between efforts for registration and voting, and he looked to political organization as the missing ingredient. But the incentive structures for groups also increase participation. The pattern in Cleveland indicated blacks did not vote in large numbers when incentives were lacking; but when the issues mattered to them, the elections were competitive, and ethnicity was symbolically important, black participation greatly increased.*

[9] Levine, *Racial Conflict and the American Mayor*, pp. 60–68.

[10] Kimball, *The Disconnected*, p. 151.

* I thank Charles Levine for helpful reactions to an earlier draft of this note.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

The United Nations in Bangladesh *by Thomas W. Oliver. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978. 231 pp. $16.00.*

This is the story, expertly told by an insider, of the relief program conducted under United Nations auspices in Bangladesh in 1971–73—before, during, and after the war that brought that state into being. It is a story that deserves our attention, because it is both gratifying and edifying.

It is gratifying because it details the achievement of a humanitarian objective, that of enabling the people of Bangladesh to survive a period of turmoil and disruption, when human catastrophe on a massive scale seemed probable. It provides a needed reminder that international relations are not all struggle and strife and ruthless pursuit of selfish ends, but include at least occasional episodes marked by enlightenment and generosity. We can take encouragement from the evidence that some rudimentary sense of international community was at work in this case, and that it produced a successful program; both the trying and the succeeding are sources of gratification.

It is an edifying story because the author deals honestly and insightfully with the difficulties, the inadequacies, and the mistakes that marred the enterprise. If the case inspires some rejoicing, it also provides the materials for some learning. A thoughtful reading of Oliver's study will contribute heavily to sophisticated understanding of the political and administrative complexities of international relief operations.

The essential basis for such operations is the humane instinct, the urge to help people in desperate need, reinforced by the calculation that assistance may promote developments that will serve (or prevent developments that will injure) the interests of the states that offer aid. This calculation gives legitimacy to the conversion of private benevolence into public enterprise. This book makes it amply clear, however, that the instinct of helpfulness, blending altruism and enlightened self-interest, must be heavily disciplined if it is to support a successful program.

The most basic discipline required is that of political sensitivity. The central political problem in the case at hand lay in the fact that the people requiring help were those of a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

province that was at odds with the central government and that eventually won a war of secession. Humanitarian aid inevitably had political repercussions, intended or unintended. It is notable that the United Nations program was carried out by three successive agencies, whose respective titles included reference to relief operations of East Pakistan, Dacca, and finally Bangladesh (UNEPRO, UNROD, and UNROB). The first phase of the operation raised the question whether it was possible to aid the people of East Pakistan without aiding the government against which they were in rebellion. The second phase raised the issue as to whether the United Nations could aid those people without seeming to undermine the integrity of Pakistan, a member state of the organization. Only in the third phase, when the independence of Bangladesh had been generally acknowledged, was the operation spared political discomforts. In international relations, generous instincts unencumbered by political shrewdness can cause great difficulty.

Such instincts must also be disciplined by rationality in the setting of priorities and the determination of emphases. Did the people of Bangladesh most need blankets or salvage teams to clear harbors? Could the relief of hunger be carried out without the reconstruction of bridges? Was there danger that international help would hurt the new state by creating an attitude of dependence? Oliver demonstrates the importance of such questions as these.

Finally, good intentions must be supported by good organization. This study reveals the inadequacies of the world's apparatus for coping with such needs as were encountered in Bangladesh. It dramatizes the enormous challenge of mobilizing resources and coordinating the work of numerous governments, intergovernmental organizations, and private agencies. This case of international assistance, an astonishingly successful one, is rich in lessons—both positive and negative—for future operations. It is more pleasant, and no less necessary, to learn from success than from failure.

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.
University of Virginia

The United Nations System: Coordinating its Economic and Social Work *by Martin Hill. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978. 252 pp. $31.50.*

The late Martin Hill was uniquely qualified to write this book. He served in the secretariats of the League of Nations and the United Nations since 1927, and most of his career was devoted to the economic and social work of the two institutions. In 1967, when the post was created, he became assistant secretary-general for Inter-Agency Affairs, and he held this position until his retirement. He had virtually half a century's experience dealing with the issues that are the subject of this book.

The first half of the book is a description and analysis of those parts of the institutional structure of the United Nations system that are involved in its economic and social work. The portrait is as masterful as one would expect. Hill is sympathetic to the motivations that led to the creation of autonomous specialized agencies and consequently to the decentralized character of the United Nations' system. He understands why developments over the years have been mainly in the direction of further proliferation of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agencies and programs rather than in the direction of greater centralization. But he is critical of the resulting fragmentation of efforts and argues that the United Nations system must become more coherent.

Hill's recommendations for improving the system are modest. His extensive and rich experience may be one explanation for this. He knew well the limits of possible change. Another explanation is that Hill wanted to avoid the creation of addition institutions; his objective was to streamline those already in existence and to make them work better. Hill wisely recognizes that people are the crucial ingredients in administration, and his recommendations concentrate on attitudes and practices rather than structures.

Improving the performance of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is crucial to Hill's proposals. He argues that the council is in "the best position to assist the General Assembly in developing the political will and taking the political decisions necessary to launch and maintain broad international actions in which the cooperation of many parts of the system is required" (p. 105). Hill recognizes that given the constitutional autonomy of the specialized agencies and the sensitivities of sovereign states, the council's role must be "essentially catalytic and exercised through intellectual persuasion" (p. 106). His prescriptions involve efforts to achieve consensus, concentration of the council's limited time on issues that broadly affect the United Nations system, development of extensive consultations among various parts of the United Nations system. Hill also advances detailed suggestions for streamlining ECOSOC's infrastructure. Hill recognizes, as Walter Sharp stressed in his study of the council published a decade ago, that in the final analysis how the council functions depends primarily upon the quality of the representatives. Neither Sharp nor Hill, however, has a fail-proof formula for guaranteeing appropriately qualified appointees.

Hill gives equal attention to suggestions concerning the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC), which is comprised of the executive heads of the agencies of the United Nations system and is chaired by the United Nations Secretary-General. He thinks that ACC's central position should be preserved. To allow it to have the time to deal with major issues, he favors increased use of subordinate functional bodies and informal consultations.

There are many recommendations beyond these. Most are detailed and relatively technical. This is a book written by the most eminent professional in the field and should be must reading for those who are professionally involved with the issues that are treated. Its utility is enhanced by six appendices that provide detailed and hard to find information about the United Nations system.

Events have overtaken some of Hill's rcommendations. Restructuring of the United Nations' system is already underway. Hill planned to take account of this and, before his death, he finished a first draft of a chapter that is published as a postscript. Had Hill lived to finish this final chapter, fitting his recommendations into current decisions undoubtedly would have been easier.

The book's weaknesses are related to its strengths. Some overly long and complex sentences resemble those often found in League and United Nations documents. The author apparently assumed that the costs of the present fragmented system and the benefits to be gained from a more coherent system are obvious and known, as they may well be to those who are professionally involved. Readers who are not as near to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

issues and who may be more aware than Hill appears to have been of the academic arguments in favor of administrative decentralization and even disorder may want more evidence than the book provides. Finally, Hill imposed sharp limits on his topic. The book does not deal with relations with agencies outside the United Nations, and it completely avoids discussions of substance. Thus Hill, as his esteemed ACC, does not discuss the appropriateness of the division of resources among various United Nations programs and agencies. As with the idealized British civil servant, the book assumes that the ends are given and concentrates only on implementing these ends efficiently. Efficient implementation is important, but it is only one of the issues that need examination concerning the functioning of the United Nations system.

HAROLD K. JACOBSON
The University of Michigan

Terrorism and the Liberal State *by Paul Wilkinson. New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1978. 257 pp. $14.95.*

The spread of international terrorism in the 1970s, as was the case with guerrilla warfare in the 1960s, has produced a considerable body of literature seeking both to explain and to combat the phenomenon. Paul Wilkinson, a senior lecturer at University College, Cardiff, has written a most ambitious book discussing issues ranging from classic liberal political theory to criminal psychology to the history of various terrorist groups. Some topics are admirably dissected while others are dealt with superficially; the book alternately intrigues and disappoints the reader.

As Wilkinson correctly stresses, terrorism has usually been a rather ineffective weapon of political coercion. Most terrorists have ended their careers in a shallow grave. When this strategy has proven relatively successful, as in the EOKA campaign on Cyprus or the Irgun struggle in Palestine, Wilkinson points out that three conditions were present. First, the civil authorities (in both cases British) were unable or unwilling to use draconian measures against the terrorist group. Second, the terror campaign took place within the chaotic environment of major intercommunal conflict. Third, the terrorists enjoyed a relatively high level of support—if not for their methods, then at least for their cause—among members of their own ethnic group.

The author's study of the airplane hijacking problem is well researched and penetrating, as is his examination of the imbroglio in Northern Ireland. His policy suggestions generally stress the prevention of terrorism, rather than its painful cure, largely through improved government counterintelligence. As a self-proclaimed advocate of a "consistent hard line" against terrorism (p. 128), Wilkinson presents a strong case against negotiations with terrorist groups. Yet, while pointing to the many genuine dangers inherent in making concessions under pressure, the author does not effectively dispute the arguments of those who favor negotiations in certain limited cases in order to alleviate the immediate dangers of the crisis or possibly manipulate the terrorist group into having a larger stake in a more peaceful resolution of the conflict. To conclude that, in the long run, "governments have nothing to lose" from following a policy of "no capitulation, no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concessions, and no deals" with terrorists (p. 132) is simply wrong; it is precisely because there is sometimes so much to lose that governments are faced with agonizing decisions in blackmail situations. Wilkinson has provided a much too easy answer to an immensely difficult problem.

When the author discusses international relations he makes a number of fundamental errors. He totally misreads Clausewitz, who did not, as Wilkinson implies (p. 51), believe that war was an irrational tool of politics. Although he explicitly disclaims any desire to present a "general conspiracy theory or cold war grand simplification" of terrorism (p. xi), the author repeatedly emphasizes Soviet involvement in terrorism against the West while downplaying far more important local causes. His argument that the strategic nuclear stalemate allows the Soviet Union and others to wage a "terrorist proxy war" against capitalism is misleading. Recent East European assistance, apparently with Moscow's approval, in capturing West German terrorists suggests a more complex reality.

Mr. Wilkinson is exceedingly pessimistic about the future. He sees a "distinct possibility of a formally organized international terrorist league emerging" (p. 198) and predicts "an escalation of proxy unconventional war" in the 1980s (p. 200). Such predictions are certainly worth discussion and debate. Others, such as his conjecture that the Soviets would establish "alliances and bases with the belligerent movements" (p. 92) in Ulster if the British withdrew, seem rather farfetched.

The major fault in the book, however, is due to Mr. Wilkinson's attitude: righteous indignation of terrorism, while morally understandable, should not have forced the author to deny that terrorists sometimes are fighting for a just cause. In this light it is interesting to note that the book rarely discusses the Middle East, where both Arabs and Jews have resorted to terrorism in their desire to reach the twice-promised land. In his attempt to "strip away the masks of terrorist illusions and expose the deathhead of murder beneath" (p. 100), the author comes close to arguing that terrorists are apolitical in nature. When he seeks to explain terrorists through a study of Sartre's or Fanon's mystical theories of violence, the reader remains unconvinced. Ironically, when Mr. Wilkinson states that those who are not moved by the writings of Alexander Solzhenitsyn "have strangled their own humanity" (p. xi), he has unwittingly expressed the mirror image of the terrorist's mentality. Terrorists often believe that their victims have "strangled their own humanity" by not siding with their cause and are therefore legitimate targets for bombs and bullets. The word "innocent" has vanished from the terrorist's vocabulary.

Scott D. Sagan
Harvard University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: An Examination of the Issues *by William R. Van Cleave and S. T. Cohen. New York, Crane, Russak & Company, 1978. 119 pp. $10.50.*

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives *by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. New York, Crane, Russak & Company, 1978. 371 pp. $24.95.*

The appearance of these two books by the same publisher in the same year is certainly one clear indication of the renewed interest scholars are showing in this recently rediscovered subject. Both books were a response to the June 1976 statement of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group that called for the improvement and updating of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Unfortunately, the two books graphically illustrate why so much of the discussion in this field seems to be nonresponsive. The Van Cleave-Cohen book begins with the normal question raised by most analysts who endorse some kind of improved or increased military preparation in Europe—"what if the Soviet Union invades tomorrow . . . etc." Starting there such books normally then examine relative capabilities and conclude that NATO is in trouble, which is the same conclusion commentators have come to for almost thirty years. One normal rebuttal to such reasoning is to suggest that "what if" is the wrong question and that "why would?" or "is it likely that?" might be more appropriate ones. The response is usually that such questions concern themselves with enemy intentions and since intentions are never known for sure and can be readily changed the analyst must concern himself with capabilities, thus returning to the "what if" question.

But to begin at the beginning. The Van Cleave-Cohen book argues that NATO planning and force levels presuppose a large-scale, conventional war in Europe with substantial build-up time and advanced warning. Further, the planning, positioning, and possible employment of TNW is surrounded by uncertainty and ambiguity making the weapons a prime target for a Soviet preemptive strike. After a rather extended discussion of United States TNW technology, including the enhanced radiation weapons (ERW) and "mini-mikes" and an ominous admission that we do not really know what the Soviets are up to in this field, except that their doctrine and capabilities do not parallel ours, the authors then offer what they believe to be the most likely scenario—a sudden attack by Warsaw Pact forces-in-being preceded by a nuclear bombardment that would neutralize NATO's tactical nuclear capability (p. 85). To prepare for such a contingency they call for a NATO commitment to "sensible TNW employment plans and procedures, weapons with highly discriminate capabilities (greatly reducing the extent of collateral damage) and improved civil defense measures" (p. 90).

The book is brief, well written, and adequately covers the material. The authors deliberately limited their sources primarily to statements by "Western and Soviet political and military officials in government or recently out of it" so as to reflect more accurately the official situation (p. viii). While there is no problem with that, it is annoying to find so many direct quotations interrupting the text when they could have been paraphrased and incorporated into the book.

The Stockholm book, on the other hand, suffers from a severe editorial problem that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seriously impairs its usefulness. It is a collection of papers from a conference held in Stockholm in October 1976 with participants from: West Germany, Sweden, Italy, United States, Japan, Finland, Soviet Union, Poland, and Yugoslavia. The lead paper by Cornell's M. Leitenberg is a book in itself that fills 136 pages including two appendixes and over 400 footnotes. It includes almost everything one would care to know about TNW development and capabilities in the United States primarily, but also in France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. After wading through all that material, the reader finds that the next paper written by Yugoslavia's O. Sukovic covers much of the same material. Further on, the paper by Finland's J. Miettinen presents still another recounting of much of the same material. Thus, the lack of rigorous editing has resulted in a book that frequently becomes tedious to read.

That failing is especially unfortunate because it is absolutely essential that Americans become aware of what Europeans think about TNW, and this book does present some very informed European perspectives. As one might expect, the Europeans demonstrate no enthusiasm for the Van Cleave-Cohen position and in fact believe that TNW should be completely removed from European soil. In general they believe that using TNW in Europe will lead either to strategic thermonuclear retaliation or to the virtual destruction of the entire European continent in a war that would have no winners and all losers as far as Europe is concerned. As an alternative to TNW the West German conferee, H. Afheldt, offers a new defensive organization for NATO centered around conventionally armed, tank-killer, "techno-commando" teams that could, apparently, stop the impressive Warsaw Pact armor capability. The final selection by another American, R. Shreffler, seems totally inappropriate since it suggests a new nuclear force for NATO that would be organized around guided missiles with approximately 100 kilometer range and subkiloton yield. It thus more clearly represents the Van Cleave-Cohen perspective and seems almost oblivious to all of the preceding papers by Europeans of various political persuasions who have pointed out the insanity of tactical nuclear war in the European theater. Once again the American response, ironically, both at this conference as well as in NATO, is to offer one more variation on the TNW theme.

PHILIP W. DYER
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Setting National Priorities: The 1979 Budget *edited by Joseph A. Pechman. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1978. 319 pp. Cloth, $12.95; paper, $5.95.*

The federal budget presents, annually, a detailed account of the programs of the federal government and of their costs. It is perhaps the single clearest statement of national priorities, as they evolve from the political process, that we have. *Setting National Priorities*, The Brookings Institution's ninth annual assessment of the budget, is intended to aid public understanding of the problems addressed in the budget and the options con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sidered by the president in trying to solve these problems. President Carter's major initiatives are analyzed, compared to alternative policies, and evaluated for their budgetary implications.

There is a Brookings "view of the world." An important part of that view that recurs throughout this book is that budgetary policy is an important instrument with which the federal government influences the level of economic activity and hence the rate of unemployment. Thus, President Carter's goals of reducing federal expenditures to 21 percent of GNP and balancing the budget, both by 1981, are seen as conflicting with the goal of reducing unemployment to below 5 percent. With outlays held to 21 percent of GNP, taxes cannot be adjusted to achieve the unemployment goal and the balanced budget goal simultaneously. There is virtually no suggestion that an alternative view, associated with Professor Friedman, even exists: that deficit spending, unless it affects the rate of monetary expansion, merely "crowds out" private spending on a more or less one-for-one basis, leaving unemployment unaffected. The reader is thus warned that the analysis of the effects of the overall budgetary stance on the national economy is predicated on a view of the workings of an economy which, although probably accepted by a majority of economists, hardly commands unanimous agreement.

That said, Pechman and his associates have performed a valuable service by providing clear and readable discussions of a broad range of policy issues. A chapter on the federal tax system discusses in detail individual income tax, the social security system, and business taxes. The author, Joseph Minarik, favors a simplified approach to individual income tax (of particular interest is the suggested comprehensive tax base on p. 138) that would allow a reduction in tax rates, but a "focused" approach to business taxes with emphasis on a higher investment credit or accelerated depreciation rather than reduced tax rates to encourage investment (p. 157). Anthony Downs, in a chapter on urban policy, recognizes that a national consensus regarding what cities should be like and what the federal government's role should be is lacking so that defining national goals is a problem. He concludes that the two most pressing problems are the human needs of the poor and unemployed who are concentrated in slums and the fiscal crises of many cities in the Northeast and Midwest (p. 171). Martin Abel's discussion of farm commodity programs clarified a subject which to this reviewer had been a welter of confusion.

Two chapters on defense spending and policy address issues ranging from the role aircraft carriers should play in the navy of the future to the best way to standardize material and procedures within NATO. On this latter issue it is argued that "the most efficient way to achieve standardization would be through a buy-at-lowest-cost doctrine within a free trading alliance" (p. 244), but that this is unacceptable to Europeans. Perspective on these things is important: from Europe, it appears to be the United States that finds this unacceptable.

There are also chapters on employment and income security and education, and appendices on the recent tendency of federal expenditures to fall short of planned levels, the problems associated with multiyear budget planning, and "tax expenditures." (Tax expenditures are taxes not collected because of allowable exemptions, deductions, tax credits, or the like.) It may be a sign of the times that there is no chapter on either energy or the environment and only infrequent references throughout the book to either.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Whether or not one accepts the Brookings view of the world there is a great deal of benefit to be derived from this book.

PAUL ATKINSON
University of Cambridge

The Legislative Presidency *by Stephen J. Wayne. New York, Harper & Row, 1978. 240 pp. $7.95.*

While developments from the presidencies of Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower are considered, the author's primary focus is on the changes made by the presidencies of Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and, to some degree, Ford. Carter's contribution is discussed in an epilogue (chapter 7). In a clearly written, straightforward style, the author provides a brief history of the legislative presidency. Chapter 1 deals with the evolution of the president's legislative function. Chapter 2 considers the development of the White House staff structure. Chapter 3 analyzes the evolution of White House relations with the OMB; chapter 4 presents the development of the programming process; chapter 5 focuses on the congressional liaison operation; chapter 6 on the business of policy implementation. Some of this material is familiar. Yet in focusing specifically on the president's legislative function, the author has contributed to a better understanding of the evolution of an important facet of the contemporary presidency.

While the president has always played a role in the legislative process, the author contends that the "legislative presidency" as an institution has developed since World War II. By the decade of the 1960s the president had become a "driving force within the legislative system much of the time" (p. 23), as he engaged in tasks of annual programming, ongoing clearance, and congressional liaison. In order to handle these tasks, an institutionalized structure developed within the White House that further contributed to the presidential problems of isolation and loss of control inherent in a large, specialized, and highly structured staff. Such growth of staff structure came at the expense of the established executive departments and agencies. According to the author, the specialization and politicization of the White House staff that accelerated during the Nixon and Ford presidencies had particularly damaging implications for the objectivity and effectiveness of OMB's function.

In contemplating the future, Stephen Wayne anticipates little significant change in the president's legislative role, since the president alone is institutionally capable of exercising the strong legislative leadership that a decentralized political system requires, and because the personal incentive for an active legislative role is likely always to be present.

> Having a national constituency, superior resources, and a more supportive internal structure makes it easier for the president, through the presidency, to solicit, synthesize, and sell national policy objectives to the Congress than for the Congress to do this itself. Moreover, a president's ability to shape public opinion and generate external support, especially for innovative domestic proposals, provides the muscle for coalition building that Congress so often lacks (p. 24).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since the president will continue to play this role, it seems likely that the increased size and structural differentiation of the White House staff will also continue. The author is, therefore, concerned that efficient management techniques be developed to prevent presidential isolation. In this regard, Wayne is concerned about the recent trend toward politicization of OMB, which he fears has limited its effectiveness as a source of advice for presidents and as a useful balance to that of their staff.

The author's suggestion for minimizing the gap between initiative and implementation is to "simply continue past attempts to promote better management from within the departments and agencies by using the traditional tools of appointing competent, loyal administrators, eliminating duplication and consolidating responsibilities by reorganizing, and achieving procedural shortcuts through red tape and complex administrative regulations" (p. 196). The critical problem, as he sees it, is "to oversee the executive branch without overinvolving the White House and OMB and without overwhelming the departments and agencies" (p. 196). He is not overly optimistic of avoiding these pitfalls.

DOROTHY BUCKTON JAMES
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Home Style: House Members in Their Districts *by Richard F. Fenno, Jr. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1978. 304 pp. $6.95.*

Richard Fenno has turned his attention from congressmen in Washington D.C. to congressmen in their home districts, noting that "perhaps we can never understand [the congressman's] Washington activity without also understanding his perception of his various constituencies and the home style he uses to cultivate their support" (p. 244). To gather data for this ground-breaking book, Fenno made thirty-six trips, over a period of eight years, to the constituencies of eighteen different congressmen. He traveled with congressmen, watched them, and talked with their constituents.

Fenno opens the book by noting that the available literature does not tell us what an elected representative sees when he or she sees a constituency. Fenno found that congressmen see more than anything else the constituents with whom they feel comfortable or "at home." Though congressmen glance fleetingly at the whole constituency, they concentrate on the likely supporters in a "reelection constituency" and the strong supporters in a "primary constituency." The heterogeneity of districts, however, can allow a congressman and his successor, for example, to perceive different districts (p. 4) and to carve out substantially different reelection constituencies.

A congressman's freedom is not complete. Members perceive that some votes would be difficult or impossible to explain. Even so, and whatever the explanation, it will be directed especially to the reelection constituency, and Fenno concludes that "members of Congress are much less constrained by their supportive constituencies and have much more voting leeway on the House floor than they believe or will admit" (p. 168).

This freedom suggests the difficulty of achieving Fenno's ultimate goal of explaining Washington activity. The portion of the book linking constituency and Washington is less satisfying, in part because Fenno's research concentrated on activities in the constitu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

encies not those in Washington. His findings suggest that though the restraints are self-imposed by the congressman's selection of his own supportive constituencies, the effort required to develop trust and communication with those constituencies precludes changing supportive constituencies later. Thus, the linkage will usually be created during the years in which the congressman is developing his home style and choosing his constituency, the period prior to his first election, and the "expansionist" phase of his early terms.

One of Fenno's findings—that each member of Congress polishes his or her individual reputation at the expense of the institutional reputation of Congress—helps explain the incongruity of voters' simultaneous disrespect for Congress as an institution and respect for their own congressman. The constituents' disrespect of Congress was fed by every one of the eighteen House members that Fenno followed! As Fenno notes, this pattern "violates every syllable of what political scientists (like this author) have long taken to be the overarching norm of the House—institutional loyalty" (p. 167).

In an interesting methodological appendix, Fenno presents views on participant observation and research methodology, views well worth pondering by graduate students deciding which research skills to develop. Fenno sees himself as a professional researcher whose principal data gathering skills are in personal interviewing and participant observation. These skills require that he maintain continued access to important officials, in this case members of Congress. The need for access precludes exposés or unfavorable evaluations. "Political scientists who are less encumbered than I by a felt need to protect across-the-board access and rapport will have to produce the most thoroughgoing critical work on Congress" (p. 278). Thus Fenno's early choice of methodological skills and his concern for the ability of both others and himself to continue to gather data have restricted some of the analyses that he might present. On the other hand, his skills and his continued access have allowed him to find data others had not found and to make analyses, as in this book, that are significant and interesting, providing further information on how representative democracies work.

DAVID A. LEUTHOLD
University of Missouri

The Public and American Foreign Policy: 1918–1978 *by Ralph B. Levering. New York, William Morrow and Co., 1978. 192 pp. Cloth, $7.95; paper, $3.95.*

This is a short, well-written survey of American opinion on foreign policy matters since the end of World War I. It effectively draws upon the formal public opinion polls taken since the late 1930s and uses surrogate evidence from elite statements, newspaper editorials, etc., to cover the years before. The author seems to have surveyed the existing literature on public attitudes quite comprehensively, and his account is an altogether well-balanced picture. Levering rebuts some oversimplifications and clichés about what American attitudes toward the world have been but avoids the pitfalls of extreme interpretations of either the establishment or revisionist variety.

In many ways, however, the book is unsatisfying. In part because the author sticks

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quite rigorously to his 1918 (or 1917) starting point, there is little in the way of any attempt to construct an overarching interpretation of American foreign policy attitudes. Levering's anecdotal style is interesting; but the result is more a collection of interesting trees than a description of forest. The account format is largely chronological, skipping lightly from issue to issue, with rare attempts to put together a general pattern of what it all might mean.

Despite its title, the book really stops before the Carter election; Levering makes little or no reference to what is happening to American attitudes since then. Thus, the reader is given no clue or hint of the apparent revival of cold war foreign policy issues or the alleged American swing to the right. Very little connection throughout the book is made between left-right issues at home and foreign policy attitudes, even though many analysts see crucial links here.

Above all, the book is simply too short to do justice to its theme. The author is judicious about choosing representative examples of the enormous numbers of formal polls taken since 1936, and he is wise to resist the temptation to include table after table. Nonetheless, *The Public and American Foreign Policy* is too unambitious, too confined in the variations on the theme it wishes to discuss, too narrative, and not speculative enough about where the United States is headed in foreign policy.

GEORGE H. QUESTER
Cornell University

Eurocommunism and the State *by Santiago Carrillo. Westport, Conn., Lawrence Hill & Co., 1978. 172 pp. Cloth, $8.95; paper, $4.50.*

One might be more enthusiastic about "Eurocommunism" without reading this little book by the secretary general of the Spanish Communist party. Rather than the dramatic break with Moscow portrayed in U.S. news media (Carrillo as the new Martin Luther tweaking the Kremlin's nose), *Eurocommunism and the State* shows more continuity than change, an unoriginal replay of theses long held by most Western Communist parties. Eurocommunism—a word coined by a noncommunist—may have been oversold. If one expects an incisive and insightful new analysis of Western capitalism or Soviet Communism, he will be disappointed.

The book was written in 1976 while Carrillo lived clandestinely in Spain and seems aimed chiefly at party comrades over whom Carrillo was asserting his control. The turgid and heavy-handed Marxist style is surely not intended for a wide audience. Carrillo's thoughts are very much within the Communist framework; he cites Communist authors exclusively and at length: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Khrushchev, Gramsci, Althusser, and Togliatti. Conspicuously missing are Stalin and Brezhnev. Noncommunist, empirical, or neo-Marxist thinkers are also totally absent. This gives Eurocommunism a musty, sectarian odor; Carrillo even spends several pages refuting Kautsky!

If one had to sum up Carrillo's orientation in one word it might be Khrushchevist. Carrillo takes Khrushchev's 1956 speech to the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress as his point of departure and stresses two of its themes: parliamentary paths to socialism and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

crimes of Stalin, more of the former than the latter. Carrillo sees the necessity neither for revolutionary violence in the industrialized countries of the West nor of a dictatorship of the proletariat. We can see here why Brezhnev and Carrillo dislike one another: the Spaniard still sings the praises of Khrushchev.

Modern technological society, already pregnant with socialism, offers excellent possibilities for Communists to assist in a peaceful, democratic delivery, says Carrillo. The "ideological apparatuses of the state" (the Church, universities) can be "turned round" to support socialism while the "coercive apparatuses of the state" (police, army) can be "professionalized" so as not to block the peaceful transition to socialism.

Carrillo finds his model in Spanish Communist policy during the 1936–39 Popular Front: "Our policy in the Popular Front period already contained in embryo the conception of an advance to socialism with democracy, with a multiparty system, parliament, and liberty for the opposition" (p. 128). Carrillo attempts to show that Eurocommunism is rooted both in the Communist and Spanish experience and is a break with neither. Insofar as he succeeds, Carrillo demonstrates that the only thing new here is the word Eurocommunism.

We should not take *Eurocommunism and the State* as the last word on the subject. The events of 1977 moved so fast—the Spanish Communist party's legalization in April, Spain's free elections in June, the Kremlin's snub of Carrillo in November, his friendly U.S. visit that same month—that Carrillo, were he writing the book today, might be more "Euro" than in 1976. As the book stands, aimed at a Communist audience in traditional party rhetoric, it is probably more exciting reading in *samizdat* editions in Eastern Europe than in the West.

MICHAEL ROSKIN
Lycoming College

Woodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation *by John M. Mulder. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978. 304 pp. $16.50.*

By now almost everyone agrees with Lasswell's famous dictum that "political science without biography is a form of taxidermy." But almost everyone would also agree that political science *with* biography can be a form of taxidermy. Many a biography has succeeded better at embalming a corpse, in the course of which the wounds and blemishes are concealed under heavy applications of make-up, than in presenting an honest and penetrating life history. What, then, is the difference between the expert undertaker and the skilled biographer?

I would suggest that the key difference is that the biographer, however much he may deny it, gives us a book that is to one degree or another a psychobiography; that is, a work that goes beyond the facts to interpret or speculate about the motivations and personality underlying the subject's behavior. Without these interpretations or speculations—the distinction between them is that the former, being based on a psychodynamic theory of some sort, is more disciplined than the latter—we often are confronted with a history demonstrating conclusively, contrary to certain current views, there is *no* life after death, not even biographical life.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These reflections are occasioned by Professor Mulder's account of Wilson's life until 1910, an account informed by Mulder's association as a doctoral student with Professor Link at Princeton (the book originated as his dissertation) and access to the Wilson papers. He makes good use of this connection in terms of providing much new information about Wilson's paternal and maternal families and about his adolescence and early adulthood. But Mulder stops short of those interpretations and speculations that could have thrown new light on Wilson's inability "to see his own jealousy, resentment, and pique toward men like West and Lodge" (p. 277). As this quote suggests, Mulder is not uncritical of Wilson; if he is not a psychobiographer, neither is he the type of undertaker referred to in the first paragraph. Indeed, he is well aware that Wilson "perpetually identified conflicts as disagreements over principles. . . . Inherent in his political thought and activity was a tendency to make his personal principles universally valid and an intolerance toward those who disagreed" (pp. 277–78).

Mulder finds the explanation for this behavior in Wilson's Calvinism and the "stern Covenanter tradition" taught by his father; the tradition "that a moral foundation undergirded all human life and that an individual was called by God to realize those moral ideals through work and self-assertion" (pp. 270–71). Unfortunately Mulder does not explore the extent to which Wilson's commitment to strict Calvinist theology, one form of which was a "Devil" theory of politics, amounted to an identification, not only with his Presbyterian father, but with the Almighty himself. He therefore misses the point that these identifications and Wilson's rigidities in personal and political life were themselves neurotic manifestations and not simply the results of a strict adherence to Presbyterianism.

We suspect the innocence of those who "protest too much"; similarly, we are right to question the innocence of someone who prays too much. Wilson was such a person. We cannot be certain of the psychic determinants of Wilson's piety, but Mulder provides evidence that his lifelong adulation of his parents, particularly his father, and his insistence always on taking the high moral ground in political controversy, probably owed much to conscious and unconscious guilts and convictions of sinfulness. Such a hypothesis is supported by what we know of the turmoil and turbulence of Wilson's adolescence and young adulthood, and perhaps also by inferences about what he was experiencing later in his extramarital relations (not necessarily sexual) with women, especially Mrs. Peck.

Professor Mulder, as may be suspected from what has been said, has little regard for the Georges' *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* and other psychobiographies of Wilson. But surely it is time to reexamine in depth Wilson's personal and political behavior. Thanks to the painstaking efforts of Professor Link and his colleagues, most of the Wilson papers are now available to scholars, and much new information—for example, about his mother—has yet to find its way into the historiography of the Wilson years. Even the book under review, although it avoids psychological interpretations, penetrates more deeply into Wilson's family background than previous works, and it is particularly valuable in the portrait it provides of Wilson's father. Certainly this reader was impressed by the similarities between Woodrow Wilson's controversies with West, Lodge, House, and others, and Joseph Ruggles Wilson's repeated confrontations with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Southern Presbyterian worthies over matters of doctrine. Mulder establishes conclusively that the father also took the high moral ground, and that he, too, found most men made of baser material than himself.

Mulder's book, in other words, is as essential reading for anyone who is interested in Wilsonian psychohistory as it is for anyone who eschews such an approach.

ARNOLD A. ROGOW
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis *by Magali Sarfatti Larson. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977. 309 pp. $14.95.*

For almost 100 years now, and certainly since Durkheim concerned himself with the matter, a variety of social scientists and historians have been convinced that the professions were central phenomena in the modern world, at once the special creations of modern social systems and also peculiarly indispensable to their successful functioning. Beyond this consensus on centrality, however, there has been much disagreement about the emergence, present characteristics, power, and worth of the professions. While there has been much admiration of the professions and of the modern world in which they are so essential, there has also been much criticism of the social superiority and the power that the modern world has created for its professions. Both these judgments, favorable and unfavorable, have more often than not been derived primarily from some type of systematic social theory and from different but strong value commitments, and less often from theory combined with good empirical research. The study of the professions is moving ahead, but slowly, and it is still enveloped in much theoretical and ideological controversy.

Into this arena now comes Professor Larson with her book, *The Rise of Professionalism*. It was her doctoral dissertation in the Department of Sociology at Berkeley and is forthrightly based on Marxist and Gramscian theories and values. Professor Larson wants not only to set her fellow social scientists straight with her Marxian analysis but to rebut the admiring, "idealized" portrait of the professions that others have drawn. It should be noted, nonetheless, that she is able to cite a large number of non-Marxist social scientists when she is describing professional failings. It would seem that Professor Larson is attacking something of what has now become a straw man. We do not learn anything new from her by way of fact or point of view. Some modern Marxist social scientists have been able to achieve either the one or the other of these two useful scientific goals, but that is not the case here.

As we might expect from its Marxist perspective, Professor Larson's book is repetitively full of such terms as "markets," "monopoly," "ideology," "mystification," "ruling class," "corporate capitalism," and more. The professions are alleged to be seeking only their interest, their own superiority and power. The public is assumed to be remarkably foolish or powerless in the face of these self-seeking aristocrats of "labor," who are not above employing fraud and mystifying ideologies to their own ends. Professor Larson, except for some minor and inconsistent qualifications, does not acknowledge the impor-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tant role that new and powerful knowledge has played in the modern world in shaping the professions and in bringing new benefits to their clients. Her few remarks about the "civilizing function" (p. 58) or the "augmentation of life" (ibid.) of the professions are lost in a flood of analysis of and references to their faults and selfishness. Professor Larson apparently was unwilling to learn from one of her mentors at Berkeley, Professor Neil Smelser, that the concept of the market is only one of the concepts social science needs to analyze exchange behavior in social systems.

Professor Larson's book may be useful to those few who have not been keeping up with recent good work on the professions, work in which one can discover accounts of both virtues and failings, functions and dysfunctions. Even to these people, however, I would sooner recommend some of the excellent historical and social science works in which a more balanced and accurate description of the professions can be found. They should look to the work of sociologists such as Hughes and Freidson and, for the rise of professionalism, to the work of historians and social scientists such as Jerald Auerbach, Thomas Haskell, Jeffrey Berlant, Daniel Kevles, and Joseph Kett.

BERNARD BARBER
Barnard College
Columbia University

Who Really Rules? New Haven and Community Power Reexamined *by G. William Domhoff. New Brunswick, N. J., Transaction Books, 1978. 189 pp. $14.95.*

During the 1960s, the study of urban politics was dominated by the power structure literature. Two opposing paradigms received the most attention: an elitist model, which concluded that a small, upper-class elite dominated local political life; and a pluralist paradigm, which maintained that power was much more widely distributed throughout society. The classic study presenting the pluralist perspective was Robert Dahl's *Who Governs?* which focused upon and analyzed decision making in New Haven during the 1950s.

This debate has received much less attention in recent years. The decline in interest has been due to a number of reasons, two of which appear to be of particular importance. Most social scientists concluded that proponents of these alternative paradigms were talking past one another rather than attempting to resolve their theoretical and methodological differences. Moreover, neither school had been able to establish the critical linkage between power and governmental policy outputs.

G. William Domhoff's *Who Really Rules?* seeks to fill this vacuum. As a result of his earlier writings, Domhoff had emerged as a leading scholar in the elitist tradition. His studies, which focused on the national rather than the local level, reflected the strengths and limitations associated with the elitist school. In this book, however, Domhoff attempts to deal with major criticisms of both paradigms. The goal of the volume is to present both a theoretical framework and a methodological statement for resolving the conflicts over the study of local power structures.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The organization of *Who Really Rules?* is noteworthy. Domhoff first applies his framework to studying the same political era in New Haven covered by Dahl's study. The author's intent is to critique the pluralist classic and to illustrate the applicability of his approach. In the concluding section of the book, Domhoff describes, on a general and abstract level, the theoretical and methodological framework that informed his earlier chapters.

Domhoff is most successful in his critique of *Who Governs?* He replicates Dahl's case study of New Haven's urban renewal program. Domhoff correctly notes the importance of this study to the development of pluralist thought. Dahl had concluded that even on an issue of central concern to local business leaders, public officials had been highly influential and the arena was not one dominated by major businesses. On the basis of Dahl's own research material, which he made available to the author, and much new data, stemming from documentary sources and additional interviews, Domhoff concludes persuasively that the major businesses were dominant in placing urban renewal on the public agenda and received the largest share of the benefits. The primary role of public officials, including Mayor Lee, was to "sell" the program to the electorate and to play a brokerage role in resolving many of the secondary issues.

Domhoff's formulation of an approach to the study of community power is both suggestive and incomplete. He proposes that studies on three different levels need to be made before reliable conclusions on the distribution of power can be reached. The first level is a systemic approach, primarily used by Marxist scholars, that seeks to ascertain which group or class "benefits the most from the functioning of the social system under examination" (p. 127). The second level is a structural approach, which has been the hallmark of elite scholarship; it seeks to ascertain "who directs or governs important institutions" (p. 129). The third level is situational and involves the pluralist approach of focusing on "who wins on important decisions" (p. 129). Domhoff argues that all three levels of power need to be investigated; each of the levels provides data that are needed before one can reach valid conclusions concerning community power.

Domhoff appears to be proposing an eclectic solution to the problem of studying community power. He takes the approaches followed by Marxists, elitists, and pluralists and accepts the theoretical relevance of each of these schools. The weakness of his formulation is its atheoretical nature; there is no theoretical rationale presented that integrates the three approaches. On the other hand, Domhoff is correct in his holistic approach to the study of power structures. What is needed is an approach that takes into account both decisional processes and the broader systemic context that shapes and constrains decision making. Although Domhoff is unable to provide an adequate framework, his formulation does point in the correct direction for future research.

STEPHEN DAVID
Fordham University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Neighbors in Conflict: The Irish, Germans, Jews, and Italians of New York City, 1929–1941 *by Ronald H. Bayor. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1978. 232 pp. $14.00.*

When immigration to the United States was at its peak, there was widespread fear that the millions of newcomers from Italy, the Balkans, and Russia would never be assimilated into American society and that fragmentation and ethnic discord would result. In his book, Professor Bayor has looked at relations between the four largest ethnic groups in New York City during the Great Depression and pre-World War II years and has found that while considerable conflict did indeed occur, the worst fears of the nativists did not come true.

His thesis is that ethnic succession issues, exacerbated by powerful events abroad and depression-induced insecurities at home, produced anger, suspicion, hostility, some small-scale violence, and much jockeying for position. The author's explanation of the origins of Irish-Jewish conflict and his detailed analysis of the districts in which clashes between the two groups took place, Washington Heights and the South Bronx, are extremely interesting.

Fiorello La Guardia is a central character in this book. He figures prominently throughout but especially in the chapter titled "La Guardia and the New Ethnic Order." In this segment, Bayor shows how Italian and Jewish dissatisfaction with the Irish monopoly of the New York Democratic party led them to support La Guardia. Italians in particular expected his election to result in patronage and recognition previously denied them by Tammany Hall.

In a later chapter, "Winning the Votes," Bayor takes us through three mayoralty elections (1933, 1937, and 1941) and shows us how La Guardia exacerbated ethnic tensions by emphasizing ethnic issues in his campaigns. In spite of the fact, for example, that most German-American Bund members were recent arrivals from Germany, not Americans of German descent who had been here for several generations, the Bund was one of the mayor's favorite targets. This caused great unhappiness among those living in the New York City German community who had hoped to increase their political power in order to protect themselves from a resurgence of the xenophobia they had experienced a decade earlier.

At some point, every ethnic group in the city, for different reasons, was angry at La Guardia. Irish fear of displacement in the civil service was a major cause of their hostility, but even the Jews who were getting these jobs attacked the mayor for permitting anti-Semitic Christian Front meetings. La Guardia's otherwise strong antifascist position enabled him to defuse Jewish protests but the incidents illustrate the intensity of ethnic feelings in the city at the time. The decade Bayor has chosen to study was an acutely troubled one.

Although he has done a thorough and conscientious job of research, Bayor does not seem to be at ease with the significant material he has uncovered; as a result, his book is less successful than it deserves to be. This is a great pity because the subject matter is fascinating and of interest to historians, sociologists, and political scientists.

There is too much undigested data, expounded in too great detail. Although not unduly long, the book is extremely repetitious. Bayor is also guilty of overkill. His chapter

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the impact of the Great Depression on New York City has good material on downward mobility, but he analyzes it to death, citing more sources than necessary and repeating his conclusions. A good editor could have done wonders to make the book more readable. Even without such assistance, however, Bayor's work complements other recent studies of ethnicity in New York and thus contributes to the total picture of intergroup relations in the 1930s.

SELMA BERROL
Baruch College, City University of New York

The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself *by Robert H. Bork. New York, Basic Books, 1978. 462 pp. $18.00.*

This is an interesting and important book that describes and criticizes certain major doctrines and directions of U.S. antitrust law. The "paradox" of the title is not specifically identified. Robert Bork's main concern is the paradox that a law intended to promote consumer welfare is often erroneously applied to disadvantage the consumer. In passing, he also uncovers certain other paradoxes. One of these is that strong support for antitrust enforcement may be found both among those seeking to preserve our corporate system of capitalism and those seeking to reform it (the right and left wings). Another is that while the antitrust laws are vitally important to the structure and performance of our economy, they are relatively poorly understood even by legislators, judges, and antitrust lawyers. Yet another paradox is that notwithstanding the importance of antitrust and the fact that it has been part of our law for almost ninety years and has received scrutiny by the Supreme Court in more than 100 detailed written decisions, this body of law is still riven with dispute and uncertainty. In identifying these paradoxes and explaining their sources the book is illuminating.

Bork's central position is that "The only goal that should guide interpretation of the antitrust laws is the welfare of consumers. Departures from that standard destroy the consistency and predictability of the law; run counter to the legislative intent, as that intent is conventionally derived; and damage the integrity of the judicial process by involving the courts in grossly political choices for which neither the statutes nor any other acceptable source provide any guidance" (p. 405).

Most students of antitrust agree with this. Differences arise in defining standards and identifying conduct that benefit or harm consumers. Bork believes that most industrial concentration (such as through mergers) promotes consumer welfare by increasing efficiencies of production and distribution. Thus, he would favor very few attacks on mergers. He is also sharply critical of the way the antitrust laws have been applied to break up monopoly power. Bork believes the distinction between being a monopoly and engaging in monopolizing conduct (which is reflected in the antitrust laws) is a very significant one. Accordingly, he is skeptical about applying the antitrust laws to break up IBM or AT&T. There is a strong streak of Social Darwinist in Bork. He sees concentrations of power that have developed in the market place as natural expressions of efficient management. They should not be disturbed unless clear evidence indicates that they harm welfare.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bork is a member of antitrust's right wing. This vocal faction holds that promoting efficiency as defined by microeconomic theory is the only way under the antitrust laws to promote consumer welfare. Ralph Nader and his associates are principal spokesmen for the antitrust left wing. They hold that deconcentration of corporate power promotes consumer welfare regardless of the short-term impact on economic efficiency. Middle-of-the-roaders such as Philip Areeda and Donald Turner of Harvard think that promoting efficiency is the principal way of serving the consumer but disagree with Bork as to what kinds of conduct inhibit efficiency. They would favor more injunctions against mergers between medium-sized competitors and generally encourage deconcentration of firms with monopoly power who seek aggressively to enhance this power. As everyone would agree, efficiency is very difficult to identify objectively. This difficulty invites different persons to impose conflicting values while invoking the same antitrust ideology. Although those he attacks cannot prove that their way of applying the antitrust laws will promote greater economic efficiency, neither can Bork prove that his approach is superior.

As long as corporatism and populism are significant social theories supported by large segments of the American people, the tension between them is likely to be reflected in the antitrust laws. Neither Bork nor Nader is likely to win absolutely; nor should they. However, Bork makes several valid points at Nader's expense.

DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL
*U.S. Department of Justice**

* The views expressed are those of the reviewer and not necessarily the Department of Justice.

The Lingering Crisis of Youth Unemployment *by Arvil V. Adams and Garth L. Mangum. Kalamazoo, Michigan, W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1978. 152 pp. $4.00.*

This study provides a survey of what we know about the dimensions of youth unemployment, the causes and consequences, and some information about the policy measures that might alleviate the situation. The exposition is straightforward. Chapter 1 examines the basic parameters such as the expanding youth population, the impact of a slack labor market, the specific factors that determine the share of jobs going to young people, and the interaction between school and work. Chapter 2 focuses on the cyclical and secular trends that affect the youth labor market. Chapter 3 analyzes labor market statistics in detail to demonstrate the changes that occur duing the teen years and early twenties. Chapter 4 looks at the employment prospects of youth based on projections of employment growth in occupations where youth are concentrated. Chapter 5 uses data for the National Longitudinal Survey to trace the transition from school to work and from "youth" to "adult" jobs, for a sample of young people. Chapter 6 analyzes longitudinal data to determine the long-term consequences of youth unemployment and the payoffs of training. Finally, the last chapter summarizes the findings and indicates some of the policy implications.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The analysis points to several important conclusions. First, the severity of youth employment problems varies markedly among subgroups, requiring targeted interventions that focus on central city and black youth, as well as high school dropouts. Second, improvements in labor market status are not preordained by the slowing growth of the teenage population cohort. Unless there are changes in the types of jobs held by youth, slow growth in demand may balance the slower growth in supply. Third, increased education is associated with substantial employment and earnings gains for blacks. Labor market knowledge is a key factor for females. Marital status is critically important for males. Fourth, there appears to be a relationship between employment success during the teen years and future employment and earnings, adjusting for all other factors. Fifth, training seems to have substantial benefits when it is closely linked to needs on the job.

The monograph provides an excellent overview of what we know about youth labor markets. It challenges some conventional wisdoms, for instance, that the youth employment problem will disappear with the aging of the postwar babies, and that employment and training programs have few lasting benefits.

The analysis also leads to several further questions. How much of the statistical relationship between teen and adult employment status is related to sorting rather than to the impacts of the work experience, with the more motivated youth getting teen jobs as well as adult jobs? Will the public sector jobs created for hard-to-employ youth have the same statistical payoff as is averaged for all jobs in the teen years? Why have studies of work experience programs yielded limited evidence of postprogram effects contrary to the evidence that is presented? Does increased education pay off at the margin rather than on the average? If training increases earnings where it is used on the job, how can the percentage of training-related placements be increased? Given the modest statistical relationships between labor market information and employment, will occupational counseling pay off? How can the occupational distribution of youth be altered? Information on these and other subjects is required before we can effectively translate what we know about the labor market problems of youth into specific public policies. *The Lingering Crisis of Youth Unemployment* provides a good foundation for addressing these questions.

ROBERT TAGGART
U. S. Department of Labor

Small Cities in Transition: The Dynamics of Growth and Decline *edited by Herrington J. Bryce. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Company, 1977. 418 pp. $22.50*

A startling development of the 1970s is the reversal of decades of rural-to-urban migration, resulting in a nonmetropolitan growth rate that is almost twice that of metropolitan areas. At the same time there are more core cities experiencing population losses, the suburban boom is slowing down with some evidence of decline in older suburbs, and population growth nationwide has decreased significantly.

This collection of sixteen short papers, and ten even briefer "epilogue" pieces, purports to deal with the reasons for and consequences of such trends. The papers are arranged in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

major sections on population trends and policies, growth decline and other economic characteristics, federal impacts, and the future of small cities. They were originally prepared for a symposium conducted in late 1976 by the Joint Center for Political Studies.

The promise of the title unfortunately is not quite fulfilled. One limitation is that few papers deal directly with communities truly "small" in size. In this collection small apparently is a characteristic only relative to the nation's very largest SMSAs, as most of the papers concentrate on just lesser metropolitan areas and their core cities. Several papers do dip below the 50,000 cutoff, but with the exception of an item on small-city planning needs (Bryce and others), there is no differentiation of size or other categories among the 97 percent of the nation's cities that fall below this population mark.

A related criticism is the failure to distinguish between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan patterns and to recognize strongly that much of today's small-town growth is other than merely a continuation of post-World War II suburbanization. In fact, nonmetropolitan trends are barely mentioned, and the consequences of immigration for rural or once-rural communities are ignored. (Exceptions are papers by Fuguitt and Beale on population distribution, and by Berry on the relationships between big and small cities.) Overall the collection is better in describing and explaining *decline* than in examining *growth*, a reflection perhaps of the long-standing devotion of social science research to metropolitan and big-city topics.

Finally, there is virtually no attention paid to noneconomic factors in the changing migration and trends in growth or decline. Conventional models about the relative influences of size and location on industrial development fail to recognize that much of this decade's population redistribution has been fueled by the decisions of retirees and the willingness of others to sacrifice good incomes for simpler life styles. The fact that economists, regional-urban planners, and demographers dominate the ranks of contributors may have affected also how the collection looks at the consequences and problems of the population redistribution. What about the impacts of growth and decline directly in concerned communities? The level of analysis generally is too macroscopic to tell us much about the actual response of governments, community elites, households, and other local-level actors.

Taken individually, however, there are some worthy theoretical and research pieces in the book. This reviewer profited in particular from reading the following papers: Beckman's survey of federal and other programs that affect but do not consciously direct population movement; Thompson's delightfully written essay on the relationships between industrial development, population growth, and city size; a documentation of increasing city dependence on federal and state aid, by Shannon and Ross; Burro's conceptualization of a scheme for analyzing local impacts of federal policies; Berry's intriguing essay on how nonmetropolitan dispersal has replaced the system of metropolitan hierarchies as the nation's dominant growth force; Clay's examination of the diverse components of both central and suburban cities, in the context of black migration to suburban areas.

ALVIN D. SOKOLOW
University of California, Davis

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Interest Groups, Lobbying and Policymaking *by Norman J. Ornstein and Shirley Elder. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Press, 1978. 245 pp. $4.95.*

One day in the early 1950s at a political science meeting, the present reviewer happened to be walking with two of the profession's luminaries, Pendelton Herring and Peter Odegard. After touching on a few matters of interest in the profession, one of them remarked, "What a career David Truman is making out of the discovery of groups in American politics!" Whereupon the two of them burst into guffaws. The joke, of course, was that one of them was the author of *Group Representation Before Congress* and the other the author of *Pressure Politics*. Curiously the game did not end with Truman's *The Governmental Process*. It went on and apparently is still good for replaying. Just recently there has been a spate of articles on "single issue groups" and "the Balkanization" of American politics. And, not least, there is now a book combining the talents of a political scientist and a journalist focusing on the same discovery, *Interest Groups, Lobbying and Policymaking*. It is designed to relieve "the frustration of a university professor who could find no adequate books on interest groups."

Indeed, this is in some respects a useful little book in that it is highly contemporary with illustrative material relating to events as recent as 1978, and has a lively style. Thus, the chapter on interest groups and lobbies has some choice quotations from active lobbyists, and there is an excellent summary of such recent changes in Congress as the opening up to the public of committee meetings, new rules, the increase in size of staffs, and so on. There is also a very handy account of recent efforts to tighten up lobbying regulations and their general failure. Strangely, the work makes no effort to deal with interest group activities with the executive branch beyond a brief mention of lobbying of Congress by the White House and administrative agencies.

In keeping with its determination to be utterly up-to-date, the book has three chapter-length case studies of recent legislative struggles. The first tells the defeat of the bill to legalize common-site picketing in 1977. The second is of amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1970 which were achieved in the course of 1975–1977 by the automobile industry and the United Auto Workers. The third is of the defeat of the B-1 bomber at the hands of President Carter as supported by an extensive grass-roots campaign in 1977. The one conclusion of any generality that might be drawn from these accounts is that "grass-roots activity" has increased significantly as a lobbying technique. Each of these stories is interesting and together they are the best part of the book.

There is something curious, however, in the general chapters that precede these case studies. Save for a cursory mention of criticisms of interest groups by Schattschneider, C. Wright Mills, and Theodore Lowi, there is little acknowledgment that the subject matter of the book has been the focus of one of the most intense controversies in political science of recent decades. Students coming fresh to the topic of the book could be forgiven at the end of its reading that there is indeed no problem either of conceptualizing the significance of interest groups in American political life or, indeed, any important ground for concern about the quality of that life. The analysis remains that of David Truman and the most complex ideas are "access" and "exchange." There is no entry in the index for "pluralism," an omission which may be accounted for perhaps by the authors' assessment

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the intellectual capabilities of their probable audience. Whether such a surmise is correct or not, these omissions are an indication of the degree of interest that the work may arouse.

GRANT MCCONNELL
University of California, Santa Cruz

How the Rural Poor Got Power: Narrative of a Grass-Roots Organizer *by Paul David Wellstone. Amherst, Univesity of Massachusetts Press, 1978. 227 pp. $12.50.*

In calling attention to rural poverty, Paul Wellstone has raised an important but neglected issue. His discussion of Rice County, Minnesota, a prosperous agricultural area, shows that poverty is not restricted to urban or minority populations. Poverty and powerlessness reinforce each other in the midst of general prosperity.

It is disappointing that the book raises such an important issue and then fails to analyze it. The book's deficiencies arise from the particular approach the author takes to "narrative history." No story tells itself or explains itself. The story of the author's Organization for a Better Rice County is no exception. The book gives readers little idea of what Rice County is—how people make a living, the current political structure, the socioeconomic basis of current county leadership, the role of county government in poverty issues. Even such basic data as the age of the population, family size, divorce rates, education and employment opportunities, ethnic and religious identities are either ignored or presented in passing in unlikely places. For example, a footnote on p. 99 mentions that the Organization for a Better Rice County was predominantly Catholic, but the implications of this are never discussed. A footnote on p. 179 describes the county commissioners as "prosperous farmers" but there is little discussion of what this means. One gets little idea of the dimensions of the problem of rural poverty, much less of its causes.

The greatest disappointment of the book lies in the area of its greatest potential contribution—the analysis of specifically rural poverty and its differences, if any, from urban poverty. The rural context is only sketched; there is little detail. The rural poor, we are told, are isolated, atomized, powerless. So are poor people in cities. The author's assertion that the urban poor are now a well-organized and effective political force is open to serious question. It would be much more useful to describe and analyze particular forms of isolation and powerlessness in rural areas. To do this would require a far more sophisticated perception of rural socioeconomic conditions and their political implications than the author presents. A rural area contains both farmers and nonfarming rural residents. There is a great difference between people who are simply rural by residence and those who are agrarian by occupation. The book ignores this central cleavage in rural America. Yet, one cannot analyze the particular shape of the politics of rural poverty unless this cleavage is examined. What is the incidence of poverty in the two groups? Indeed, how is poverty measured for rural residents and farmers? Who pays what proportion of the county and state taxes and to what extent are local poverty programs funded by local revenues? All such questions that could lead to an analysis of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political economy of rural poverty are either ignored or glossed over with conventional generalities that may even prove to be invalid.

These descriptive lacunae and analytical deficiencies mean that the author fails to answer his own question of the utility of community organizing as a method of social change. The Organization for a Better Rice County emerges as a constellation of difficult personalities, but the implications of these personal frictions is unclear when they are not linked to a larger pattern of economic interests and political forces. If the Organization for a Better Rice County had as little relation to the large situation as the book implies by its method of presentation, then that situation ought to be clearly stated and explained. The intensity of individuals' emotional involvement with the organization is never analyzed. Is this merely a consequence of the particular personalities involved in this organization as the author implies, or is this more a general feature of community organizations? If community organizations among new political activists arouse such emotions, what does this mean for successful political action through coalition formation and political trade-offs?

Without raising more general questions, the narrative lacks purpose. It is regrettable that the author did not use his own experience more effectively to discuss the role of the middle-class reformer in poverty politics. It is difficult to understand why a participant in these events would have relied so heavily on newspaper accounts rather than on research, organizational records, and his own unique personal experience.

FRANCES HILL
University of Texas at Austin

The Revisionists Revised: A Critique of the Radical Attack on the Schools *by Diane Ravitch. New York, Basic Books, 1978. 194 pp. $8.95.*

Over the last decade, along with slavery and postwar American foreign policy, the history of American schools has been a major target of reevaluation by radical historians. This work by Diane Ravitch, the author of the widely respected *The Great School Wars* (1974), is the first full-fledged liberal rejoinder to these revisionists. To the perennial question of schools functioning as agents of social control or social change, Ravitch takes the middle position of the schools as mediators of social conflict.

In assessing this radical school of historiography, Ms. Ravitch explores ten works of leftist scholars who differ both in disciplinary background (economists, philosophers, and historians) and ideological itensity (anarchists, Marxists, and non-Marxists). According to Ravitch, these critics' condemnation of the schools as undemocratic and bureaucratic assumes a new conspiratorial twist. They argue, she says, that "American schools have been an intentional and purposeful failure," and "those responsible for this arrangement were not conservatives, but liberals, progressives and reformers" (p. 6). Specifically, radicals assert that schools were imposed upon unwilling masses by reformers interested in meeting the labor needs of capitalism and that the schools had a negative effect upon social mobility. Ravitch incisively observes that the preceding themes rest on three analytical perspectives: socioeconomic reductionism, confusion of initial intent with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ultimate effect, and determination of organizational purpose by organizational structure. The author credits the radicals with asking basic questions about the class bias of schools and curricular inequities—testing and tracking—yet she effectively undermines their conclusions.

She rejects the radical argument that bureaucracy has been merely the vehicle for ensuring capitalist domination of educational institutions. Probing Katz's sophisticated work in this area, Ravitch demonstrates that his four alternative organizational structures were either themselves incipiently bureaucratic or elitist.

Ravitch displays her keenest analytical skills in dissecting Katz's notable book on nineteenth-century school reform. Going over the same case study data, she argues plausibly for rejecting his "reform by imposition" thesis, and she convincingly contends that immigrants were not uniformly downtrodden targets of elite control, but evidenced a variety of group responses: pressuring for public education, establishing their own schools, or developing ethnic programs.

Ravitch has written a spirited and lucid defense of the "liberal-democratic tradition." In contrast with a number of her radical adversaries, she basically adheres to her own high standard of having "a decent respect for the tentativeness of truth." It takes courage to boldly defend liberalism in an era of radical nihilism and conservative backlash.

Occasionally, however, she succumbs to rhetorical flourishes that detract from her otherwise subtle line of argumentation. Ravitch also displays a tendency common to the power structure literature: she marshals more evidence for negating her opponent's view than in constructing a defensible paradigm. Ravitch's methodology has influenced her major findings: the historical case study approach of which she is a master tends to yield pluralistic power patterns and thereby gives her a categorical research advantage over radical historians with the same methodology. Ravitch, however, never really clarifies her criteria for either inclusion or exclusion of those categorized as radicals. Except for Katz, why are there so many of the shrill and relatively shallow thinkers here? Are their polemics easier to attack than the analytical elegance and controlled research of a highly sophisticated radical like Caroline Hodges Persell?

Such limitations should not take away from the fact that this is a compellingly written and intellectually stimulating book. It deserves the attention not only of social scientists, but also of policymakers and the informed public.

EDWARD A. DUANE
Michigan State University

The Public's Business: The Politics and Practices of Government Corporations *by Annmarie Hauck Walsh. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1978. 436 pp. $19.95.*

This book embodies the results of a study, commissioned by the Twentieth Century Fund, of public authorities, or "statutory corporations," defined broadly as "government-owned businesses—primarily state and local—that raise capital by issuing revenue bonds in the private money markets and invest it in public facilities" (p. xiii).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

They may have powers of eminent domain, but no direct taxing powers. This distinguishes public authorities functionally from the thousands of local taxing districts with which they are mostly and indiscriminately lumped as "special districts" in the Census Bureau's *Census of Governments*. Besides borrowing, public authorities' sources of revenue include charges to customers of their services; lease-back rentals of facilities they technically own; and grants, guarantees, and other subsidies from federal, state, and municipal governments. They thrive on the tax exemptions their securities enjoy, on the unregulated monopoly positions they frequently occupy when pricing their services, and on the ingenuity and enterprise of the private interests their activities benefit.

These interests and benefits have mushroomed in the past two or three decades. "One port authority in Oregon borrowed $140 million to construct facilities for a Japanese-owned aluminum company. That figure exceeded the total net debt of all Oregon municipalities" (p. 324).

Two background chapters deal in a fresh way with the heritage of doctrines and precedents. In the nineteenth century first states and then municipalities lent or gave their funds to encourage many business, real estate, and transportation ventures; waves of speculative excesses and consequent defaults led to constitutional limits on public debts and taxes. Public authorities provide a mechanism for by-passing these limits. In the twentieth century political reform movements invoking two "inconsistent themes: faith in participatory democracy and suspicion of elected politicians" (p. 24) supported the growth of government enterprises that promised "business-like efficiency" coupled with "nonpolitical" direction—autonomous public authorities. But on "the circular premise that effective and efficient management is incompatible—or at least uncomfortable—with democratic politics," the price of efficiency is a loss of accountability to the electorate. The rest of the book is addressed to an elucidation of "this central dilemma of public administration" (pp. 38–39) and its ramifications.

The main section of the book examines the workings of the municipal bond market, the private parties—bankers, brokers, and bond counsel—who live on it, and the biases in policy, as well as conflicts of interest that they introduce. This will be fresh ground for most students of public administration; a wealth of data and some case studies are presented. In Pennsylvania a handful of firms have sponsored the creation of nearly two thousand locally or state chartered authorities to finance the construction of schools, sewers, etc. The Congress in 1968 cut off the tax exemption of industrial revenue bonds, with some exceptions; one of these, pollution control bonds, by 1976 accounted for a larger annual volume than "all industrial development bond financing at its peak in 1968" (p. 151). Deference to market incentives and private promoters has led "public authorities as a general class . . . [to] show some common tendencies: to borrow and build with minimal delay; to select projects more conducive to generating net financial revenues than alternative means of providing public service; to rely on established methods with predictable results; and to emphasize physical rather than social targets" (p. 337). Bond covenants have insulated some authorities from unwanted demands.

Another section deals with the internal structure and methods of public authorities that build and operate facilities and are not merely financing shells. Herein of banker-dominated boards, the author looks at some European counterpart examples where more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

politically representative boards prevail. She looks also at the TVA and other federal government corporations created since the Government Corporation Control Act, and finds greater flexibility there. Herein too are such "mandarins" as Robert Moses and Austin Tobin.

The final section consists of a reflective reappraisal and ends with a near-decalogue of recommendations. This is an important book.

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, SR.
Columbia University

Judicial Craftsmanship or Fiat? Direct Overturn by the United States Supreme Court *by Howard Ball. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1978. 160 pp. $18.95.*

Howard Ball's monograph examines three instances of "direct overturn" by the Supreme Court of the United States: *U.S.* v. *Darby Lumber Co.* (1941) burying *Hammer* v. *Dagenhart* (1918); *West Virginia Board of Education* v. *Barnett* (1943) overturning *Minersville School District* v. *Gobitis* (1940); and *Hudgens* v. *N.L.R.B.* (1976) upsetting *Amalgamated Food Employees Union* v. *Logan Valley Plaza* (1968). Ball attempts to distinguish the characteristics of an overturn that is highly successful from one that is not. The attempt flows from a concern, frequently articulated in recent decades, that the Supreme Court must not *appear* political as it perforce makes decisions that *are* political. The goal is one of "maintaining the genial fiction of stability" (p. 22). Guided by prudence, in other words, the justices should function within the unique constraints set by tradition and principled adjudication, lest acting like a legislature, they lose their prerogative to be treated unlike one. Ball's focus on overturns, however, should not obscure the fact that the same concern attaches to each decision the Court makes. Judicial credibility may be strained most when the Court abruptly changes its mind, but changes in constitutional law more often occur incrementally. Moreover, controversial decisions may also involve cases of first impression.

"In justifying their decision to break sharply with precedent by overturning a decision," Ball writes, "the justices . . . can give three basic reasons: prior error, clarity, and/or justice" (p. 23). "Changed conditions" (p. 26) may also justify an overturn. The test is whether the overturning decision is persuasive, correct, definite, and principled (p. 30). Perhaps not surprisingly, *Darby* and *Barnett* pass inspection while *Hudgens* flunks. The effort of the first was eased by the shaky foundations supporting *Hammer;* yet students of the Commerce Clause will wonder why Ball fails to mention *Swift & Co.* v. *U.S.* (1905) when analyzing the soundness of that decision. Certainly in *Barnett* it helped that three justices from the *Gobitis* majority shortly admitted their error, while *Hudgens* faced the task of unseating *Logan Valley* that seemed to rest securely on *Marsh* v. *Alabama* (1946). That task was made more difficult when no single opinion emerged in *Hudgens* to which at least five justices could subscribe. (It may only be an unfounded impression, but the Burger Court seems to display an uncommonly high number of such

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plurality opinions.) At the very least, these complicate the reporter's life, make the headnotes read like a crossword puzzle, and becloud the law.

A comparison of overturns might have been more revealing had the selection included more than one case of recent origin. *Darby* dates from the Hughes Court and *Barnett* from Stone's. Both are decisions that are as well settled now as anything ever is in constitutional law. It would have perhaps been intriguing had the author drawn at least one overturning case from the Warren years. As much as one might herald the importance of reasoned opinions, it seems clear that the "right" result founded even on infirm grounds goes down better than the "wrong" result on any basis. *Hammer* would not be looked upon as an exercise in judicial statesmanship today—or then—even if Justice Day had done a better job of writing the majority opinion. Likewise, Frankfurter's opinion in *Gobitis* (and in *Barnett*, dissenting) seems unconvincing to Ball at least in part because the modern Court—for almost forty years—has largely rejected the judicial role *Gobitis* espoused.

Some errors mar the bibliography and the usefulness of the notes in chapter three. His account of the reaction to *Hammer* might wisely have included more than the few references to contemporary commentators that the notes contain. This he does when he moves to *Gobitis* and beyond. Moreover, one would like to know the thoughts of the justices, outside their opinions, on impending and accomplished overturns. Ball gives the reader no indication whether manuscript sources contain any such gems. Nonetheless, the volume is another example of the efforts by constitutional scholars—whose numbers these days include many lawyers but depressingly few political scientists—to act as a check on the Court by providing critiques of its work.

D. Grier Stephenson, Jr.
Franklin and Marshall College

Felony Justice: An Organizational Analysis of Criminal Courts *by James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob. Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1977. 322 pp. Cloth, $11.95; paper, $5.95.*

Plea Bargaining: The Experiences of Prosecutors, Judges, and Defense Attorneys *by Milton Heumann. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978. 220 pp. $15.00.*

Commentators suggest that major factors influencing criminal court activity include the personal characteristics of judges, the race or income of defendants, the kind of defense counsel (for example, public defenders, private attorneys), the prevalence of plea bargaining, criminal code provisions, and the quality of evidence. That these explanations are inadequate is the argument of *Felony Justice*.

Eisenstein and Jacob prefer to understand courts as workgroups. Incentives and shared goals motivate courtroom workers to perform their specialized tasks in mutually acceptable ways. Some goals are dictated by community expectations, especially the "expressive goal" of doing justice and the "instrumental goal" of disposing of a heavy case

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

load. Other goals are internally generated: the expressive goal of maintaining group cohesion and the instrumental goal of reducing uncertainty in the disposition of cases.

The critical variables in workgroup performance are stability and familiarity. Judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel who interact in many cases develop consistent work arrangements to facilitate their business; if workgroup members come together only episodically, relationships will be formal, rule bound, and often adversarial. Workgroup activity is conditioned by external forces—sponsoring organizations (the judges' organizations, the chief prosecutor's and public defender's central offices), police, rules and decisions made by legislatures and appellate courts, prison authorities, the media, and the political environment.

Eisenstein and Jacob test these propositions in three cities. Chicago's workgroups are the most stable; Baltimore's the least; Detroit's fall between. Moreover, Chicago's workgroups derive coherence from pervasive attitudes rooted in the Daly political organization. In Detroit workgroups are disrupted by a strong central prosecutor's office, sharp racial divisions about the integrity of the justice system, and wide ideological divergences among judges. Baltimore's workgroups gain some coherence from conservative community attitudes.

Analysis of preliminary hearings, bail, disposition, and sentencing did not show significant differences between the three cities, despite their sharply different courtroom workgroups. Conviction rates were similar. Also, "half of all defendants remained in jail (at least through the preliminary hearing stage) in Baltimore. In Chicago and Detroit, two-fifths stayed in jail" (p. 196). And, "different combinations of characteristics accounted for the decision to convict, for the choice between guilty plea and trial, and for the choice of a bench trial or jury trial. This produced an extraordinarily complex decision process that cannot be neatly summarized in a single statistical equation" (p. 258).

The authors find the "autonomy" of workgroups confirmed by data explaining greater courtroom-to-courtroom variances within cities than between them. But if workgroup patterns are similar in each city, but different among cities, then the authors' theory should require similar outcomes within cities and wide differences between them.

Explaining preliminary hearing outcomes, Eisenstein and Jacob observe that "these cities differ more on how they reached . . . results" than on the outcomes themselves. This may, indeed, be their important and unexploited conclusion. The Detroit prosecutor's strong screening of cases resulted in early dismissals, more releases on recognizance, low average bail, and a short time between arrest and disposition. Chicago's stable workgroups produced more plea bargains and three-quarters of a year's jeopardy from arrest to disposition. Baltimore's unstable workgroups also produced long delays and used bench trials to no significant advantage, achieving no higher rate of conviction. Stable courtroom workgroups apparently may increase the duration of jeopardy, the incarceration, and the financial burden for unconvicted defendants.

In at least two respects, the findings of *Felony Justice* overlap the conclusions of Milton Heumann's *Plea Bargaining*. First, work load pressures do not explain the frequency of plea bargaining. Chicago had only one-half Baltimore's case load per court but used plea bargains twice as frequently. Heumann shows that plea bargaining in Connecticut has not increased since 1880 despite higher work loads; that it is no more frequent in courts

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with high case loads than in those with low case loads; and that it did not decline when case loads dropped abruptly after a jurisdictional change.

Second, stable workgroups develop mutual reliance and mutual goals, both of which enhance negotiated settlements. "The court community is not very large. Most plea bargained cases are negotiated by prosecutors and defense attorneys who know each other, who have worked together on innumberable cases in the past, and who expect to work together in the future" (p. 120).

Heumann's study, based on interviews with twenty-three prosecutors, thirty-five defense counsel, and thirteen judges in Connecticut, argues that adaptation, as much as coercion, explains new participants' acceptance of plea bargaining. New defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges are naive about criminal law. Their thinking is shaped by law school training, a belief in the "due process model," or civil law experience.

Defense counselors soon learn that most cases lack contestable factual or legal issues, that defendants readily admit guilt, that lighter sentences may accompany pleas, and that it is better to take a plea than to wage a hopeless defense. Moreover, if he does not plea bargain, the prosecution may close its files to him, refuse to bargain in other cases, waste his time by delaying trials, disregard his schedule in setting hearings, and consume his time with legal maneuvers. The prosecutor too wants to plea bargain—to save time and energy, to avoid quixotic defeats by unpredictable juries, and to preserve control over sentencing. New judges also soon find few contestable issues in cases; they too wish to save time and to avoid possible reversals on appeal.

For Heumann "the prosecutor—not the judge—looms as the central and most important figure for case disposition in the local criminal court" (p. 118). The prosecutor evaluates cases and decides what charge and what sentence should attach. His decisions are based on the seriousness of the offense, the strength of the case, the defendant's prior record, the cooperativeness of defense counsel, and his own vision of criminal law.

Neither *Felony Justice* nor *Plea Bargaining* endorses the conditions it describes. But both show the advantages for workgroup members and find substantial merit in existing practices. Neither study considers the defendants' perspective or the effect of existing practices on public attitudes toward the criminal courts. Principled models of due process, which are value prescriptions rather than empirical statements, are given short shrift. Both books advance our knowledge of the American judicial system. But neither will do much to improve the quality of justice as Americans strive to elaborate that goal.

DAVID ADAMANY
California State University, Long Beach

Housing Costs and Government Regulations: Confronting the Regulatory Maze *by Stephen R. Seidel. New Brunswick, N.J., The Center for Urban Policy Research, 1978. 434 pp. $15.00.*

For many years housers, planners, zoners, and others have devised and implemented various kinds of officially imposed standards on residential construction. These efforts were presumably based on the premise that there is something peculiar to the housing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

market (that is, the suppliers, the housing, or the consumers) which justified public action. Over the years an incredible array of such standards have come to be imposed on the construction of housing in virtually every part of this country. Until recently, however, little attention has been given to careful assessment of the costs which these standards impose on housing consumers.

In *Housing Costs and Government Regulations* Stephen Seidel attempts a comprehensive survey of government regulations which influence housing costs, as well as an assessment of the costs of these regulations. His ultimate purpose is to demonstrate that these regulations could be modified in order to reduce the cost of housing, and therefore make the possibility of new housing open to a wider segment of American households. While Seidel supports his argument that regulations are costly by citing a wide array of recent studies, and by reporting the results of three surveys (municipal building department officials, municipal zoning and subdivision officials, and home builders) conducted by the Center for Urban Policy Research, he fails to quantify those costs convincingly.

The material is presented in a straightforward manner. Following a general, if somewhat simplified, discussion of the housing industry, the author develops a conceptual framework for the examination of various types of government regulations. This is followed by individual discussions of seven major areas of regulation: building codes; energy conservation regulations; subdivision regulations; zoning regulations; growth controls; environmental regulations; and settlement and financing regulations. For each of these categories of regulation, the author presents a brief history of the regulations, their original intent, the ways in which they have been modified over time, and the mechanics of their implementation. This is followed by a discussion of the ways in which the regulations might be expected to affect the costs of housing, supported by data from other studies as well as by the results of the current surveys. Each section is completed with a discussion of the cost-effects of the regulations and recommendations for reducing those costs. There is also an extensive bibliography associated with each section. Given the wide range of regulations, related to housing, the information presented serves as a valuable reference for urban planners, various kinds of public officials, elected officials, and housing officials.

The major weakness in the book is in the quantification of the costs of the various regulations. Rigorously assessing the excess cost of regulations (excess being defined as requirements in addition to those necessary to insure health and safety) is clearly a difficult task. While it is not difficult to show that excessive requirements are costly, it is difficult to define "excessive," and even then, assessing the cost of the excess is problematic. In some cases the author quantifies only the costs of delay in obtaining necessary permits, and this is based on the assertion that such delays cause cost increases of 1 percent of total cost per month of delay. This implies a 12 percent annual discount rate on the total cost of the dwelling, rather than on only the amount of funds committed at the time of the delay. In other cases the author lists costs as excessive without carefully discussing the reasons for the requirements, or the costs of reducing them.

What might prove to be the most widely used portion of the book is the final chapter written by Kristina Ford which establishes a method for tabulating the excess costs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

associated with regulations for any given dwelling. The author sets up a method whereby the analyst assigns excessive costs on the basis of specific regulations which were imposed. The procedure includes steps for each of the major sets of regulations presented in the book. Unfortunately, however, the cost figures used are not supported by the previously presented material. While the structure for analyzing the costs of regulation makes sense, the cost figures cited seem somewhat conjectural, and one can only hope that readers are not seduced into using them for other than illustrative purposes.

Altogether, this book is a useful handbook on government regulations affecting residential construction, but falls short of presenting a rigorous analysis of the costs imposed by those regulations.

MICHAEL J. MUNSON
Princeton University

Light Water: How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved *by Irvin C. Bupp and Jean-Claude Derian. New York, Basic Books, 1978. 241 pp. $10.00.*

There is no public policy issue more important today, in more nations around the world, than the debate over the future of nuclear energy; Bupp and Derian have made an important contribution to this debate. Self-professed friends of nuclear energy, the authors critically analyze the history of the development of the predominant nuclear energy technology in the world today—the title's "light water" reactor type—and raise many of the kinds of objections that have been given currency by the antinuclear movement. The authors' critique of nuclear energy's past and their embrace of nuclear energy for the future may betray an underlying inconsistency, one common to nuclear energy policymakers in the Carter administration and elsewhere.

"The 30-year effort to develop nuclear fission as a cheap and reliable energy resource has been one of the 20th century's most important planned efforts to modify society. . . . The outcome has been technological virtuosity combined with commercial and political debacle, resulting in a stalemate" (p. 179). To substantiate this judgment, Bupp and Derian have written an excellent political biography of the reactor technology developed by the U.S. government in cooperation with American industries in the late 1950s, a cooperative effort that, by the late 1970s, accounted for more than 80 percent of all power reactors operating or under construction in the United States. Their thesis is that the success of this reactor type is due more to the worldwide promotional efforts of the U.S. government and the cupidity of those who have adopted this type of reactor rather than its economic performance; indeed, the light water reactor's poor economic performance is at the heart of today's "nuclear stalemate."

Derian's background in France's nuclear energy program and several references to the competition between the American and European reactor types in the late 1950s and early 1960s lend substance to the impression that the book is in part "la revanche de l'eau lourde." Of course, few of the objections to nuclear energy are specifically aimed at a particular reactor type, and in the end Bupp and Derian are ready to recommend increased reliance on light water reactors as long as they are operated without plutonium fuels.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

They apparently share the Carter administration's distaste for the "plutonium economy," whatever the "technological virtuosity" of plutonium recycling and fast breeder reactors.

Since 1975 the world has entered a "nuclear recession," in which only a handful of new plants have been ordered and progress toward the completion and start-up of others slowed. The book's discussion of the economics of nuclear energy, on which Bupp has written extensively, is an excellent aid in explaining this recession. The author's counsel to drop the insistence on the politically contentious plutonium recycle in light water reactors seems to be prudent advice if the nuclear industry is to save itself.

The political debacle of nuclear energy decision making in the United States seems to be the key to the book's argument, and hence the book's value. Bupp and Derian level stinging criticism at the way in which decisions on technology have been reached in America, attributing many of the problems of the light water reactor to the bureaucratic and interest group decision processes that created "a circular flow of self-congratulatory claims that preserved the discrepancy between promise and performance" of the light water reactor (p. 188). The book is important precisely because the essence of the debate over nuclear energy is the yet unresolved questions of how social policy choices should be made in a democracy, through what process, and reflecting what interests?

The authors are as critical of the antinuclear movement as they are of those who created and promoted the light water reactor, and herein lies a major potential contradiction: if the past processes were too incestuous, reflecting the wrong range of interests, why should the antinuclear movement be condemned for demanding more openness and insisting that a broader range of interest be reflected in decisions such as the choice among alternative technologies, the mode of technological deployment, etc.? What technocrats such as Bupp and Derian, inside and outside of government, have to decide is how much democracy they are willing to tolerate, especially when the decisions reached may not coincide with their informed judgments.

STEVEN J. BAKER
University of Texas at Austin

Approaches to Controlling Air Pollution *edited by Ann F. Friedlaender. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1978. 465 pp. $24.95.*

This collection of essays on implementing the 1970 Federal Clean Air Act Amendments is a *tour de force* of sophisticated analysis, masterfully edited by Professor Friedlaender. It marks the turning point in the field of pollution control policy: no longer are scholars searching for single, all-purpose solutions; there is an appreciation within this interdisciplinary field of the technical, economic, and political complexity of pollution control and the need for a portfolio of appropriate implementation strategies.

The book focuses on the political and legal issues of policy formulation (mobile and stationary sources, nondegradation policy) and implementation; and the economics of computing the tangible and intangible benefits and costs of pollution control. Both areas are covered well by nationally eminent scholars and public officials. Their chapters are enhanced by "comments" at the end of each chapter which are occasionally brutally

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

candid. Yet these exchanges facilitate deeper reflection on the problems raised by the authors.

The book opens with Helen Ingram's analysis of the political forces behind the unworkable 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments. She concludes that this grandiose symbolic law is typical of what we can expect from Congress in the way of policy formulation, and terms this behavior "political rationality." I call it political expediency, and believe that Congress wants to do better. Witness the creation of the Congressional Budget Office. Perhaps Congress was anticipating an administration which would not aggressively seek to abate air pollution and felt the need to spell-out the details. Charles Corkin's analysis of EPA shows that indeed, the Nixon administration designed EPA with several structural and procedural hobbles (for example, regional offices with little authority) which crippled enforcement.

Corkin made an even more important contribution to the volume when he asserted that no new laws are needed to enforce the air quality standards (p. 189), but rather, that enforcement depends upon political support from the public. Yet not enough is known about the tradeoffs competing interest groups are willing to make as they participate in the implementation of existing laws. New surveys are needed to update public opinion regarding environmental protection, particularly in light of the statement made by Charles Jones (p. 62) that the public is no longer interested in the environment. Research on public perceptions of site-specific enforcement decisions is also needed, since, as Helen Ingram suggests, economically impacted groups tend to mobilize, while the benefits of clean-air are diffuse and those who support it tend not to organize. Can these unmobilized clean air supporters carry election day—that's what elected officials will want to know before they take enforcement action.

An intriguing issue (not addressed in this book) which also needs research is how municipal and nonprofit polluters will finance pollution control operation and maintenance. This is a serious problem in the Land of Proposition 13. . . .

To conclude, I came away from the book pleased to see such balanced, constructive criticism of past experience and recommendations for the future. These proposals signal the end of a long and rather tiresome debate within this field over effluent fees versus standard-setting (William Drayton, p. 231). Now there is interest in combining standards and effluent fees so that industries which lag behind compliance schedules are charged the money they save by not meeting the standards. This has worked well in Connecticut since 1975. This and other new approaches described in the book auger well for the future of air pollution control in the United States.

The book is suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses. I salute the authors for an excellent job.

LAURA M. LAKE
University of California, Los Angeles

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pollution and Policy: A Case Essay on California and Federal Experience with Motor Vehicle Air Pollution, 1940–1975 *by James E. Krier and Edmund Ursin. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978. 401 pp. $15.95.*

This book is a review and analysis of how motor vehicle air pollution emerged as a public problem in California; how it got onto the political agenda; and how air pollution policy was formulated, enacted, and implemented in Washington and in California over a thirty-five-year period, 1940–1975. The authors are professors of law at the Los Angeles and San Diego campuses of the University of California.

Krier and Ursin refer to their work as a case essay, a historical narrative that is less data bound, less rigorous, and more impressionistic than the term "case study" might imply. The terminological distinction is less important than the authors' suggestion that the historical case essay is more suitable for capturing the complexity and uncertainty of policy development and implementation than more systematic approaches. Although some scholars will dispute this assertion, *Pollution and Policy* does offer a highly competent, broad overview of the evolution of air pollution policy that adds significantly to our knowledge of the politics of pollution.

There are five parts to the book. In Part I the authors provide an introduction to the nature of pollution problems for the uninitiated. It is a clear and helpful discussion of the technical, behavioral, and institutional aspects of air pollution. Parts II, III, and IV constitute the extensive historical narrative, with 100 pages devoted to the 1940–1960 period, 60 pages to 1960–1969, and 50 pages to 1970–1975. The last period represents the modern environmental era, in which major changes in air pollution policy have taken place. The review of problems in implementing the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (chapter 13) is an especially valuable analysis of federal, state, and local actions and resulting conflicts. Throughout these historical sections, Krier and Ursin make effective use of public documents, newspapers, studies, and reports. Interviews with key political and administrative actors, however, are noticeably absent, in sharp contrast to Charles Jones's *Clean Air*.

In many respects, Part V is the most important section of the book and the one most likely to interest political scientists. Here the authors appraise the policymaking process, emphasizing several themes familiar to students of environmental policy. The process (prior to 1970), contend the authors, was one of "least steps taken down the path of least resistance—steps, that is, quite consciously designed to disturb the existing situation as little as possible" (p. 252). In contrast to this norm, nonincremental policy changes have emerged from a sense of crisis created by particularly notable pollution episodes.

Another theme of some familiarity is a "technological and regulatory fixation" in policy choice. Technological solutions and direct regulation promised to be fast and predictable and were consistent with the status quo. Thus these types of policies have been favored. Moreover, Krier and Ursin argue convincingly that there has been an overall "unwarranted delay" or lag in governmental resolution of air pollution problems due to such characteristic political responses. Not unexpectedly, then, they end their analysis with a brief evaluation of the effectiveness of current policy, consideration of alternatives (especially pricing systems), and some suggestions for policy changes and more effective environmental management procedures for California.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pollution and Policy is an informative assessment of California's attempt to come to terms with the problem of air pollution. While not an exhaustive, rigorous, or heavily theoretical study of air pollution policymaking, it is an excellent and highly readable book.

MICHAEL E. KRAFT
University of Wisconsin-Green Bay

Public Policy and Private Higher Education *edited by David W. Breneman and Chester E. Finn, Jr., with the assistance of Susan C. Nelson. Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1978. 468 pp. Cloth, $16.95; paper, $7.95.*

A great many people in the United States care about private higher education. The reasons may vary: because they are aware of the important contribution institutions of private education have made to the development of new knowledge and to the education of the political, economic, and intellectual elites of the country; or because they themselves participated in private higher education and profited from the experience; or because they believe that pluralism in the educational system is vital and could not exist without private higher education. Those who care tend not to ask themselves whether, in the absence of private higher education, they might not have received as valuable an education in public institutions, or whether the country's elites might not have emerged from public universities. Pluralism may well be a very important value in a heterogeneous country like the United States—but what price pluralism? It is the exceedingly valuable contribution of *Public Policy and Private Higher Education*, edited by David W. Breneman and Chester E. Finn, Jr., to make clear how public policy now accommodates or might better accommodate the competing values of pluralistic choice in higher education and access to low-cost higher education for all students who want it and should receive it.

Breneman and Finn have done much more than simply edit a set of papers that are more or less closely related to a central topic. They have identified major issues, set out in their introductory chapter on "The Uncertain Future," and they have obtained excellent contributions from other authors to illuminate these issues. Chapters on such topics as "Financial Trends and Issues" (Susan Nelson), "The Demand for Higher Education" (Michael McPherson), "Federal Politics" (L.E. Gladieux and T.R. Wolanin), "The Politics of State Aid" (Robert Berdahl), to name only a few, constitute independent studies that, nevertheless, profit greatly from being read in relationship to each other.

What, then, are the major issues and what are the major policy recommendations that emerge from this book? The key issue would appear to be the cost differential between public and private higher education and the alternative ways of reducing that differential. This may be accomplished by charging students in public institutions a larger portion of the cost of instruction or by subsidizing private institutions and thereby lowering the tuition they have to charge. As Breneman and Finn put it:

> The costs, the political alignments, the redistributive effects, and the latent impacts on campus autonomy of these two approaches are wholly dissimilar. . . . As the numerous complexities of this subject are explored in the following chapters, one fundamental question continually crops up: when the difference in price between the two sectors is defined as the problem, and when

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> shrinking that difference is perceived as the objective, is there a better case to be made for trimming the "public" character of one or compromising the "private" features of the other (p. 7)?

Insofar as open conflict has developed between the two sectors, public institutions and their proponents have argued with federal and state authorities for types of support that broaden *access*, while private institutions believe *choice* is essential for their survival.

This does not mean that private higher education does not include institutions with different concerns and interests: the private research universities are, for example, more dependent on tuition income than the liberal arts colleges; and the latter have a special stake in present federal tax policies on charitable donations. It is the private research universities that have recently experienced the sharpest drop in federal support (p. 85); and if, over the periods 1966–67 and 1973–74, the tuition gap is examined, it is found that the private institutions have held their own fairly well, with the exception of the comprehensive universities and the less selective liberal arts colleges (p. 167). Nor does the common commitment of the private institutions to choice vs. access mean that policies that favor the private sector have the same effect in different states; thus, "state aid to the private sector in New York appears to come at the expense of the public sector, whereas in California gains for private higher education come as part of advances for the public system" (p. 97).

One of the more surprising findings in the book has to do with the affordability of private higher education: "the ratio of cost to income has not risen over the 1961–75 period, indicating that increases in median family income and in per capita disposable income have kept pace with increases in college costs" (p. 29). Indeed, Michael McPherson argues in his excellent chapter that too much attention may have been given to the cost of private education, and that there are other factors—quality, accessibility, selectivity, and variety of offerings—that may be more important than the tuition gap in explaining the great increase in the proportion of students enrolled in the public sector since 1960" (p. 156).

It is possible in a brief review to mention only the central recommendations that Breneman and Finn make for policy in the 1980s. Given the commitment to pluralism and the existence of a well-established system of private education, it would be best to use existing resources rather than expand the public sector. And if this premise is accepted, it follows also that policy makers will have to adopt a national perspective toward higher education; rather than increase the number of undergraduate places in states where the assortment of postsecondary educational opportunities is limited, they should devise ways of facilitating greater student mobility across state lines. Public policy should not stand in the way of informed student choice (pp. 417–18).

There is a great deal more in this very good book than a brief review can convey; it is a book that deserves to be widely read, and not only by the devotees of private higher education.

ELINOR G. BARBER
Ford Foundation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Pursuit of Equality in American History *by J.R. Pole. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978. 380 pp. $14.95.*

In this lengthy historical survey of egalitarianism in American public thought, based on his Jefferson Memorial Lectures of 1971 at Berkeley, J.R. Pole has made a valuable contribution to current discussion of the theoretical issues raised by such programs as affirmative action and unrestricted college admissions. By identifying different "categories of equality" representing different "levels of awareness" (p. 326) that he believes have been characteristic of different moments in the American past, Pole apparently hopes to promote greater self-consciousness and precision of understanding in future debate. Some readers may object to his cautious statements of "individualistic preference" (p. x) and his implicit criticisms of standardized policies designed to impose "absolute equality of results" (p. 357) in social, economic, and educational affairs; but few will fault him for lack of judiciousness in outlining ideological alternatives. In any case, *The Pursuit of Equality* is offered as a "work of history, not of philosophy and still less of advocacy" (p. ix), and must be judged accordingly. As such, it is admirably broad in conception and rich in detail, reflecting the perspective and expertise of an outstanding British scholar who is an authority on early American politics.

This said, it must be added that *The Pursuit of Equality* makes a curious and uncertain approach to an equally curious and uncertain subject. As often as not, it seems, this is meant to be a "history of ideas" following the historiographical model developed by Arthur O. Lovejoy, whose exposition of the "Great Chain of Being" indeed provides the backdrop against which—"as a successor"—the multifaceted "idea of equality" (elsewhere sometimes referred to as a "concept") "emerged in the higher reaches of popular thought" and then persisted in America with particular "tenacity" (p. 3). Subsequently, with a vocabulary reminiscent of Lovejoy's, Pole explains how before the Enlightenment the idea of equality had to "struggle for existence" (p. 5), how for a while it "advanced" (p. 176) in America, how by the beginning of the twentieth century it appeared about to "die of neglect" (p. 214), and how after World War II it got "out of its box again" (p. 292). At the same time, there also seems to be another voice speaking in *The Pursuit of Equality*, more "sociological" in its language of analysis. This is the Pole who would explain the "function" of egalitarian argument in relation to "social structures and political policies" (pp. x, xii) and who is quick to contrast "egalitarian rhetoric" with the conditions of an "unequal society" (p. 13); this is the Pole who argues that equality of opportunity became the major egalitarian "category" in Jacksonian America because of its congruence with the "aspirations of an age dominated by economic development" (p. 129). Surprisingly, for a book that in its basic structure seems to assume the continuity and active social power of ideas, *The Pursuit of Equality* takes serious account of the possibility that social and economic circumstances have generally been determinative.

The difficulty here is not that Pole's various premises regarding the role of ideas in history are necessarily inconsistent, but that his more "sociological" line of interpretation leads one ultimately to doubt first the integrity and then the very legitimacy of his subject. "The concept of equality," he says of the Progressive period, "was broad and flexible enough to contain differing and even divergent points of view" (p. 215). If so, was it a "concept" at all? If terms like "mystique" (p. 30) and "illusion" (p. 292) serve better,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exactly to what historical reality do they refer? Before the era of the Warren Court, Pole repeatedly asserts, most Americans made only fitful and usually disingenuous use of egalitarian argument—for example, to "give hope, thus drawing off discontent even among those for whom the doors would never open" (p. 146). If that is true, why not give priority of attention to motives instead of doctrinal niceties?

In the final analysis, to use a figure of recent vintage, *The Pursuit of Equality* may be said to "self-destruct." Perhaps the most important generalization that emerges from Pole's elaborate study is that before the middle of the twentieth century themes of equality in American public discourse reveal relatively little of the regular patterning and emotional commitment discovered by numerous historians in such abstractions as "nature," "progress," and "individuality." Why this should have been so, and why there has been a heightening of egalitarian consciousness in the past few decades, are questions that Pole poses briefly but leaves more or less unanswered. Suggestively, he associates egalitarianism with "circumstances of social upheaval" (p. 1) and speculates that moral issues surrounding the rise and fall of international fascism may have been crucial in activating principles in which Americans could claim an "inheritance" (p. 256). This is intriguing, if incomplete, and doubtless will be a point of departure for further thought. Not only to political theorists but to historians, *The Pursuit of Equality* reaches a conclusion that—in Pole's words—"should be considered as a beginning rather than an end" (p. 354).

STEPHEN BOTEIN
Michigan State University

In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process, The Colonial Period *by A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. New York, Oxford University Press, 1978. 512 pp. $15.00.*

This volume is a very important and useful accomplishment and deserves to be widely read. It is important that a member of the federal appellate bench has begun a multivolume review of the historical interactions between black slavery and the American legal process; it is useful as the first coherent legal history of the American role in the creation of the institution of slavery in the colonial era. Judge Higginbotham's interest in the contemporary racial scene led him further and further back into American history "to learn the lessons of racial history, to ascertain to what extent the law itself had created the mores of racial repression" (p. ix). In order to provide a view of slavery from the perspective of the law, Higginbotham has analyzed cases, statutes, and legal edicts to approximately 1776.

The author and his research assistants have learned a great deal about the legal history of colonial slavery. Although the overall analysis is more competent than original, the various chapters are informative to the general reader and helpful to the scholar. The presentation includes careful reviews of the statutory and judicial development of slavery in Virginia, Massachusetts, New York, South Carolina, Georgia, and Pennsylvania, and a very relevant discussion of the English experience with slavery, emphasizing in particular

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the landmark *Sommersett* decision of 1772. The current volume ends with the question of whether the Declaration of Independence was a self-evident truth or a self-evident lie.

In addition to the critical analysis of slave codes, the text is alive with passionate statements and interpretations. Higginbotham says things that need to be said about matters that some academics are apt to pass over in their search for objectivity. He draws attention to "the dark shadow of repression under which, historically, most American blacks have lived" and acknowledges that "it is bad bicentennial form to refer to the fact that many of America's founding fathers owned slaves and that most, either directly, or indirectly, profited from the evil institution that enslaved black human beings only" (pp. 4–5). Higginbotham concludes that in colonial Virginia "the black slaves' plight was one of daily imposition of brutality by the laws which sanctioned his enslavement; no part of the legal process was his ally, the courts not his sanctuary" (p. 58). The occasional expression of moral outrage is both well considered and appropriate.

Since at least three more volumes are planned in this series, some critical comments and suggestions are in order. The current volume is neither sophisticated legal history nor distinguished general history by professional standards, despite the evident erudition of its author. Although some of this is inevitable for a person diligent enough to pursue several careers at once, the author has on occasion not reaped the benefit of the most relevant secondary literature. The blame lies partly with the professional historians who advised him. The best chapters on particular colonies are those for which extensive secondary literature exists, such as New York and South Carolina. This need to become aware of and incorporate the latest secondary literature will become increasingly important as the author moves his account into the crowded thickets of the study of slavery in the nineteenth century.

The author's portrait of colonial slavery is inevitably dependent as well on printed primary sources, especially statutes and reported decisions. Although Higginbotham has analyzed these materials carefully, his research does not adequately reach into the vast pool of manuscript court records for the various colonies, which contains the real truth about the legal experience of blacks. Only the court records reveal how laws were in fact enforced and how blacks were treated in practice by the legal system. The current volume should at least encourage others to pursue the remainder of this task.

The author's legal and judicial training and experience have been more of a hindrance to the current effort than they will be for future volumes. The art of historical analysis seems more easily learned as one moves toward the present. The current effort on occasion approaches a discredited form of legal history, wherein statutes are strung together as an acceptable reflection of human experience. In other instances the author lapses into the style and jargon of a modern judicial decision, which reduces the considerable pleasure of a modern judge critically reviewing earlier judicial decisions. These limitations primarily arise in the context of comparative judgments among the various colonies, which specialists will be inclined to question.

DAVID H. FLAHERTY
University of Western Ontario

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Remembered Gate: Origins of American Feminism, the Woman and the City 1800–1860 *by Barbara J. Berg. New York, Oxford University Press, 1978. 334 pp. $14.95.*

Historians may judge the accuracy of this study, but political scientists must consider the questions it opens concerning public and private power, state and family governance, women and men.

Berg's hypothesis is both conventional and novel. Like others, she submits that American women had more power and status in the eighteenth century than in the nineteenth. Vital to production *and* reproduction, women were participant-observers in an ideological debate over the nature of femininity. There liberals dared to suggest that women might be independent, intelligent, interesting individuals.

However, industrialization, which "separated the work place from the home," and urbanization, which generated other changes, maimed women. They lost strength and assumed a social role, the "woman-belle ideal," that constricted them. The demands of that role were inseparable from a national myth that praised the home and rustic bliss. Men, greedy for myth, ambivalent about the reality it was concealing, also sought to help themselves by putting women in a lesser legal, political, economic, and psychic place. Berg writes: "Thwarted in efforts to dominate the changing national economic, political, and social scene and overwhelmed in attempts to alleviate urban problems, men became desperate to exercise some measure of control. . . . They finally found an outlet for these emotions through their domination of women" (p. 72).

Middle-and upper-middle-class antebellum women responded to their new condition in several ways. Some accepted it; some were ill; some wrote; some became feminists. Berg adopts Gerda Lerner's distinction between feminism, which seeks "to free the woman herself from society's pressures to conform to externally established social standards" (p. 5), and women's rights, which more specifically calls for certain legal reforms, such as the right to vote. Berg goes on to argue, freshly and boldly, that feminism developed in American cities between 1800 and 1860. Its medium was the female voluntary association, formed to aid orphans, widows, prisoners, older women, and, significantly, prostitutes. Doing association work, women found health, value, self-esteem, and the rudiments of a political analysis, particularly of women's oppression, and of women's bonding through inequity, brutality, and deprivation.

The Remembered Gate is lucid, eloquent. Berg's sophisticated style is congruent with her use of literary and documentary sources to reconstruct a historical whole. One learns more about the letters and journals of the American Female Moral Reform Association than about its membership statistics. Berg's methodology may come under scrutiny. So may her position in contemporary scholarship. She looks at men's inhumanity to women and at women s resistance to it—a subject many scholars disavow. Yet, missing from her sources are some of the most interesting, new historians of women, sexuality, and the family. I think, for example, of Nancy Cott.

Berg, though, has offered a synthesis of ideas about the city, sex-gender arrangements, political change, and modernization of sufficient richness to demand that critics provide

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

substantive evidence of inadequacy and error, if *The Remembered Gate* is in fact inadequate or in error.

CATHARINE R. STIMPSON
Barnard College, Columbia University

Wartime Origins of the Berlin Dilemma *by Daniel J. Nelson. University, Ala., The University of Alabama Press, 1978. 219 pp. $11.95.*

This is a study of the European Advisory Commission (EAC), with special attention given to the negotiations on Berlin. There are two introductory chapters, one on Berlin as a problem in international politics and the other on the origins of the EAC. Four chapters are devoted to the EAC negotiations: one to the inheritance of the EAC, two to the "first round" negotiations in 1944 and the "second round" in 1945, and the fourth to the special problem of access to Berlin. The book has two concluding chapters: one is a "post-mortem" that tries to fix responsibility for the failure of the EAC to achieve more than it did; the second repeats some of the material in the post-mortem and closes with a brief analysis of the four-power agreement of September 3, 1971, on Berlin. There are also 12 annexes, including the 1971 treaty.

The book relies on archival materials, especially on the records of the American delegation to the European Advisory Commission; the papers of Ambassador John G. Winant, the American delegate to the EAC; the published materials in the *Foreign Relations of the United States;* and on Philip E. Mosely's publications and comments on his service as a member of Ambassador Winant's staff. Nelson got much information from Mosely; some he documents with the usual citation in a footnote; some he refers to in parentheses in the text.

In a foreword, the book is described as a "ripened version of an excellent Columbia University dissertation." But it was not published when it was finished, apparently in September 1972, and it is now dated. With the exception of a footnote reference to *Time* magazine for September 13, 1971, and references in the text to memoranda Nelson received from Mosely, there is no reference dated later than 1969. That would hardly matter except that several important studies on Nelson's subject have appeared in the meantime: Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington, 1975); Tony Sharp, *The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany* (London, 1975); Warren F. Kimball, *Swords or Ploughshares: The Morgenthau Plan for a Defeated Germany, 1943-1946* (Philadelphia, 1976); and Bruce Kuklick, "The Genesis of the European Advisory Commission," *Journal of Contemporary History* (October 1969). The three books often differ from Nelson's, and Kuklick's thesis that the United States sabotaged the EAC from the very beginning can hardly be ignored.

In my judgment, Sharp's study is much more useful as an analysis of the EAC, in part because Sharp interprets the negotiations in London in their appropriate military and strategic context. Ziemke's study is far superior on U. S. military policy and the EAC.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Following Mosely's lead, Nelson repeats often the argument that the EAC was stymied by the failure of the U.S. government to instruct Ambassador Winant properly, and he assigns heavy responsibility for the failure to the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of the War Department. He might have been less inclined to accept Mosely's views had he consulted Ziemke's study or a study published as early as 1963: Paul Y. Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy," in Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies*. Indicative of the level of Nelson's analysis elsewhere, he discusses the Morgenthau Plan apparently unmindful of the fact that military decisions generally flow down the chain of command rather than up it. He observes (p. 147) that Secretary of War Stimson and Assistant Secretary of War McCloy opposed the plan as policy for Germany, but he concludes—without elaboration or comment—that the CAD nevertheless managed to get substantial portions of the plan "absorbed into JCS 1067."

JOHN GIMBEL
Humboldt State University

Stalin Embattled, 1943–1948 *by William O. McCagg, Jr. Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1978. 423 pp. $18.95.*

Perhaps no foreign policy question has been so much studied and debated as the origins of the cold war. Usually, however, because of the accessibility of material and the interest of scholars, the focus has been on American deeds and misdeeds. For this reason, we must welcome a new study of Soviet foreign policy during the crucial years from Yalta to the formation of NATO.

McCagg's thesis is that Stalin failed in his peaceful foreign policy because of domestic political pressures and the revolutionary audacity of foreign Communists, who forced a reasonable man into revolutionary postures, 1945–1948, as not before or after. Thus, Stalin, we are informed, had some difficulty reestablishing his absolute authority after the war and spent the next three years maneuvering under various pressures. To support this thesis, he cites many declarations, well-known and obscure, along with numerous details of politics inside and outside the Soviet Union.

To state the thesis, however, makes the book appear much more coherent and logical than it is. Most of the facts adduced have no visible relation to the argument; it is more a jumbled history of those years than a presentation of a logical thesis. It is certainly true that many of the Soviet people had high expectations of a better and freer life after victory; but there is no real evidence that Stalin's position was ever shaky, and if it had been he would in all probability have behaved in an opposite fashion, for example, giving a little more priority to consumer goods. That the foreign Communists had a potential for troubling him does not really appear. After all, they mostly depended on him and demonstrated total loyalty. The chief exception, Tito, was expelled. Moreover, the thesis implies a much more coherent and planned Communist movement than existed; many actions are understandable as uncoordinated responses to particular situations, and contemporaneous events were subject to antithetical interpretations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

McCagg's often dubious relation of facts to conclusions presents a more serious problem. For example, it is repeatedly noted that Stalin was devious and tricky beyond measure; yet Stalin's statements are again and again cited as proof of his state of mind. When he said some pleasant things to a British leftist, according to the author, this showed his desire for peace. His speech of 6 November 1944 was allegedly a pronouncement of the highest significance, "a great strategic vision" (p. 69), because he said the big powers shared common interests—not an extraordinary statement in the course of the war when Stalin still depended on Western cooperation. The Stockholm peace appeals of 1951–55 are cited as evidence of Stalin's goal of peace. The founding meeting of the Cominform was allegedly inspired by Stalin's fear of war—an odd view of an event that did much to sharpen confrontation.

There are many interpretations that will raise eyebrows. Some are plausible, such as the observation that Soviet republics were permitted to have commissariats of war and foreign affairs, not for U.N. purposes, but to facilitate accession of new republics. Most are not, for example, McCagg's contention that Stalin's essays on linguistics in 1950 were in some mysterious way related to the Korean War (p. 307). Stalin was supposedly sick, literally, from fear of attack by the West in 1947 (p. 283), between his adventure in Iran and the Berlin blockade. And Stalin, we are told, risked war abroad to prove wrong his party critics at home (p. 237). In 1950, according to McCagg, Stalin was in some involved way abandoning the cult of personality (p. 281). McCagg also apparently accepts the Soviet thesis that the United States was salivating over prospects of taking over the British Empire. The author speaks of Soviet industrialists at the end of the war being worried about markets, as were their American counterparts (p. 189). Stalin's "inability to deny Leninism as the source of his authority" is called his "point of greatest weakness" (p. 118), as though he had not built himself up as disciple, helper, and successor of Lenin. Regarding the publication of the Cominform condemnation of Tito on 2 June 1948, the author informs us, "This was Vidov Dan, the anniversary of the battle of Kosovo and of the assassination of 1914, the Serbian national holiday. This is the surest sign that Stalin at least synchronized the Berlin confrontation with the climax of this battle with Tito, starting a war scare, just as he had in March 1945 and March 1946, so as to emphasize his domestic political manipulations" (p. 303).

In conclusion, we are told that there could be no peace without stability in the Soviet Union and control of Communists outside. Stalin pursued these goals; therefore he sought peace (p. 312). Alas, the Allies rejected his outstretched hand, as Hitler once did: "He gave his friendship to the West during the war, and after 1947 the Allies also rejected him" (p. 311). Yet the book is not simply an apology for Stalin; earlier we are told how Stalin kept up Alliance appearances to fool the Western powers.

In short, this book tells less about Stalin's aims than about the lengths to which American sovietology will go to make a book appear scholarly.

ROBERT WESSON
University of California, Santa Barbara

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky *by Baruch Knei-Paz. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978. 629 pp. $27.50.*

Knei-Paz states that this study developed from his "interest in the relationship between ideas and historical events in general, and between Marxist ideas and the Russian Revolution of 1917 in particular" (p. vii). He is concerned with the "extent . . . to which intellectual preconceptions 'in the minds of revolutionists' may be said to have played a role in shaping history, and the extent to which such preconceptions were overpowered and made largely immaterial by forces of reality" (p. viii). More narrowly, however, he has attempted to provide both "as complete an exposition of [Trotsky's] thought and writings as is possible," and a discussion of Trotsky's thought "analytically and critically within the framework of a consistent interpretation of its significance, its virtues, and its flaws" (p. x).

Of these various aims, the one most adequately realized is the exposition of Trotsky's thought. Knei-Paz presents a coherent and integrative view of Trotsky's initial formulation of the theory of combined development and permanent revolution, in the context of the revolutionary events of 1905; his alienation from and eventual reconciliation with Lenin over the question of the role of party organization in the revolutionary struggle; and his analysis of Stalinism as the revolution betrayed. (There is also a less successful and less well-integrated section on "the revolutionary as man of letters.")

Knei-Paz's interpretation of Trotsky's thought revolves around the conception of "permanent revolution" as a "revolution of backwardness." Combined development—in the case of Russia, the forced amalgamation of precapitalist and developed capitalist modes of production, with resulting social and political contradictions—is a principal aspect of so-called backward or underdeveloped societies. Such societies, indeed, can be called "backward" only through comparison with more developed societies; and this comparison proceeds from the interaction between more and less developed societies. Now, in classical Marxist theory, the higher the stage of capitalist development, the greater the prospects for socialist revolution. But in fact, argues Knei-Paz, the prospects for revolution are greatest in backward societies; and he credits Trotsky with understanding "already in 1905" why "social forces and movements other than those of Russian Social Democracy were too weak to bring down and replace the Tsarist autocracy and why, moreover, the Social Democratic movement was strategically so well placed. In 1917 he also recognized the importance which must be attributed to party organization and leadership if the movement were fully to attain power" (p. 430). But, Knei-Paz continues, Trotsky was quite wrong in seeing the revolution as *socialist;* hence he also was wrong in seeing Stalinism as the revolution betrayed. The bureaucratization of the political process was a necessary consequence of Russian backwardness. Thus Knei-Paz's rather ironical conclusion: "Backwardness, understood in this sense as a condition of insufficient social differentiation and political consciousness, posed, as Trotsky feared, the permanent danger of undermining whatever prospects Bolshevism had of introducing socialist measures and institutions in Russia; but without this backwardness, Bolshevism itself would either not have arisen or, at the very least, would not have succeeded in seizing and holding power" (p. 430).

Leaving aside a variety of other issues, Knei-Paz's interpretation clearly depends upon discounting the possibilities of proletarian revolution in more developed capitalist

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

societies. For if these possibilities are not discounted, then Marxism cannot be seen simply as a theory of the "revolution of backwardness." Likewise, if one does not rule out the "classical" proletarian revolution in advance, then one must take seriously Trotsky's conception of the interconnectedness of western European and Russian conditions, with respect to the political prospects for *both* areas. One need not follow Trotsky in viewing the failure of the revolutionary movement in western Europe as a matter of missed opportunities or the advent of Stalinism in Russia as a revolution betrayed. But neither must one lapse into the ironical contemplation of the play of social forces.

Put slightly differently, Knei-Paz is interested in demonstrating why a specifically socialist, revolutionary transformation of Russian society did not and could not occur, despite the intentions of revolutionary leaders such as Trotsky. Hence his view that "the forces of reality" win out over the "intellectual preconceptions" of revolutionists. But Trotsky never thought socialism could be realized in one country, much less one backward country; thus, the only question really on the table is the extent to which the subjective desires of individuals can influence the course of political events. Trotsky could not *will* socialism into existence in Russia; but it is precisely his own theory, Marxist theory, that demonstrates that individual volitions and subjective moral imperatives are no substitute for the realistic analysis of the objective possibilities for revolutionary action. Hence from a Marxist perspective, Knei-Paz has not meaningfully addressed the question of the "relationship between ideas and historical events."

EUGENE VICTOR WOLFENSTEIN
University of California, Los Angeles

The Unsuspected Revolution: The Birth and Rise of Castroism *by Mario Llerena. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1978. 324 pp. $12.50*

Mario Llerena is a Cuban exile who participated in Castro's 26th of July Movement, becoming the official representative of its Committee in Exile (essentially in the United States) before formally breaking with the Movement in August of 1958. The date is important, for it antedates by more than four months the Rebel Army's final march into Havana and the beginning of revolutionary rule in Cuba.

This is essentially a personal memoir, written in the first person and covering the period from 1956 to 1958 in substantial detail—with additional background on Cuban politics and the author's earlier experiences in the 1950s. Less inflamed than most memoirs by Cuban exiles, it has the additional virtues of being well written, having a decent index and useful notes, and including in its three appendices translations of important documents and letters.

At the outset Llerena is clear concerning his major reason for writing this book, or at least publishing it at this time, since the manuscript is essentially a rewritten version of materials assembled by the author in the early 1960s. As he reiterates at numerous points in his story, "I am deliberately using my own experience, and consequently my own person, as the incarnation of a political type, so to speak—the middle-class reformer or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

'moderate' who inadvertently gets himself involved in and cooperates with an unsuspectedly radical revolution" (p. 31).

An intelligent and cultured man, trained both in law and theology, Llerena was—as were many Cubans of his sensibilities and background—thoroughly disgusted with the corruption of politics in Cuba. As with so many of his generation, he was drawn toward what was then called "revolutionary" politics, understood as a politics that would cleanse *la patria* of the degradations represented by the way in which it was ruled. The 26th of July Movement came to embody much of this symbolism and spirit, and thus it was not surprising, given the historical moment, for a person such as Llerena to seek to express his constitutionalist and patriotic feelings from within the Movement.

But this constitutionalist and patriotic urge was evidently not accompanied by a particularly profound understanding of the causes of the miserable, backward, and hopeless conditions in which large sectors of the Cuban population lived. While Fidelistas in the mountains and in the cities were learning—both before and after January of 1959—about the depth and structural nature of Cuba's social and economic problems, and thus were being radicalized by events, others both inside and outside of Cuba were steadfastly insisting that the main problems were political in the old-fashioned sense. Needless to say, such persons found the radicalization of the 26th of July Movement intolerable. Llerena is a prime example—all the more interesting because he found the Movement intolerable even before it had really changed very much. As he says, "much though I disliked any entanglement with traditional politics, I dreaded a radical course far more" (p. 162). With such fears and values at the core of his political vision, Llerena's flight to the United States in June 1960 was entirely predictable.

Thus his narrative has an unintended as well as an intended message: moderates should be careful about being swept up in political movements that at root are more radical than they suspect. How this happened to "middle-class reformers" in Cuba in the 1950s is well told in his story. What Llerena also inadvertently suggests is how these same reformers were unable and unwilling to come to grips with the social and economic realities of their homeland. The radicalization of the Cuban Revolution, after all, did not derive from a voluntaristic decision on the part of the leadership to "be radical." Rather, the process gestated in a host of national and international experiences, not the least of which was the gradual realization by Castro and many others that a successful assault on underdevelopment, misery, and exploitation would involve transformations many times more profound and costly than reformist politics would allow.

RICHARD R. FAGEN
Stanford University

Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia *by Harry R. Strack. Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1978. 296 pp. $15.00.*

The Bingham Report, detailing the complicity of some of Great Britain's highest public officials in subverting oil-import sanctions against Rhodesia, appeared a few months after

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this book was published. Bingham's revelations, which shocked the British public, would scarcely have surprised Harry Strack, who, on the evidence of this book, is a man who understands the devious ways of this world. Indeed, he seems so calm and detached a chronicler of a subject most often treated with public passion that one wonders if anything could shake his cool.

Strack's purpose is "to identify, explain, and determine how, and under what circumstances Rhodesia has been able to maintain and/or establish her international relationships" (pp. 237–38). He succeeds admirably in meeting this purpose. This is a painstakingly researched and precisely written study of a topic on which all parties have an interest in lying and covering up the facts. The reader will find none of the high tragicomedy and informed gossip snitched from the corridors of power that both enliven and make suspect parts of R.W. Johnson's *How Long Will South Africa Survive?* Strack documents his points carefully and restrains any inclination to stretch the facts into thunderous conclusions or into tendentious generalizations. The thoughtful reader can only be grateful.

Strack's success is based in large part on his patient ferreting out of facts from a wide variety of written sources (including Rhodesian propaganda) and on careful interviewing in and out of Rhodesia. It also owes much to his penchant for using his own experiences as sources of data. (Want to know how airline tickets to Rhodesia are sold abroad? See how the author arranged it, pp. 184–85.) Strack also seems to have a knack for turning up in odd places at just the right moment. What a delicious coup for a researcher to be able to document some of Rhodesia's Francophobe African connection by greeting Foreign Minister van der Byl in Abidjan's Hotel Ivoire in August 1976.

What is one to conclude about the effectiveness of sanctions from the book's evidence? After detailing all the ways in which Rhodesia has been able to avoid sanctions and all the ingenuity other parties have deployed to help them do so, Strack nevertheless reminds us that sanctions have had an impact. Although Rhodesia has managed to avoid international isolation, "isolation is not an absolute variable in the sense of it either existing or not existing" (p. 239). Sanctions have imposed many personal and political constraints on the Rhodesian system, and these constraints, when combined with substantial (but far from overwhelming) military pressures, now have forced, at the very least, an evolution toward a multiracial government that Ian Smith once swore never to accept. The most successful form of sanctions has been political. Far from Smith's confident expectation that increased trade would lead to recognition of the flag, Rhodesia's political isolation has only increased. Economic sanctions have been the least successful. Too many national and transnational actors have had incentives to violate them, and too many Western business interests openly sympathized with the Rhodesian cause. (Although in 1973 Rhodesian delegates were barred from attending the Congress of the International Council of Nurses, Rhodesian businessmen were welcomed at the Lions International Convention in Miami. Two years later the Lions gave Mr. Smith their International Distinguished Award!)

Those contemplating the future use of sanctions as a tool of international coercion would do well to reflect carefully on the conclusions of Strack's final chapter. Chief among them is the necessity to apply the entire array of sanction measures available as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quickly as possible. Slow escalation of pressure provides time for finding creative means of avoidance. Sharp restrictions on communications with the sanctioned country, twice vetoed in the Rhodesian case by the United States and Britain, might be the key to making sanctions effective; they could also be rapidly implemented. Finally, "in terms of political achievements, sanctions must be regarded as marginal instruments of influence best employed in conjunction with other means of influence such as armed force—especially if political results are desired in the short-run" (p. 253).

WILLIAM J. FOLTZ
Yale University

Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations *by Michael Walzer. New York, Basic Books, 1977. 361 pp. $15.00.*

Michael Walzer, professor of government at Harvard, author of works on revolution and disobedience, describes himself as one who was a political activist and partisan during the Vietnam war. From this experience he discovered a need to study just war doctrine, required in time of war to help us think about the morality of war and to articulate our positions. His approach is eclectic moral/legal with emphasis on practical morality. The theme of the book is the tension in just war theory and practice between winning a war fought for a just cause and "fighting well."

In Part I Walzer develops the "moral reality of war," denying the "war is hell" approach that places war beyond morality and adopting a just war stance. In Part II on the *jus ad bellum* (law regulating recourse to armed coercion), Walzer examines the "theory of aggression." In Part III, the *jus in bello* (law regulating conduct of war) is addressed in terms of what Walzer calls the "war convention." Some selected issues are discussed in Part IV and Part V concludes with the "question of responsibility" for violations of the moral/legal rules of war.

Walzer's treatment of *jus ad bellum* issues suffers from his underestimation of the gravity of any effort to discount the residual limiting effects of the UN Charter and the customary law of the League-UN era. There is certainly reason to question the efficacy of the law prohibiting recourse to force except as part of UN enforcement or self-defense. But the universal aspirations behind this law require a more comprehensive treatment of the subject than Walzer provides. His formulation of the *jus ad bellum* as a "legalist paradigm" (pp. 61-63) does not do justice to the great experiment of the twentieth century in limiting the acceptability of war as an instrument of foreign policy. Moreover, in a work emphasizing the moral over the legal, Walzer curiously does not address the traditional just war *jus ad bellum* issues of competent authority, just cause, and right intention.

Walzer makes a contribution to *jus in bello* thinking in his treatment of the "war convention," particularly in his imaginative analyses of the principles of noncombatant immunity and double-effect. Literal application of the principle of noncombatant immunity, or discrimination, threatens efficacious deterrence and defense at all levels of modern war, *viz.*, nuclear, conventional, revolutionary/counterinsurgency. Some form of double-effect reasoning is necessary to balance the need for discrimination with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reasonable defense requirements. Walzer's version is promising: . . . "the intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims narrowly at the acceptable effect; the evil effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends, and, aware of the evil involved, he seeks to minimize it, accepting costs to himself" (p. 155). He applies it well in the overlooked question of sieges and blockades which may constitute "counter-value" warfare as much as air attacks on cities.

Walzer's book is particularly meritorious in two respects. First, its combined moral/legal approach permits extensive treatment of practical and normative dilemmas of modern war. Second, Walzer's use of historical cases lends credibility to his efforts to deal with the real issues as they have arisen. As indicated, the *jus ad bellum* sections do not sufficiently come to grips with the dilemmas of salvaging hard-earned legal limitations on force. Overall, the somewhat impressionistic character of the book leads to unevenness of treatment despite its elaborate organization. However, the book was not intended to be a comprehensive treatise and Walzer has succeeded in producing the kind of issue-oriented book he set out to write.

WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN
Georgetown University

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

City Employment in 1977 *prepared by the Governments Division, U. S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 20 pp. $.65.*

County and City Data Book 1977 *prepared by U. S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 456 pp. $19.50.*

County Government Employment in 1977 *prepared by the Governments Division, U. S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 17 pp. $.70.*

Dictionary of American History *by Michael Martin and Leonard Gelber. Totowa, N. J., Rowman and Littlefield, 1978. 714 pp. Cloth, $15.00; paper, $7.95.*

Evaluation Studies Review Annual, vol. 3 *edited by Thomas D. Cook et al. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1978. 783 pp. $29.95.*

The Municipal Year Book 1978 *prepared by the International City Management Association's Data Services Center. Washington, D. C., International City Management Association, 1978. 428 pp. $27.50.*

The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. XI, 1829–1832 *edited by Clyde N. Wilson. Columbia, S. C., University of South Carolina Press, 1978. 728 pp. $27.50.*

Policy Studies Review Annual, vol. 2 *edited by Howard E. Freeman. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1978. 749 pp. $29.95.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 12, 1977 *edited by Stein Rokkan. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1978. 288 pp. $18.50.*

Southeast Asian Affairs 1978 *prepared by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Exeter, N. H., Heinemann Educational Books, Inc., 1978. 324 pp. $21.50.*

State Government Finances in 1977 *prepared by the Governments Division, U. S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 65 pp. $1.40.*

The Statesman's Year-Book 1978–1979 *edited by John Paxton. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1978. 1696 pp. $25.00.*

Taxes, Jobs, and Inflation *edited by Margaret Thompson. Washington, D. C., Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1978. 160 pp. $5.95.*

Women and Society—Citations 3601 to 6000: An Annotated Bibliography *edited by JoAnn Delores Een and Marie B. Rosenberg-Dishman. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1978. 275 pp. $17.50.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cornell University Press


Robert H. Connery and Gerald Benjamin
Rockefeller of New York
Executive Power in the Statehouse
Rockefeller of New York

A sympathetic yet critical look at Nelson A. Rockefeller's performance as governor of New York–

Rockefeller of New York

Executive Power in the Statehouse

By ROBERT H. CONNERY and GERALD BENJAMIN

"Rockefeller loved to govern; he loved to get things done – and the authors have captured the flavor of that zest magnificently." –FRANK MACCHIAROLA, Professor of Political Science, The Graduate School, City University of New York.

This new book is at once a history of Nelson A. Rockefeller's fifteen-year governorship of the State of New York and, more importantly, a balanced assessment of his performance. Reviewing the major public projects initiated by the Rockefeller administration, the authors pinpoint the governor's successes and failures, and use them as a springboard for probing the limits of state executive power in the United States today. $15.00

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS Ithaca, New York 14850

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

P-H Political Texts

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AFRICAN POLITICS
Christian P. Potholm, II — Bowdoin College
1979 — 307 pp. — Paper $8.95

URBAN POLICY AND POLITICS IN A BUREAUCRATIC AGE
Clarence N. Stone — University of Maryland; **Robert K. Wheelan** — University of North Florida; **William J. Murin** — University of Wisconsin, Parkside
1979 — 399 pp. — Cloth $9.95

WHO'S RUNNING AMERICA, 2nd Ed., The Carter Years
Thomas R. Dye — Florida State University
1979 — 253 pp. — Paper $6.95

PUBLIC POLICY: Scope and Logic
Frederick M. Frohock — Syracuse University
1979 — 320 pp. (est.) — Cloth $11.95

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE METHODS
Robert A. Bernstein and **James A. Dyer** — both of Texas A&M University
1979 — 295 pp. — Paper $8.95

PUBLIC BUDGETING IN AMERICA
Thomas D. Lynch — Mississippi State University
1979 — 384 pp. (est.) — Cloth $15.95

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 5th Ed.
David S. McLellan — Miami University, Ohio; **Fred A. Sondermann** — Colorado College
William C. Olson — Rockefeller Foundation
1979 — 400 pp. — Cloth $8.95

CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 3rd Ed.
Abdul Aziz Said — The American University
1979 — 416 pp. (est.) — Cloth $13.95

THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT
Robert E. DiClerico — West Virginia University
1979 — 368 pp. (est.) — Paper $8.95

CASES IN CIVIL LIBERTIES, 3rd Ed.
Robert Cushman — New York University
1979 — 400 pp. (est.) — Cloth $9.95

INDIA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM, 2nd Ed.
Richard L. Park — University of Michigan; **Bruce Bueno de Mesquita** — University of Rochester
1979 — 205 pp. — Paper $7.95

POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES: Their Origin and Impact
Leon Baradat — Miracosta College
1979 — 337 pp. — Paper $8.95

AGE OF IDEOLOGY: Political Thought 1750 to Present, 2nd Ed.
Isaac Kramnick — Cornell University
1979 — 110 pp. — Paper $4.95

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL EXPERIENCE
David V. Edwards — University of Texas, Austin
1979 — 674 pp. — Cloth $14.95

CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5th Ed.
Robert Cushman — New York University
1979 — 768 pp. (est.) — Cloth $21.95

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 2nd Ed.
Walter E. Volkomer — Hunter College
1979 — 454 pp. — Paper $10.95

Prices subject to change without notice.

For further information, or to order or reserve examination copies, please write: Robert Jordan, Dept. J-493, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632.

Prentice-Hall

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe between the Superpowers

The Enduring Balance

A. W. DePorte

A thoughtful, informed analysis of Europe's recent past in the light of its history. It presents the distinctive thesis that the division of Europe into East and West and the relationship between the United States and Western Europe are both sound, firm, and likely to endure. A Council on Foreign Relations Book $18.50

The Politics of Faction

Christian Democratic Rule in Italy

Alan S. Zuckerman

Using the behavior of factions in Italy's Christian Democratic party as evidence, Zuckerman argues that political clienteles can be found within the political elites of many, if not most, countries—and not just in transitional societies. His book makes a significant contribution to our understanding not only of Italian politics but of political elites, political parties, political cleavages, and comparative politics. $18.50

Also available

The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record

Second edition, revised and enlarged

Volume 2: British-French Supremacy, 1914–1945

compiled, translated, and edited by J. C. Hurewitz

This volume examines the evolution between 1914 and 1945 of the international political system in the Middle East and North Africa, radically rearranged by the First World War and its settlement and again in the Second. Hurewitz once more provides essential background for understanding today's problems in the Middle East. $40.00

Now available in paper



The Military and Politics in Modern Times

On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers

Amos Perlmutter
Foreword by Samuel P. Huntington

"What makes this excellent book indispensable reading for all is the analytical framework Perlmutter has developed. He has provided the categories which will shape the debate in this field over the coming decade." —M. Crawford Young, *Political Science Quarterly* Cloth $17.50 Paper $6.95

The Ages of American Law

Grant Gilmore

"[These essays] convey a highly original, and personal, view of the development [of American law], and like the personality who set them down they are sharp, opinionated, and as pungent as cheddar."—*The New Republic*

"An excellent theoretical discussion that would be useful in any course on legal theory."—*Journal of Politics*
Cloth $12.50 Paper $3.95

Yale University Press
New Haven and London

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MACMILLAN PUBLISHING CO., INC.

866 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022

1979 Publication

An Introduction to American Government

Fourth Edition

ERWIN L. LEVINE, Skidmore College;
ELMER E. CORNWELL,
Brown University

352 pages approx. paper
ISBN 0-02-370310-5

Here is a concise, intensive, straightforward description and explanation of the major forces in American national government—*with special emphasis on constitutional principles as they relate to all formal and informal government agencies.*

The fourth edition has been rewritten, reorganized, and updated. • The PRESIDENCY chapter now includes a long and separate discussion on the important Executive Office of the Presidency • The CONGRESS chapter adds new discussion on the importance and power of Congressional staffwork • The COURTS chapter includes a new section on civil rights and liberties, especially freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and abortion • There is a case study of the CARTER ENERGY BILL • The BAKKE DECISION is included—*plus much more!*

For the first time, an **INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL** is available.

1979 Publication

Constitutional Law: A Textbook

Second Edition

BERNARD SCHWARTZ, Edwin D. Webb Professor of Law, New York University School of Law

480 pages approx. ISBN 0-02-408190-6

Professor Schwartz, one of the nation's leading academic commentators on the constitution, takes the law student through the dynamic field of constitutional law by explaining the significance of cases as they apply to • Judicial review • The federal system • Congressional power • The commerce clause • Executive power • Property rights • Criminal procedure • First amendment rights • Equal protection.

This is not a casebook but an important commentary on constitutional law that includes all of the important cases up to Summer 1978!

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1979 Publication

American Constitutional Law

Fifth Edition

MARTIN SHAPIRO, University of California, Berkeley;
ROCCO J. TRESOLINI, late of Lehigh University

816 pages approx. ISBN 0-02-409570-2

A successful text in the fields of *political science and pre-law* for many years, this book introduces significant court decisions ranging from Marbury v. Madison (1803) to the Bakke decision (Summer 1978). New cases presented in this fifth edition include • under THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: Barron v. Baltimore (1833); National League of Cities v. Usery (1976) • under FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS, AND ASSEMBLY: Buckley v. Valeo (1976) • under RACE DISCRIMINATION: Bakke v. Board of Regents, University of California (1978) • under THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION: Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976) • under CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Coker v. Georgia (1977) • under PRIVACY: a note on subsequent birth control and abortion cases.

1979 Publication

Handbook in Social Philosophy

ROBERT N. BECK, Clark University

220 pages approx. paper
ISBN 0-02-307208-0

This is a brief, descriptive guide to the major schools of thought or positions that are significant in the field of social and political philosophy. The book • describes nine positions: *Classical Realism, Positivism, Philosophical Liberalism, Utilitarianism, Idealism, Communism, Pragmatism, Existentialism, Analytic Philosophy* • covers, in each position, six central topics: *Man and Society, Social and Political Values, State Power and Authority, Law and Rights, Political Obligations, The Ideal of Justice.*

Each chapter concludes with a bibliographic essay, there is a glossary, and there are appendices on Platonism and on Fascism.

Other Outstanding Publications

The Pursuit of Happiness:

Government and Politics in America

JOHN A. MOORE, California State Polytechnic University;
MYRON ROBERTS, Chaffey College

1978 352 pages paper
ISBN 0-02-383310-6

This book relates American government and politics to the efforts of the ordinary citizen to pursue happiness in everyday life. Politics is examined not merely from a technical or functional viewpoint but as a sum of ideas, ideals, passions, and actions that engage a people.

Covering all topics normally presented in an introductory course in American government, the text explains both how government does work and how it should work.

An **INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL** is available.

The Relations of Nations

Fifth Edition

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN, Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor, Naval War College

1978 704 pages ISBN 0-02-351270-9

This fifth edition provides extended coverage of the increasing importance of developing nations as well as updated information on the civil war in Angola, the Arab-Israeli conflicts, China, and the financial crisis of the United Nations.

A glossary is new to this edition.

American Government:

Structure and Process

MICHAEL A. KRASNER, Queens College of the City University of New York;
STEPHEN G. CHABERSKI;
D. KELLY JONES

1977 390 pages paper ISBN 0-02-366250-6

Here is a "nuts and bolts" text that *really does* provide a full, factual, descriptive account of American government....leaving the instructor free to discuss the deeper questions of analysis and value!

An **INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL** by THOMAS SCISM of Eastern Illinois University is available.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CHANGING FACE OF AMERICAN POLITICS... From Wiley

STATE AND COMMUNITY GOVERNMENTS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

Charles Press & Kenneth VerBurg, *both of Michigan State University*

This comprehensive new text uses the framework of intergovernmental relations to examine the structure and processes of state and local government. It emphasizes that state and local governments are influenced by one another and the federal government and operate within a federal system. Public policy issues are integrated with chapter topics and the processes which produce them. Each chapter includes "Policy Boxes" or case studies which focus on specific policies of interest to students and teachers. A complete Teacher's Manual is available.
0 471 02725-1 Jan. 1979
approx. 500 pp. $12.95 (tent.)

PARTIES IN CRISIS
Party Politics in America

Ruth K. Scott, *Pepperdine University*, & Ronald J. Hrebenar, *University of Utah*

Here is a critical, up-to-date assessment of the present state of political parties. From this critical perspective, it explores the important but reduced role parties will play in the future; provides an historical perspective; analyzes interrelationships among parties, electoral laws, and institutions; examines and illustrates party organizations; and traces recently occurring changes in the electorate.
0 471 01796-5 Jan. 1979
311 pp. $12.95

URBAN POLICY GAME
A Simulation of Urban Politics

Thomas A. Henderson, *American Justice Institute*, & John L. Foster, *Southern Illinois University at Carbondale*

In this unique role-playing simulation of the budget and policy-making process of American cities, students get a close-up view of the many facets of local politics by adopting roles common in urban government and preparing an annual budget for a fictional city. The text is self-contained and highly flexible for any class-size, time, and physical setting.
0 471 03398-7 1978
137 pp. $6.95

FROM SOCIAL ISSUES TO PUBLIC POLICY

Robert Eyestone, *University of Minnesota*

A comprehensive analysis of when, how, and which social issues are translated into governmental action. Eyestone details numerous social issues and subsequent governmental response. He suggests the kind of result a citizen can reasonably expect from government and hypothesizes how government can be further sensitized to the issues involved.
0 471 24978-5 1978
197 pp. $6.95 paper

UNDERSTANDING MODERN GOVERNMENT
The Rise and Decline of the American Political Economy

Edward S. Greenberg, *University of Colorado at Boulder*

Here is a historical analysis of how a modern, large-scale, interventionist government developed in the U.S. from a radical Marxist perspective. It examines government policy in relation to the rise of the corporate economy and America's overall place in world capitalism.
0 471 02913-0 Jan. 1979
197 pp. $7.95 paper

To be considered for complimentary copies, write to Carol Luitjens, Dept. 3492. Please include course name, enrollment, and title of present text.

JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc.
605 Third Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10016

In Canada: 22 Worcester Road, Rexdale, Ontario
Prices subject to change without notice.

A 3492-02.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Announcing

A New Basic Text for American Government Courses

A MORE PERFECT UNION

INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

By *Samuel C. Patterson,* University of Iowa
Roger H. Davidson, University of California, Santa Barbara
Randall B. Ripley, Ohio State University

JUST PUBLISHED

THE DORSEY PRESS
Homewood, Ill. 60430

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW

Faction Politics

Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective

Frank P. Belloni and Dennis C. Beller



A systematic cross-national approach to political factionalism discussed in 15 original essays by noted political scientists. The conclusion provides generalizations about faction structure, activity, and consequences and the essence of political competition itself.

". . . factional politics, despite confusion about its precise meaning, is a critical aspect of politics, a political phenomenon very much in need of explication in our total understanding of the political system."

from the *Introduction*

Studies in International and Comparative Politics, #11

1978. 471pp. CIP. Hardcover $26.50

The United States in World War I:

A Selected Bibliography

Ronald Schaffer



"Interest in American involvement in World War I has again risen . . . 2902 entries in nine large sections subdivided by relevant subject headings . . . an excellent introduction, with explanatory notes for each section . . . a superb reference guide."

Library Journal, October 15, 1978

War/Peace Bibliography Series, #7

1978. 224pp. Index. CIP. Hardcover $21.50

Order from:

American Bibliographical Center Clio Press

Publisher of ABC POL SCI Reference Books
World Treaty Index

Riviera Campus, 2040 A.P.S., Box 4397, Santa Barbara, California 93103

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Grenville Clark Fund at Dartmouth College, Inc.
announces the winners of the second

GRENVILLE CLARK PRIZE

There were three recipients of the Grenville Clark Prize of 1978. They were awarded the Prize on October 20, 1978 in New York City.

* * *

CITATION

accompanying the award to

JACK GREENBERG

"Years ago he took on the job of legal defense of his country, and he does not cease to battle for all who have less than equal rights, personal freedom and security in the developing society of a young nation unique in its population of so numerous and varied antecedents. Many downtrodden, unrecognized, beaten or ignored have learned they have a champion in this man."

* * *

CITATION

accompanying the award to

THEODORE M. HESBURGH

"With an outpouring of energy and talent, he never ceases to reach out to help so that the individual may live with decency, liberty, dignity and freedom. He also asks of the nations of the world that they be conscious of their shortcomings and learn a way to bring all persons reassurance and hope for world peace based upon a harmony and understanding between the disparate peoples of this globe."

* * *

CITATION

accompanying the award to

SYDNEY KENTRIDGE

"Deeply aware of countless individual cases of severe oppression, many victims without recourse, he has advanced and fought without regard for self to rescue from annihilation or despair. He continues this work with combined courage, intelligence, skill, tenacity and success."

Members of the Board of Directors of
The Grenville Clark Fund of Dartmouth College, Inc.

F. William Andres	Leo Gottlieb	Louisa Thoron Peterson
Norman Cousins	Erwin N. Griswold	Robert H. Reno
E. Grey Dimond	Anthony Lewis	Elliot L. Richardson
Mary Clark Dimond	H. Carl McCall	John K. Schemmer
J. Chrys Dougherty	Jonathan Moore	Samuel R. Spencer, Jr.
	Dudley W. Orr	

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New from THE FREE PRESS

TIDES AMONG NATIONS
KARL W. DEUTSCH
Written over a quarter of a century, these essays show the evolution of Deutsch's thinking regarding the relationships between nationalism, internationalism, war, and peace.
341 pages/$17.95

TOWARDS PROFESSIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL THEORY
Macrosystem Analysis
MORTON A. KAPLAN
Examining the current state of international relations theory, Kaplan argues that the critical literature in the field is professionally substandard. The most systematic analysis of the art of criticism in the literature.
288 pages/$15.95

THE CORRELATES OF WAR: I
Research Origins and Rationale
Edited by J. DAVID SINGER
This volume, enumerating the political and intellectual origins of modern international war, is the first of a two-volume series growing out of Singer's long investigation into the correlates of war.
405 pages/$17.95

AFRICAN PROCONSULS
European Governors in Africa
Edited by L.H. GANN and PETER DUIGNAN
Sixteen biographical studies of Belgian, British, Portuguese, French and German governors in sub-Saharan Africa, introduced by essays on the wider problems of governorship, elite formation, and ideology of each colonial power.
548 pages/$29.95

ACCOUNTING FOR GENOCIDE
Victims—and Survivors—of the Holocaust
HELEN FEIN
"An extraordinary piece of work, a great book. . . . With the publication of this book, Helen Fein goes to the head of the ranks with Hannah Arendt and Raul Hilberg as the most important scholars of the Holocaust."
496 pages/$15.95 SIDNEY H. ARONSON

Now Available in Paperback

MAO'S CHINA
A History of the People's Republic
MAURICE MEISNER
432 pages/$6.95

THE WIDENING GULF
Asian Nationalism and American Policy
SELIG S. HARRISON
416 pages/$7.95

CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS
The Invisible Force in American Lawmaking
HARRISON W. FOX, JR. and SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND
224 pages/$5.95

Order from:

THE FREE PRESS
A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
100D Brown Street
Riverside, New Jersey 08370

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Distinguished studies in International Affairs

Russia's Road to the Cold War

Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945

VOJTECH MASTNY. "Mastny's study of the origins and first stages of the Cold War is meticulously researched and superbly written. . . . This book is a major new contribution to scholarship but beyond that needs to be read and absorbed by anyone seriously concerned with the vital problems of our security and well-being in a world of growing Soviet power."—*Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Visiting Scholar, The Johns Hopkins University.*
384 pages, $16.95

Victims of Politics

The State of Human Rights

KURT GLASER AND STEFAN T. POSSONY. "The current situation of 'man's inhumanity to man' is expertly documented in this impressive, historically based work. The authors go beyond graphic description and alarmism to an innovative series of constructive recommendations. . . . This encyclopedic work will serve . . . as a fundamental . . . reference on a vital topic of universal concern."—*Library Journal.*
584 pages, $35.00

Rousseau and Representation

A Study of the Development of His Concept of Political Institutions

RICHARD FRALIN. "Fralin says Rousseau's ambiguities or—as others would put it—inconsistencies are part of the evolution of his ideas. Initially, Rousseau acquiesced to representation, but later is his *Contrat,* he would not delegate sovereignty to representatives. Yet, Fralin tells us, Rousseau feared mass violence. . . . Since Rousseau is ambiguous, books like this demand attention."—*Library Journal.* 256 pages, $16.00

Socialism, Politics, and Equality

Hierarchy and Change in Eastern Europe and the USSR

WALTER D. CONNOR. In a systematic study of social, economic, and political stratification in contemporary Eastern Europe and the USSR, Walter D. Connor examines socialism's record on equality. Utilizing the broad range of national data now available, Connor provides a realistic picture of everyday life in the socialist countries and offers the first authoritative comparison of the socialist experience to that of life in the United States and Western Europe. 448 pages, $20.00

To order send check or money order to Dept. JN at the address below. Individuals must enclose payment, including $1.30 for postage and handling. Institutions may request billing.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Academy of Political Science

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Grayson Kirk
Chairman of the Board

Emilio G. Collado
Vice Chairman of the Board

Robert H. Connery
President

Thomas M. Macioce
Vice President and Treasurer

John V. Connorton
Secretary

Courtney C. Brown

Arthur F. Burns

Leland M. Goodrich

Eli S. Jacobs

Robert MacCrate

George B. Munroe

Alfred C. Neal

Edward L. Palmer

Mary G. Roebling

George T. Scharffenberger

Franz Schneider

Harold A. Stevens

John R. Stevenson

Alan H. Temple

Clarence C. Walton

Aaron W. Warner

HONORARY MEMBERS

Miguel Alemán

George W. Ball

Claude T. Bissell

Roberto de O. Campos

John Sherman Cooper

Arthur H. Dean

Milton S. Eisenhower

Luther Gulick

W. Averell Harriman

Oveta Culp Hobby

Jerome H. Holland

Lady Bird Johnson

Mary Lasker

John J. McCloy

W. Earle McLaughlin

Harold Macmillan

Charles Malik

Paul Martin

Jean Monnet

N. A. Palkhivala

Galo Plaza

Lord Roll of Ipsden, K.C.M.G., C.B.

Carlos P. Romulo

Dean Rusk

S.M. Sikri

Margaret Chase Smith

Sir Duncan Wilson, G.C.M.G.

The Academy of Political Science was founded in 1880 to promote objective, scholarly investigations of political, social, and economic problems. Through its conferences and publications it seeks to inform the public by presenting widely divergent views of these problems. It does not make specific policy recommendations.

In addition to the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, the Academy publishes the PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE twice a year at irregular intervals. Members receive both publications and invitations to all Academy conferences and functions.

Regular membership: One year, $16. Three years, $42. Student, $12 a year. Foreign postage, $2 additional per year.

Special membership: Contributing, $25. Sustaining, $35. Supporting, $50. Life, $300. Patron, $1,000 or more. Special members receive a certificate.

Contributions are tax deductible.

Dues are payable in advance. Checks should be made to the Academy of Political Science and mailed to 619 West 114th Street, Suite 500, New York, New York 10025.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED